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Abstract 
I 
Abstract 
Human Reliability Assessments (HRA) have been developed so designers and users can 
understand how likely it is for a human to make an error when using a product or 
system in the workplace.  This is called the reliability of the product.  Approximately 
twenty-six techniques exist to assess the reliability of an individual human in a process.  
However, often a team of people interact within a system and not just one individual on 
their own. Hence a new generation of HRAs is needed to assess the effects of teamwork 
on reliability.    
 
This EPSRC CASE studentship, supported by BAE systems, develops a prototype, 
which enables a designer to quantify and answer to the question: “If I allocate this team 
to execute that task in System X, how likely is it that they will succeed?”   
 
This prototype assumes that a process can be defined in the form of a flow diagram and 
that roles can be allocated to execute it.   Then, using one of those twenty-six 
techniques, individual reliabilities can be calculated.  These are then modulated, by 
considering how the team interaction affects the three core elements of Trust, 
Communication and Decision Making Power Distance.  This creates an ‘interactive 
reliability’ factor for each individual in the team. These individual reliability factors are 
combined according to the team architecture for the process in order to determine the 
overall team reliability factor.  
 
The methods of development include: stakeholder interviews; the evolution of 
requirements specification; sensitivity analysis; and a stakeholder review of the tool.  
The information from these analyses produced a model about team interaction and the 
requirements for the new tool together with statements and algorithms that need to be 
used in the new tool: ROCCI. 
 
This technique is useful for use in the early stages of the design process. The successful 
prototype can be extended into applications for operations and used to assess and adapt 
products and systems, which involve teams. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This research develops a “proof of concept” HRA tool prototype that assesses the 
reliability of a team of people.  This research is an EPSRC (Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council) CASE Study award with sponsorship from BAE Systems.  
 
Chapter One is an introduction to the issues that originally identified the problem.  It 
clarifies the limitations of the existing HRA tools and identifies why there is the need 
for conducting this research to developing a HRA tool, which would quantify the 
reliability factor of a team (Section 1.1).  The aims and objectives of the research are 
specified (Section 1.2), followed by a brief description of the methodology.  Chapter 
One concludes with an outline of the structure of the thesis (Section 1.3). 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Problem 
There are two aspects of human behaviour that are central to this thesis. The first is that 
human beings have an outstanding ability to make any system function well even in 
difficult and dangerous circumstances.  The second is that they can also make errors 
which cause the system to malfunction.  These are known as ‘human error’. It is 
precisely this dilemma which needs to be addressed by this HRA tool on team 
reliability.  This leads on to the presumption of this thesis, that systems need to be 
designed so that the human tendency to error is anticipated and so capable of being 
engineered out of the system.  This is a better solution than simply assigning people’s 
skills set to fit a system’s application.   
 
BAE systems had already sponsored an initial study, which investigated how a product, 
known as a capability, is developed (Ng et al., 2004c).  This also explored where HRA 
might fit into the process (Figure 1.1).  Then BAE Systems Advanced Technology 
Centre (ATC) initiated a second project that was to explore the use of HRA techniques 
across the military domain (Ng, 2003c), in particular those that are used within BAE 
Systems.   
 
The first task was to ascertain which HRAs were suitable and then determine which 
were actually being used.  In total, there are seventeen HRA techniques that are 
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applicable to individuals.  The ones available to BAE Systems were: HEART, 
SHERPA, HAZOPS, THEA and CHLOE.  These include both quantitative and 
qualitative methods.   
 
 
Figure 1.1: Capability Maturity Process, with HRA Highlighted (Ng, 
2003) 
 
There is a need for quantitative HRA techniques as:  
‘In safety critical systems and indeed complex systems, the customer 
is beginning to specify reliability levels.  There will be further reliance on 
the quantitative techniques of which there are only a limited number.’(Ng, 
2004b, p.6) 
 
An early stage in the project was to compare the efficiency and benefit of the four 
quantitative methods that were available to BAE Systems: HEART, CREAM Basic, 
CREAM Extended and Air Systems’ technique.  These four techniques can be put into 
two sets. The first set takes a high level approach, namely: HEART and CREAM Basic.  
The second set also considers the sub tasks, namely: CREAM Extended and Air 
Systems (Ng, 2004a).  The four techniques provided similar values for the reliability of 
the overall task assessed: (left engine failure during takeoff on a Eurofighter); but Air 
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Systems’ was the more reliable for predicting the reliability of the sub tasks, compared 
to CREAM Extended.  
 
HRA techniques have been developed for designers and users so they can assess and 
understand the technical difficulties of using a product or system.  Human error occurs 
when it is human action which is the ultimate cause of an incident and it is believed that 
the individual is culpable for causing the incident. Humans will inevitably make errors. 
The number of errors made (the reciprocal of this being the reliability) by  a system can 
be quite predictable, but the reliability of the human element of the task can vary. The 
human reliability is found using HRA techniques.  Designers should anticipate this 
variability when they design systems by seeking to reduce the likelihood of human error 
occurring.  This is done by designing the systems around the person, rather than placing 
the person into the system.  They should also create mechanisms by which errors can be 
resolved and rectified by feedback and review.  
 
BAE Systems want to move forward with their HRA techniques.  They wanted to 
provide a technique that deals with the dependency within a system operated by a team 
or teams.  They could see a benefit in team feedback. For example: If an operator is 
performing a repetitive task and makes an unconscious error the first time, it is likely 
that this error will be repeated each time.  It is not advisable to decrease the reliability 
for each repetition.   
 
There was, however, a second dimension to the dependency when there are multiple 
operators.  Some of the operators may perceive errors that are made by their colleague 
operators. They may be in a position to help correct the error and need to communicate 
how to rectify the situation or just execute the action themselves.  This team feedback 
has the potential to increase the reliability of the whole process.  Accounting for 
multiple operators is not this simple.  There are other factors that can affect the 
interaction of multiple operators. There is one HRA that looks at these factors, which is 
CHLOE (Miguel et al., 2002; Miguel & Wright 2002a).  But its limitation is that it is a 
qualitative, not a quantitative, technique. There was a gap in the HRA field for a 
quantitative collaborative technique and there was a distinct need for such a tool (Ng et 
al., 2004).   
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1.2 Aims and Objectives  
 
The aim of this research had two components.  The first and primary component was to 
develop a proof of concept prototype of a quantitative team HRA (THRA) tool.  This 
THRA tool is called ROCCI (Reliability of Collaborative Crew Interaction). The second 
component was to evaluate whether the process could be implemented further.   
 
To achieve these aims the work consisted of a number of objectives: 
1. To explore, using interviews with stakeholders, requirements based on current 
experience and future expectations 
2. To develop a model for team reliability using information from Objective One 
and produce team structures and algorithms for use in sensitivity analysis 
3. To carry out  sensitivity analysis on ROCCI algorithms 
4. To validate ROCCI concept through stakeholder reviews. 
 
Aspects of these objectives were approached using semi-structured interviews; selected 
case studies and sensitive analysis. 
 
The semi-structured interviews were for collecting information from the stakeholders.  
This method was used twice, once at the beginning of the study to provide information 
on what the stakeholders want from the tool developing the requirements specification 
and again at the end of the research when ROCCI was taken back to the stakeholders for 
their feedback on the tool.  
 
The Sensitivity Analysis was used to check the sensitivity of the algorithms underlying 
the quantitative method. 
 
The five guiding principles below are a starting point for this research.  It is through the 
acceptance and application of these principles that the reliability of individuals within 
teams can increase and so enhance the reliability of the whole team’s interaction when 
they are working together.  These are the five guiding principles for human performance 
as identified by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) (Davis, 2002, p.9): 
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1. People are fallible – even the best make mistakes 
2. Error-likely situations are predictable, manageable and hence preventable 
3. Organisational processes and values influence the behaviour of individuals 
4. People can achieve high levels of performance based largely on the 
encouragement and reinforcement received from leader, peers and subordinates 
5. Events can be avoided by understanding the root causes of mistakes and 
spreading the application of the lessons learned. 
 
These principles provide an insight into the background behind the decision by BAE 
Systems to explore further how to develop the HRA tools for teams. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
Chapter One is an introduction to the issues that originally highlighted a problem.  The 
research structure has two stages (Figure 1.2).   The development stage leads to the 
formulation of the team HRA tool, ROCCI.  The testing stage validates the benefits of 
ROCCI in applications.   
 
1.3.1 The Development Stage 
A literature review, Chapter Two, reveals and highlights the important topics that 
should be considered when developing a HRA technique.  Chapter Three is a 
description of methods used in the research.  Chapter Four produced the Requirements 
Specifications.  Understanding the requirements of the stakeholders are vital to 
producing a prototype that is suitable for future development.  Chapter Five is the 
development of various components. These are: the model for team reliability;  the 
initial development of ROCCI; and the algorithms and statements. 
 
Chp 1: Introduction 
6 
 
Figure 1.2: Model of Research Stages: Development and Testing 
 
1.3.2 The Testing Stage 
Chapters Six and Seven describe the stages of the testing of ROCCI with iterative 
development. Chapter Six is a sensitivity analysis of the algorithms.  Chapter Seven 
includes the stakeholder reviews of ROCCI.   
 
1.3.3 Conclusion 
Chapter Seven discusses the development of the team HRA tool (ROCCI): how it fits 
within HRA; reflects on the completion of the aims and objectives of the research; 
presents solutions to the limitations of ROCCI and suggests possible methods of further 
development. 
 
1.4 Summary 
Chapter One has provided an overview of the origins and structure of the thesis.  As 
indicated in Section 1.3, Chapter Two now turns to the literature review, which 
highlights the important topics that need to be considered when developing a HRA 
technique. 
 
Requirements Specification 
(Chapter 4) 
Create Model of Team 
(Chapter 5.2) 
Sensitivity Analysis 
(Chapter 6) 
Future Developments 
(Chapter 7.4) 
Stakeholder Review 
(Chapter 7.3) 
Development Testing 
Literature Review 
(Chapter 2) 
ROCCI 
(Chapter 5) 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
 
This literature review examines the main areas of research relevant to designing a HRA 
tool.  These are error classifications (Section 2.1), HRA techniques (Section 2.2), design 
life cycle (Section 2.3), team structures and attributes (Section 2.4) and ends with a 
summary of all the information that is taken forward to aid the further development of 
ROCCI (Section 2.5).   
 
2.1 Error 
After research into defining error Reason’s (1990) definition is the most concise, yet 
broad definition: 
 
‘Error will be taken as a generic term to encompass all those 
occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails 
to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failure cannot be attributed 
to the intervention of some chance agency.’  (Reason, 1990)  
 
Three elements of a system can produce an error: the task, the environment and the 
individual/people involved in performing the task.  When considering human error all 
these elements are important.  An adverse environment could be the cause of the error. 
The user of the system or the human at the sharp end can either cause an error to occur 
or be the symptom of the error (Reason, 2000).  There are often several antecedents to 
an error, (Moray, 2000; Shappell & Wiegmann 2001).  In the past, human error has 
been seen as the largest cause of incidents (Salminen & Tallberg, 1996), but recently  
organisational factors have featured prominently as the main contributor to error (Cullen 
2001; Gehman et al., 2003). 
 
2.1.1 Classifications of Error 
There are several approaches to classify error.  Kletz (1999) concentrates on five classes 
of errors that a human can make.  Rasmussen (1982) concentrates on human cognition 
and its affects on human error.  Whereas Reason (2000) shows how the person and the 
system are both present in causes of incidents.  The many taxonomies demonstrates that 
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errors can be multifaceted and that deciding up on what error has occurred and why, can 
become complex.  Below are some of these classifications.   
 
Kletz (1999) classified five errors of actions:   
Mistakes are errors that occur because the correct procedure is not known and the 
intention of the action is wrong. 
Violations are actions that are known to be wrong, but are thought of as being the most 
suitable action at the time given with the information known. 
A mismatch occurs when the task and the cognition of the operator are not compatible, 
for example, the operator could be overloaded or may have established a habit and 
cannot change their viewpoint when new information is offered. 
A slip occurs when the intention is correct but that action is wrong, for example 
pressing the wrong knob on a control panel.  
A lapse is where an action is missed, e.g. due to an interruption.  
 
There is cognitive reasoning behind these errors.  But there could be other causes for the 
errors, which would not be errors of cognition.  In his classification, Kletz does not 
discuss the effect of the environment, organisation, or equipment issues on the error.  
His is a general classification, best used as guidance for understanding different forms 
of human error.  This is general and high level, it is not sufficiently precise.  The 
discipline has moved to a finer level of focus, as seen in Norman (1988). 
 
2.1.1.1 Norman  
Norman (1988) errors have distinct behavioural, contextual and conceptual reasoning.  
This more detailed classification makes the errors easier, than Kletz’s, to detect and 
differentiate their causes.  Consequently, preventing these errors is simpler (Strauch, 
2002). 
Capture errors:  a frequently done activity takes control over the intended one.  For 
example; automatically driving from work to home, when the intention was to go to the 
dentist.  
Description errors:  when similar objects become confused or an action is based on a 
wrong object.  This is because the cognitive description of the object is ambiguous, 
often due to tiredness and lack of concentration. For example; putting the coffee in the 
fridge and the milk in the cupboard. 
Chp 2: Literature Review 
9 
Data-driven errors: ‘data driven’ behaviour is an automatic response to sensory 
information.  These actions can interfere with pre-planned behaviour and lead to errors.   
Associative activation errors: internal thoughts and associations can trigger unwanted 
actions.  For example sending a text message to a person mentioned in the text rather 
than the intended receiver.  
Loss-of-activation errors: this occurs when some part of a process is forgotten due to 
decay in the ‘activation’ of the goal.  For example, forgetting the reason why you have 
entered a room.  
Mode errors: a computer or machine has different modes.  The operator believes it is 
in one of its mode but it is actually in another. This causes incorrect data input and 
confusion. For example, trying to open a presentation in a word processing programme.   
 
2.1.1.2 Rasmussen  
Rasmussen (1982) wanted to address ‘human functions and capabilities and their 
limitations’ (p.312).  Previously, physical errors had been the focus of reliability 
assessments with little consideration of the cognitive aspects.   
Skill based errors: are errors related to variability of force, space or time; e.g. pushing 
something too hard. 
Rule based errors: are errors, such as classification, recognition, or recall, that relate to 
cognitive mechanisms. 
Knowledge based error: are errors in planning, prediction and evaluation.   
 
The level of performance for each error increases down the list.  Skills are actions that 
can be learned by rote.  To apply rules the user must be able to interpret situations and 
apply the appropriate rule.  Knowledge based performance is applying learnt skills and 
rules to a novel situations, with an understanding of the consequences.  This kind of 
knowledge cannot be taught.   
 
2.1.1.3 Reason  
There is growing evidence that accidents are not always due to human error.  Fujita and 
Hollnagel (2004) found that more accidents occur due to error-prone situations and 
error-activities, than error-prone people.  Reason (2000) resolved this change in 
thinking by presenting two approaches to error.  
 
Chp 2: Literature Review 
10 
The first is the person approach where the focus of the error is on unsafe acts 
performed at the sharp end. The person approach can be classified as ‘active failures’.  
These are errors of actions, such as the Kletz’s classification, that are ‘direct and shortly 
lived’.   
 
The second is the system approach which acknowledges that humans are fallible, so 
system defences, i.e. barriers, should be used to prevent the occurrence of errors.    
Similarly the system approach is also referred to as ‘latent conditions’.  These are the 
factors that can influence how the human interacts with the system.  Errors arising from 
decisions that affect the design of the system, the maintenance of the equipment and the 
ethos of the company, which can either produce ‘error provoking conditions or long 
lasting holes or weaknesses in the defences’, making the system basically unsafe 
(Dekker, 2001).   
 
Organisational errors can be deep rooted and, even once a disaster has occurred, they 
can be hard to eradicate.  The unfortunate disasters of the Challenger and Columbia 
NASA space craft are linked (Gehman et al., 2003).  After Challenger, the 
organisational issues that came about from the Presidential report were thought to be 
rectified; however, it was similar organisational factors that were the cause for the 
Columbia incident.  Reasons model of error (Figure 2.1) is like a piece of cheese with 
holes. The block of cheese is the environment and system in which the actions occurs.  
The holes are the potentials for errors to occur, such as unsafe acts and psychological 
precursors.  The number and size of holes are the possibility of latent and active errors 
to occur.  Defences, such as double checking, ‘undoing mistakes’ and safety procedures 
are represented as the bulk of the cheese. Where there are fewer holes there are more 
defences in place to reduce the error from occurring.  An error will only go through the 
whole system if all the holes are lined up and there is no prevented by a barrier.  There 
is always the possibility for an error to occur. 
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Figure 2.1: Reason’s (1990) Model of Error 
 
2.1.1.4 Systematic Error  
The decisions that designers and engineers make can have a long-term effect on a 
system.  Decisions made in the design process cannot easily be revised once the piece of 
equipment is in use.  Similarly, once a training programme is in place each person going 
through that training programme will respond to the same situation in a similar way.  
Therefore, if the environment, equipment and individual are constant then the likelihood 
of an error recurring is high.  Reason called these types of errors systematic errors.  An 
example of systematic error is the Ladbroke Grove train collision (Cullen, 2001).  
Between August 1993 and 5 October 1999 there had been eight Signals Passed at 
Danger (SPADs) on the railway signal SN109.  These incidents had been recorded and 
preventative action had been suggested.  But the organisation had decided not to 
implement them.  On 5th October 1999 a Thames Trains train driver passed a signal at 
danger (SPAD) resulting in a collision with a First Great Western Train: 31 people lost 
their life.   
 
Current emphasis for error and the reasons for disaster have been on organisational 
issues, as shown in accident reports: Challenger (Anon, 1986), Columbia (Gehman et 
al., 2003), Bhopal (Cullen, 2001; Gupta, 2002) Ladbroke Grove (Cullen, 2001).  This 
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augmentation of organisational and cultural culpability has been justified by recent 
forms of classifying error, such as Reasons Latent Failures.  Due to the current 
emphasis on organisational issues, there has been little research into understanding the 
effects of team collaboration on reliability.  There is then an opportunity to investigate 
further this perspective of error. 
 
2.1.2 Individual / Human Error  
Human error occurs when human action is the real cause of an incident and it is 
believed that the individual is culpable for the incident. Human error is the main cause 
for accidents, at a level of 60-90% (Degani & Wiener, 1993; Davis, 2002; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2001).  Who is the human that creates an error?  Within the lifecycle of a 
system there are many people involved who could create an error.  The initial designers 
of the system may have inadvertently designed an aspect that will often allow an 
accident to occur (Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2: Example of a Design Not a User Error 
 
Human errors, such as reacting inappropriately to a warning signal, misreading dials, or 
using the wrong controls, are not always the fault of the user at the sharp end.  There are 
others involved in the design and use of the system. Moray (2000) model of error 
(Figure 2.3) shows that there are many conditions that affect a situation and can result in 
an error.  Humans will inevitably make errors.  Designers should anticipate these when 
designing systems.  This reduces the likelihood of errors and creates a means to resolve 
Rucksack Waistband Design Fault 
 
Recently I have been backpacking around New Zealand.  I had just brought myself a new 
rucksack, which is modern, comfortable with many pockets and clever devices for the 
experienced backpacker.  This rucksack had been developed over many years and has 
come along way from the metal frame, bag and two arm holds that is sitting in my attic.   
 
However, one day the waistband broke on me.  I was not sure what had happened (which is 
often the case in the initial stages after a disaster).  Had I misused the bag in some way?  
Been to rough with it?  It should be sturdy.  I wasn’t sure if I needed to be responsible and 
mend the rucksack myself, as if I had caused it to break, or to take it back to the shop and 
ask for a new one.   
 
As I had nothing to loose, I went to the shop.  There they instantly replaced the waistband.  
During the design and testing stages of the rucksack, a fault had gone undiscovered.  A 
pivot joint was a weak spot on the rucksack and was likely to break.  This had happened to 
other people before, and the manufacturer had investigated the problem and new 
waistbands were to be installed. I had not done anything unexpected to the rucksack, 
although I was the last person to touch the rucksack before it broke. Often the end user is 
not the cause of the error.                                     [Author’s own field research 2008] 
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errors.  Employers can also reduce errors by ensuring that the environment is 
appropriate to good working conditions.  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Moray’s (2000) Model of Error 
 
When an individual performs a procedure or part of a procedure there are several 
aspects that are present.  Each procedure is made up of a series of tasks, as can be 
identified by creating a task analysis.  These tasks are often hierarchical.  Each task has 
a goal, which leads towards the overall goal for the whole procedure.  Completing the 
tasks and achieving the goals correctly and efficiently would make an individual or 
team very reliable.  Errors can be made at any or all stages of the procedure.  Some 
errors may be rectifiable or insignificant.  Other errors may go unnoticed.  Several 
insignificant errors together may create a significant error in response.   
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Humans are not always the villains in a system.  If they cause up to 90% of errors, then 
it would appear to be a good idea to remove the human from the system.  However, 
humans can also be the hero in preventing a disaster, 
 
‘People in complex systems create safety.  They make it their job to 
anticipate forms of and pathways toward failure.  They invest in their own 
resilience and that of their system by tailoring their tasks, by inserting 
buffers, routines, heuristics, tricks, double-checking, memory aids.’ 
(Dekker,2001, p.206).   
 
A system, even one that has cutting edge technology, cannot cope with having to 
interpret new and unexpected information (Mital et al., 1994).  In these cases, a human 
can interpret information, creating new ideas that deal with unique and possibly volatile 
situations.   The human is able to decide on the appropriate action and possibly prevent 
a disaster.   
 
Due to free choice, humans are able to cause disasters deliberately.  These actions are 
sabotage they are not classified as an error. Only actions that are non-malicious shall be 
discussed in this document.  
 
2.1.3 Summary  
Many accidents have been blamed on human error.  However, there are various 
antecedents to an error occurring.  These include aspects of organisation, environment 
and design. Kletz, Norman, Rasmussen and Reason have classified what errors occur: 
whether they are due to human actions, psychological dysfunction, or system issues.  
Understanding the type of errors humans make and that this is predictable, improves 
design of man-machine interfaces (MMI), training, manuals and organisations.  There 
has been thorough investigation into individual and system errors.  But the description 
of  team errors has been deficient.  This provides an opportunity for further study into 
team errors. 
 
2.2 HRA Techniques 
Below is a history of HRA and account of HRA methods.   
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2.2.1 HRA Background 
  
‘People’s knowledge is limited, their awareness is finite and multiple 
goals may compete for their attention … the point in learning about human 
error is not to find out where people went wrong.  It is to find out why their 
assessments and actions made sense to them at the time.’ (Dekker, 2001, 
p.255)  
 
A human interacting with a system can be analysed to determine which errors could 
occur, what factors could help mitigate these errors and the probability of these errors 
occurring.  This is done by using HRA techniques.  HRAs are qualitative and 
quantitative measurements of the risks and errors that can occur in a system because of 
human actions, not by a fault of the system.  HRA have been developed for designers 
and users to understand the technical difficulties of using a product or system.  As, no 
matter how good the product is, it is impossible to make the product error proof: 
humans are inevitably fallible.   
 
As a field of research HRA has been around since the 1960s (Shorrock et al, 2005).  
Predicting the probability of error can be a controversial topic because probabilities are 
based on random behaviour and humans are not random; some factors that can affect 
them are consistent (Redmill, 2002) e.g. training.   HRA techniques have accounted for 
factors that influence the error probability in the form of "performance shaping factors” 
(PSFs).  The task, the individual and the environment define the performance shaping 
factors.  There are three main approaches to HRA (Kirwan, 2002): 
• Human error identification – what can go wrong? 
• Human error quantification – how often will a human error occur? 
• Human error reduction – how can human error be prevented from occurring or 
its impact on the system reduced? 
 
HRA analyse systems (with varying degrees of accuracy), determine the errors that 
could occur within the system, what factors could help mitigate these errors and the 
probability of these errors occurring.  Below are the different HRA methods that are 
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available to BAE Systems.  This is not an exhaustive list but it covers those methods for 
which information is available.  One of the interviewees did explain that air systems had 
created their own HRA method but that information is not currently available to the 
investigator and so has been excluded from the current research.  
 
Figure 2.4: The 10 HRA Stages (Kirwan, 1994) 
 
The methods below range from 1st generation techniques through to 3rd generation 
techniques, these are: THEA, CHLOE, SHERPA, TRACEr, ASHRAM, HFACS, 
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HEROS, TAFEI, HEART, CREAM basic and CREAM extended.  The process and 
usability for each method shall be described. There are ten stages that can assessed by 
HRAs (Figure 2.4).  One of the developments that occurred with the second generation 
is that more stages were covered by each technique.   
 
2.2.2 First Generation Techniques 
The first generation of HRA techniques began in the 1970s, e.g. SHERPA (Embrey, 
1986)  and HEART (Williams, 1986). These are generic prospective techniques.  They 
assess physical, organisational and psychological aspects, but cognitive reasoning is not 
used to explain the possible errors.   
 
2.2.2.1 Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) 
(Embrey, 1986): 
SHERPA is a mature, computerised method that uses questions to identify where an 
error may occur (Ng, 2003a,b,c; Ng, 2004).  The questions address both psychological 
and external errors.  The output is a list of errors that could occur and why they occur.  
The assessor uses this list to mitigate the errors.  SHERPA is a good technique as a 
variety of errors are considered and it also accounts for error recovery.  The computer 
based questionnaire means that the technique is simple to use.  But the psychological 
terms need comprehension and can lead to different assessors generating different 
results.  The assessor must also have a good understanding of the system.  No Human 
Error Probabilities (HEPs) are produced by SHERPA, therefore it would be hard to 
adapt to a quantitative method.  
 
2.2.2.2 Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) (Williams, 
1986): 
HEART is a commonly used technique, as it is quick and simple to use.  The first step is 
to choose the ‘generic task’ statement, which will assign the scenario with a baseline 
HEP.  The assessor then works through lists of statements of PSFs, choosing the most 
relevant.  The statements have multiplying factors, which vary depending on the 
importance and severity of the error forcing condition.  The baseline HEP and the 
multiplying factors are then calculated to produce a final HEP for that scenario.  The 
severity and importance of the error forcing  conditions are clear from the multiplying 
factor.  So the assessor can concentrate their efforts to reduce error on these areas.  The 
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statements do not need human factors experience to decipher and so the method is 
usable by all.  The major concern with this technique is that the probabilities and 
multiplying factors are not always representative of the situation.  It has been 
commented on that the final probabilities could be out by a factor of 2.   The statements 
used means that there is room for developing this method to include team working 
errors.  As it is currently used at the moment it would be easier to encourage the use of 
the new tool in the workplace.  
 
2.2.3 Second Generation Techniques 
Second-generation techniques such as, TAFEI, TRACEr, CREAM, THEA, have 
improved the reliability of the HRA for individuals.  These techniques are often 
contextual and consider many influences of human reliability and error, such as 
organisational, environmental, psychological and cognitive issues. 
 
These second generation techniques have been widely used, but they have not been 
validated.  It was becoming apparent that these techniques were not fulfilling their 
potential. Dougherty (1990) criticised the first generation techniques.  The points that he 
believed should be addressed were (Dougherty, 1990, p.294-296):  
The necessary stochastic nature of things; the tool should be compatible with a 
probabilistic framework. 
The necessary time-dependence; including the operators perception of time and their 
anticipation of events.   
The need to model complexity; there are many factors that influence human behaviour 
and they all should be modelled. 
The need for better error analysis; the error modes, types, mechanisms and causes 
must be identified more realistically 
The making of peace with planning; planning is an important element of error 
mitigation. 
The integral incorporation of influences; ad hoc changes to techniques should not be 
made, as all aspects of reliability should be designed into the tool 
An extended paradigm:  
The need for validation; models should be validated. 
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These comments made the field review the techniques and provided inspiration for a 
new aim to find a method that fulfils Dougherty’s criteria and included the most recent 
knowledge of error and human behaviour (Redmill, 2002).   
 
2.2.3.1 Task analysis for error identification (TAFEI) (Baber & Stanton, 1994, 
1996): 
TAFEI qualitatively predicts erroneous interactions between people and machines.  It 
consists of an HTA displaying human activity; State-Space Diagrams describing 
machine activity; and Transition Matrices that determine potential for errors that occur 
at the interaction of the human and machine.   
 
2.2.3.2 Technique for Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors. 
(TRACEr) (Shorrock & Kirwan, 2002): 
TRACEr is a method that is designed to be used in the air traffic control (ATC) 
industry.  This immediately limits its used as a basis for a collaborative tool, however it 
is a modern, second generation technique with few shortcomings.  This is a computer 
based tool that uses statements, flow diagrams and tables.  Statements and taxonomies 
are used to describe the context of the system, production of errors and the recovery of 
errors.  These taxonomies are ATC oriented.  The context of the system produces 
performance shaping factors (PSF) that are unique to the particular situation.  Once the 
errors have been established the cause, including cognitive and behavioural  error 
modes, are ascertained so that appropriate mitigating factors can be utilised.  The 
method can be used retrospectively and prospectively which facilitates learning 
throughout the lifecycle of the system.   
 
2.2.3.3 Aviation Safety Human Reliability Analysis Method (ASHRAM) (Miller, 
2001): 
A second generation technique, ASHRAM, is developed by Sandia National 
Laboratories.  It is designed for use in aviation both prospectively and retrospectively.  
The method uses a cognitive model that helps to categorise rather than describe 
behaviour, consequently human factors expertise is not required.  Assessors follow the 
step-by-step method of ASHRAM.  Firstly the system and scenario are described and 
the error forcing contexts (based on the scenario and PSFs) are identified.  Either a 
singular or all deviant scenarios are found, these are recorded and mitigation of the 
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errors can occur.  The ASHRAM method does not measure the severity of the errors, 
nor contains HEPs, so developing this tool into a quantitative method could be 
challenging. 
2.2.3.4 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2001): 
HFACS is a retrospective and prospective tool for military and commercial aviation.  It 
contains a hierarchy of taxonomies which the assessor uses to decipher what errors may 
or have occurred.  Reason’s model of accident causation (Reason, 1990) creates the 
final section of this taxonomy.  Although most of the errors are for an individual, Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) is considered.  This is a taxonomy and so the method 
does not promote error mitigation, it just highlights the state of the error.  As there is 
currently only a  taxonomy the method requires great development to produce a 
quantitative method that can guide engineers to improved design.  
 
2.2.3.5 Human Error Rates and Optimising System (HEROS) (Richei, Hauptmann 
& Unger, 2001): 
HEROS uses fuzzy set theory, a complicated mathematical technique,  to produce 
HEPs.  The method is computer-based to increase its usability.  There are several steps 
to the analysis.  Initially the system and context of use are described resulting in a task 
analysis.  This is then used to produce fault trees.  The fault trees combined with PSF 
information are manipulated by HEROS to produce HEPs.  This is a thorough technique 
and considers organisational, environmental and psychological aspects of the system.  It 
also takes into account the severity of the errors to aid the design of mitigation factors.  
As the technique it is often used as a ‘black box’ but it can be used to support 
qualitative techniques, by providing quantitative output.  There is no consideration of 
human-human interaction so there is little scope for development into a collaborative 
tool.  The complexity of the fuzzy set theory would also produce difficulties for 
developing the technique.   
 
2.2.3.6 Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel, 
1998): 
CREAM can be divided into two sections basic and extended.  CREAM basic focuses 
on the environment in which the operator works rather than human error.  The first step 
of CREAM is to produce a task analysis of the system.  Then ‘Common Performance 
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Conditions’ (CPC) are determined.  CPCs provide information of the organisation, 
environment and working conditions.  This information is used to determine the 
‘probable control mode’, this is the reliability of the overall working conditions.  There 
are four modes: scrambled, opportunistic, tactical and strategic, each mode has a 
probability of a failure occurring, giving the CREAM Basic probability. This is a simple 
technique and does not take long to perform, it provides an estimation of the overall 
reliability of the system. 
 
CREAM Extended focuses more on the human, but the above information is the basis 
for the technique.   Each task performed is assigned a cognitive activity, e.g. observe, 
from this types of errors can be ascribed and each error has a probability.  These 
probabilities are then weighted for the effect of the control mode and the CPCs.  Several 
tasks can be collected together to produce an overall probability.  This probability is 
more specific to the scenario chosen than CREAM Basic.   CREAM Extended is 
complex, time consuming and experience is needed to allocated the cognitive activities 
correctly.  However it can be tailored to different industries.  Because each task can be 
done separately the assessor can ascertain where there is a high risk of error, but the 
severity of the error is not shown.   It could be possible to extend the CPCs and 
cognitive activities to involve team working.   
 
2.2.3.7 Techniques for Human Error Assessment (THEA) (Wright, Fields, 
Harrison and Wright, 2001): 
THEA is a technique that has been developed by the Dependable Computing Systems 
Centre (DCSC) at York university.  It is a tool that is designed to be used by system 
engineers, therefore, human factors expertise is not required.  This tool is to facilitate 
the evolution of the safety, usability and functionality of design requirements, for this 
reason is should be used early in the design lifecycle.  THEA consists of six stages 
(Figure 2.5).  
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Figure 2.5: The THEA Process. 
 
System Definition; to improve the understanding of  the system being design. 
Scenario & Task Description; a) To improve the understanding of how the system will 
be used.  b) To facilitate the system designers representation of the system statements  
that have been produced, these provide hints so that stages 1 and 2 can be expressed 
completely.  
Structure the Scenario; a decomposition of the system into goals. 
  Error Identification, Error Consequence                improve the understanding 
  Underlying model of “human information processing”     of how errors can evolve.  
 
THEA uses Norman’s 1988 model of human information processing (Figure 2.6) to 
evaluate the errors that may be due to the human in the system.  The system designer 
answers questions on four stages of the model; 
• Goals, triggering and initiation 
• Plans 
• Performing actions 
• Perception, interpretation and evaluation. 
The answers should provide a list of possible errors that may occur or situations that 
may cause errors.  From this barriers can be introduced into the system to prevent errors 
from occurring or to reduce the severity of the errors.   
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Figure 2.6: Norman (1988) Human Information Processing Model. 
 
THEA is a qualitative HRA, this is consistent with being used at the beginning of the 
design lifecycle.  THEA concentrates on cognitive errors and will not discover 
behavioural errors, or account for joint decision making (Topic V, 1997).  For THEA to 
be usable goals and plans for the system must be available.  If plans are available, 
THEA can produce coherent results with the need for expertise in human factors.  
 
For the purposes of creating a tool to predict team error the statements produced could 
be adapted to account for team working.  However there is no possibility of turning this 
method into a quantitative method.  Also, the DCSC has already developed THEA into 
CHOLE, which is a collaborative HRA technique.   
 
2.2.3.8 Third Generation Techniques 
Often a team of people interact with a system, not just an individual.  There is now a 
call for a new generation of HRA to account for when a product is used within a team 
(Miguel & Wright 2002a).  The interactions between the team members can increase 
and decrease the reliability of each individual and overall the reliability of the team.  
Some of the PSFs of team reliability are communication, trust and resource 
management (Sasou & Reason, 1999).   
 
CHLOE (Miguel & Wright., 2002a) has been developed to take into account the effect 
of teams on reliability.  Miguel et al (2002a; 2002b), wrote ‘collaborative errors may be 
caused by factors such as a lack of [situational awareness, SA], misunderstandings 
between participants, conflicts and failures of co-ordination’ (p.4).  CHLOE is a 
qualitative method and in a time when corporate manslaughter is becoming more 
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prominent and system reliability is measured in probabilities then human reliability also 
needs to be quantitative. 
 
2.2.3.9 A Technique for Analysing Collaborative Systems (CHLOE) (Miguel & 
Wright, 2002a): 
CHLOE is designed to identify failures in collaborative work, whether this is direct 
human – human communication or human – computer – human communication.  Like 
THEA, CHLOE consists of four stages; 
• Scenario Description  
• Task Identification 
• Error Analysis, produced using a list of questions 
• Design Suggestions. 
 
Sequence diagrams are used to ascertain the interaction that occurs between the agents 
and the system.  The assessor then answers questions on the possible breakdown in 
communication within the system.   CHLOE is to be used by system engineers and so 
psychological and human factors experience is not required.  Error analysis and design 
suggestions should be performed concurrently.  The assessor creates design solutions 
through conducting the assessment and inputting this information into a table similar to 
that in (Table 2.1). 
 
 No behavioural errors are considered, the results are qualitative, do not consider the 
severity of the errors and so the safety of the system cannot be determined. 
 
Table 2.1: CHLOE Consequences and Design Issues Table 
 
 
Questions Consequences Design Issues 
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2.2.4 Summary 
Using the requirements that have come out from the interviews and discussions with 
employees at BAE Systems the techniques that are most suitable to be developed in to a 
tool that can be used to look at collaborations must have the following qualities: 
• They must be quantitative methods 
• They must be prospective methods 
• They must be simple for engineers to use 
• They should not be time consuming 
• They must be able to fit into the engineers current method of working.   
There are only a few quantitative methods these are HEROS, HEART and CREAM.  
All of these are prospective methods.  HEROS is not suitable for further development as 
the fuzzy set theory is beyond the capabilities of the MPhil and the researcher.  The 
technique needs to be one that engineers can use easily.  CREAM basic is a simple 
technique and will not provide any suggests to improve design of equipment, CREAM 
extended is complex and time consuming, engineers are unlikely to create time to fit 
this method into their designing of equipment.  Conversely, CREAM would be a good 
method to use as some research has been done on developing CREAM in to a 
collaborative technique (Smith, 2003).  Hollnagel has developed high-quality models 
that consider a large proportion of the factors that produce errors.  These should be 
considered in the future. 
 
HEART is a quantitative method that is easy to use and helps engineers to find where 
the highest areas of risk are.  This is essential if the tool is to aid development rather 
than just provide overall probabilities.  HEART contains many statements and adding 
more may encumber the list and reduce the usability of the tool.  Another important 
aspect of HEART that needs to be contemplated is the probabilities used.  Currently 
these are not accurate and have not been validated.   HEART is used by some 
employees at BAE SYSTEMS and so using this method will reduce the amount of 
learning and integration time required to ensure use of the new tool. HEART is chosen 
as the method that will be the foundation for the new tool.  
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2.3 Design Life Cycle 
Knowing how a product is designed and managed throughout its lifecycle will provide 
understanding of the stakeholders of the product, the various stages that a product will 
go through and how human factors will fit into the design process.   The design lifecycle 
process is broken down into four stages: 1) product definition (Section 2.3.1.1), 2) 
product design development (Section 2.3.1.2), 3) product acceptance (Section 2.3.1.3) 
and 4) post design (Section 2.3.1.4). There are generic models (Section 2.3.2.1) that are 
used to plan the lifecycle management.  These are, the spiral model, the waterfall model 
and the ‘V’ diagram,.  BAE Systems Air System BU has created a model to aid the 
design for human usability (Section 2.3.2.2).  All the models will be portrayed and how 
the type of HRA that would be appropriate to used at each stage will be discussed.   
 
2.3.1 Lifecycle Stages  
Below are the descriptions of the lifecycle stages. 
 
2.3.1.1 Product Definition  
The first stage instigates the production of information.  Before any product can be 
designed the need must first be defined.  This will enable the designer/engineer to 
understand the context in which the product will be used, ensuring that the correct 
product is designed.  The need is defined in terms of: 
• The role, task and context that the product will be used in 
• The behaviour, functionality and interfaces of the product 
• The engineering qualities that the product must have 
• The programme imperatives in which the product will be designed. 
 
Once the wider context has been determined, the product concept requirements need 
specifying.  It is important that the product and context definitions are set to ensure a 
smoother design process.  If the design requirements are not properly explored the 
product will not suit the use and so design changes will be needed.  The later on in the 
design process changes occur, the more costly they are to implement. Aspects that 
should be considered are: 
• the definition of the function and decomposition of the product 
• the definition of the roles of each component  
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• the definition of the interface required 
• the capabilities of the skills and technologies. 
 
The information of the product available at this stage is general.  The environment and 
when the product will be used is understood.  The type of HRAs that can be used at this 
stage are qualitative, they will be able to highlight major risk areas, but will not be able 
to define the risk as a level of probability. The product definition stage is the ‘early 
stages’ of the design process and it is also referred to as the ‘front end’. Only when the 
concept has been defined and the boundaries set can the design process begin.   
 
2.3.1.2 Product Design Development 
Once the product requirements are known, the designer has sufficient information to 
generate an initial design and assess it for its appropriateness to the context of use.  The 
product is tested throughout the design process to guarantee that the product is reliable 
and that it can integrate with other systems. This is an iterative process consisting of the 
following steps: 
• Creation of the detailed design 
• Creation of the drawing set 
• Analysing the behaviour and performance of the design  
• Analysing the robustness of the product throughout its manufacture, operability, 
environment tolerance/impact,  and supportability 
• Assessing the configuration management. 
 
To ensure that the product stays true to the original design specifications some aspects 
of the design are reviewed at the end of the design stage: 
• Conformance to drawings 
• Material traceability 
• Process quality. 
 
Designing a product can take many years and there may be changes to the personnel 
working on the product, so it is important that all designs, modifications and 
justifications are recorded.  At the end of this stage the final product has been designed, 
it is functioning and can be integrated within a system.  All predictive HRA techniques 
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are suitable for use at this stage of design.  Qualitative and quantitative methods will 
provide appropriate information that can beneficially affect the design.  It is important 
to use HRA recurrently throughout the design process as changes in the design may 
affect the human reliability in unforeseen manners and an improvement in reliability 
can be shown as the design progresses.  
 
2.3.1.3 Product Acceptance 
Before the product can be put into regular use, the safety of the product and the 
fulfilment of the requirements need to be assessed.  Much of this stage should already 
have been assessed in the previous stage, but this is a formalisation of this information. 
The designers/engineers must answer a series of questions: 
• Doe the product solve the right problem? 
• Does the product solve the defined problem correctly? 
• Has the stated problem been solved competently considering all operating 
conditions and environments? 
• What are the limits to use of the product? 
• What are the hazards of the product? 
• What is the products reliability? 
 
Quantitative HRA techniques can  provide values that will tell the project manager or 
the buyer of the product, the reliability of the product and if this is an improvement on a 
predecessor product and or a similar product already on the market.  HRA techniques 
highlight areas of risk, limitations of the product.  If any changes to the design need to 
be made at this stage, this could be costly and is not advisable.  When all the questions 
have been answered satisfactorily the product can be employed.  
 
2.3.1.4 Post Design 
Once the product is in use the lifecycle of the product is still managed. The product will 
need maintenance and repairs.  The frequency of these needs to be assessed and 
recorded so that this information is retrievable when needed.  Appropriate training for 
the operators, maintainers and repairers needs to be set and implemented.  It is feasible 
that the context in which the product is used may alter, so that new needs are fulfilled. 
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This means an ongoing assessment of the use  and operability of the product, leading to 
design modification updates.   
 
There could also be cases where the product is involved in an accident.  In this case a 
retrospective HRA method would be used to determined why the error occurred, to 
prevent the incident reoccurring. Any problems that occur during the use of the product, 
that did not come about in the design stage need to be rectified. 
 
When the product is retired, it needs to be dis-assembled, recycled and all ordinary and 
hazardous materials need be disposed of safely.  Any lessons learnt from the complete 
lifecycle of the product should be recorded and they should be accessible to aid future 
designs.   
 
2.3.2 Lifecycle Process Models 
2.3.2.1 Generic Lifecycle Models 
 
Figure 2.7: Waterfall Lifecycle Process Model 
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Figure 2.8: 'V' Diagram Lifecycle Process Model 
 
There are different types of project management. There is the Spiral model where there 
is continuous enhancement and convergence to the point of satisfaction.  There is also 
the waterfall model (Figure 2.7).  This is a sequence method where each step is 
performed one at a time, in order, although iteration can occur. Finally, there is the ‘V’ 
diagram (Figure 2. 8), where requirements formed in the development stage are 
compared to the design outcomes, this is also a hierarchical method. 
 
It is down to the individual or team designing the process to decide which model to use.  
The benefit of ‘V’ Diagrams over the Waterfall model is that the information from the 
requirements and initial design stages are fed into the later testing stages.  This ensures 
that the product will always do what was initially asked of it.  Some companies adapt 
these model to suit particular methods of working. An adapted model is discussed in the 
next section.  
 
2.3.2.2 Formalised Lifecycle Models 
There is no set lifecycle process model within BAE Systems, as each BU is 
independent.  Air Systems are forward thinking in their approach to human factors and 
have developed a model to incorporate human usability into the design process (Figure 
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2.9).  This is a waterfall approach, with iteration occurring during the design stage.  A 
document accompanies this diagram informing the users of the inputs and outputs 
required at each stage.  
 
 
Figure 2.9: Air System's Lifecycle Process Model 
 
2.3.3 Safety Case 
A Safety Case is process to argue how safety of a system will be developed, achieved 
and maintained (DEF STAN 00-250, DEF STAN00-56). The argument is compiled 
from a variety of sources of information including the human factors input of hazard 
analysis, accident mitigation, and error analysis.     Its intent is to produce a compelling 
and comprehensive case that a system is safe for the intended environment.  Prospective 
HRAs can highlight areas of risk in the system informing the engineers of these areas 
and highlighting where mitigation is required to increase the safety of the system.  
 
A Safety Case is produced for any system that is incurring any design changes such as 
being developed, upgraded or refitted. It covers the whole lifecycle of the system.  The 
Safety Case information is summarised into a Safety Case report.  This provides a 
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record of the intended environment of the system, highlights the areas of risk of the 
system and informs of mitigation to reduce the risk.   
 
2.3.4 Summary 
Project management is complex.  Whilst the tool created in the MPhil is not used to 
predict the suitability of a project management style, but to ensure usability of the tool 
then the process in which it is used must be understood.  Different stages require 
different levels of detail and output from an HRA. The aim of the tool is to be used in 
all stages of the design process.  The detail of the information available increases in 
complexity throughout the design lifecycle, therefore the tool must start simple and also 
increase in complexity throughout the stages to emulate the development of the product. 
 
2.4 Team Structures and Attributes 
2.4.1 Team Structures 
Teams are used in commercial and military settings (Fitzpatrick & Askin, 2005; 
Helmreich, 2000) as, under the right circumstances, a team can out-perform any single 
member, whether this is through physical strength, knowledge or decision making.  
Collaboration can improve situational awareness, understanding of a situation and 
decision making (Noble, 2004). Companies use teams to handle complexity that 
emerges in global industries.     
 
2.4.2 Definition of Team and Team Work  
This research uses Eason’s model of teams (Eason, 1995; Sinclair, 2003) 
 
A definition of a team is  
‘two or more individuals who must perform distinct, complementary 
or independent tasks in pursuit of a common, specified goal.  Teams must 
communicate as well as share information and resources in order to meet 
their goal(s). The ability of each individual member to adapt and adjust 
through reliance on other team members determines the level of a team’s 
coordination and thus teamwork’ (Salas et al., 2005 p.794)  
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Huczynski & Buchanan (1991) have defined two types of teams, formal and informal 
groups.  How the team members are chosen and the relationships within the teams 
differ.  But how a person perceives when they are part of a group or team is the same.  
The attributes of a group are: 
• that there must be at least two people 
• they should interact with each other 
• they should be psychologically aware of each other  
• each individual should perceive themselves are being in a group.   
 
These attributes apply to all groups whether they are formal or informal. 
 
A formal group will have a formal structure.  It will be task oriented and the activities 
of the group will contribute directly to the organisations collective purpose.  The group 
is consciously organised by some person for a reason. An informal group forms when 
individuals develop interdependencies with each other, need each other and influence 
each other’s behaviour.  In a work environment people will be placed in formal groups 
by supervisors or managers, but they will create their own informal groups, which may 
have stronger influences on behaviour than the formal group.  
 
A team has characteristics (Huczynski & Buchanan, 1991) that should be considered 
when developing systems that are to be used by a team. These are listed below: 
• An increase in members leads to an increase in the number of possible 
relationships within the group, which will mean there is an increase in the 
communication required and therefore there is an increase in the amount of 
structure needed to operate the group. 
• There is a shared communication network 
• There is a shared sense of collective identity 
• There are shared goals and the members of the team must feel obliged to achieve 
the shared goal 
• There is a group structure, individuals will have different roles and they will 
abide by group rules.  
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Noble (2004) cites the ‘Bay of Pigs’ Fiasco (Janis, 1972) where a battle plan went 
wrong  due to inappropriate rules of the team.  The members of the team did not discuss 
doubts and were not given the opportunity to test assumptions in the plan. There was a 
lack of knowledge sharing, communication and trust within the team.  This caused the 
plan to fail leading to the deaths of many and the surrender of the rest. Salas et al  
(2005) corroborates with this, by describing that for collaboration to be effective there 
needs to be co-operation, openness, sharing and trust.   
 
2.4.3 Previous Teamwork Experiments 
2.4.3.1 The Early Days 
The Hawthorne studies (Sundstrom et al., 2000) performed between 1924 and 1932 
were an early investigation into teamwork and team motivation.  The experiments, 
performed by the Harvard Business School, are some of the most extensive experiments 
to date.  The resultant information was that an individual is motivated by more than just 
money.  A person has a need for recognition and a sense of belonging.  In the 
Hawthorne factory, people were divided into formal groups and they formed social, 
informal, groups.  To gain a sense of belonging into either of these groups an individual 
can shape their attitude to work, so that it corresponds with the rest of the group.  One 
example of this is, if a group had decided that they will work only as hard as they need 
to, to get the days quota through, then anyone working faster or slower than required 
was ‘punished’ by the group, thus moulding an individual’s workrate to suit the group.  
Huczynski & Buchanan (1991) believe that this effect of motivation should not be 
underestimated.    
 
2.4.3.2 Military Studies 
Whilst the above interactions affect team morale, studies in the 1950’s and 1960’s have 
looked at improving the function of military teams.  These went beyond looking at how 
teams worked socially, to how their ability is diminished under extreme conditions of a 
battlefield.  Some of the aspects studied were time pressure, stress, ambiguous or 
incomplete information and severe consequences for actions taken (Paris, 2002).  These 
factors are still the topic of investigations, with studies looking at workload  and 
situational awareness.   
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2.4.3.3 Current Team research 
“Some of the emerging research themes that are of particular interest 
to ergonomists comprise of analysing team tasks and measuring team 
performance, assessing the effects of team structure and roles and 
evaluating workplace design and team workload” (Annett & Stanton, 2000, 
p.1046) 
 
Annett and Stanton (2000) define team accomplishment as the product of the team and 
how the team behaves is known as the team process.  They believe that communication 
and co-ordination are crucial processes.  Team spirit and cohesion can influence team 
performance.  Team process is effected by the structure and role differentiation within 
the team, for example the division of leadership and responsibility within the team.  
Work place design and the workload of the team are also important to team 
effectiveness (Artman, 1998; Paris et al., 2000,).  The current research is taking place in 
command and control (e.g. battlefield) or process control environments.  Some of the 
issues important to team work in 2000 are stress, decision-making, mental models, 
workload, SA, morale, cohesion, performance measurement, communication and team 
skills.   
 
Paris et al. (2000) writes that there are three primary categories for team work, 
cognitions, skills and attitudes.  They also say that “teamwork skills are not readily 
quantifiable” (p.4) and that team behaviours evolve over the lifecycle of the team.  
Team architecture has three attributes, member proximity, communication modality and 
allocation of functions.  Member proximity and communication are two of the three 
team attributes that are in ROCCI.   
 
2.4.3.4 Teamwork Dimensions 
Both Noble (2004) and Salas et al (2005) describe three elements that are fundamental 
to effective team work.  Noble describes them as; adequate resources, the right kinds of 
knowledge and motivation, whereas Salas has produced the knowledge, skills attitudes 
(KSA) model (Figure 2.10).  Noble (2004) focuses on the importance of knowledge, he 
believes that ‘knowledge is central to collaboration and teamwork’ (p.4) if individuals 
do not have the correct information, they cannot work effectively together.  The 
knowledge must also be shared amongst the team, no one person should know 
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everything (as that could result in knowledge overload), but every team member should 
know enough to do their own work.  Team members should interact and communicate 
with each other to discuss ideas and increase understanding of a situation. 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Illustration of how KSAs Contribute to Teamwork 
(Salas et al., 2005, p.795)  
 
2.4.4 Communication 
Communication is essential for sharing knowledge, making decisions, developing trust 
and improving SA in a team.  Appropriate group communication can lead to greater 
homogeneity of the group, increased frequency and effectiveness of actions.  Deciding 
upon the structure of the communication, i.e. who communicates with who, depends 
upon the complexity of the task (Table 2.2). Having all information going to one person 
for a simple task, or where one person is performing the task, is beneficial as there will 
be little repetition of information, if the information was spread amongst the team, then 
the person performing the action may not have all the correct information.  Where a 
complex task is being performed by several people and there is great volume of 
information, a comcon model would be more appropriate as the information would be 
shared amongst the team members and so no one person would become saturated 
(Baron & Greenberg, 1990).  This is a simplified model of communication.  There are 
many types of teams and tasks which may not fit into Baron and Greenberg’s (1990) 
models.   
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Table 2.2: Two Communication Models and their Suitability to Simple and 
Complex Tasks (Huczynski & Buchanan, 1991, p.206)  
 Communication Model Simple Tasks Complex Tasks 
 
Wheel  
 
 
Central person 
has all 
information 
 
Central person becomes 
saturated 
 
 
Comcon 
 
 
No one person 
has all 
information 
 
Information flows, no one 
become saturated with 
information 
 
The structure of the communication is not the only aspect that should be considered, 
frequency, content, language, bandwidth (Carron & Hausenblas, 1998) and the 
cognition of communication, also influence the effectiveness of communication.  The 
appropriateness for each of the aspects varies with each situation, there are no precise 
parameters for team communication.  An overview of each of the four aspects shall be 
discussed below. 
 
2.4.4.1 Frequency 
The relationship between frequency of communication and the effectiveness of working 
is not linear, but U-shaped.  If there is very little communication then there will not be 
enough sharing of knowledge for correct decision making, but if there is too much 
communication there will not be enough time to thing about the decisions, or to perform 
work.  Too much communication may be a sign of lack of trust, as one team member 
may be over monitoring the other’s performance.   
 
2.4.4.2 Content and Language 
Where direct orders are given, the quality of the communication is low and there is a 
high risk situation, then formal language and topics of conversation should be used.  
This optimises the availability of the communication and reduces the strain on other 
cognitive processes.  If the aim of the communication is to discuss ideas and share 
knowledge and there is no immediate time frame, then informal communication, which 
not only discusses the relevant issues, but also personal information is appropriate. 
Understanding another team member’s character, interests, strengths and weaknesses 
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will increase the trust in the relationship, ultimately producing more effective team 
working.  
 
2.4.4.3 Bandwidth 
Bandwidth refers to the method of communication used and how much information can 
be portrayed at any one time.  Face to face communication has high bandwidth, as the 
verbal communication is supported by body language and facial expressions. Having 
face to face communication means that there are several methods of communicating 
available, if one type is inappropriate, e.g. in a noisy environment hand signals are used 
to convey information.  Distributed teams are common and they communicate through 
telephones, email and computer supported networking.  Each method of communication 
should be appropriate to the environment and the resources available.   
 
2.4.4.4 Cognition of Communication 
Communicating is a cognitive act.  A person hears/reads the information, processes the 
information, acts on this knowledge and then may initiate another communication.  
These processes may cause a modification to the understanding of the communication.   
When sending or receiving information there are four aspects that could lead to this 
modification: 
• Levelling this is the reduction or simplification of communication 
• Ordering this is remembering the first and last sections of the communication 
and the middle section will be lost, or not understood completely 
• Sharpening this is putting an emphasis into a communication, that may not have 
previously been there 
• Assimilating this is were the meaning of the communication shifts to match 
previous information.  
These forms of error should be considered when measuring the reliability of team 
working.  
 
2.4.5 Situation Awareness (SA) 
Endsley (2000) simplifies the definition of SA ‘as knowing what is going on around 
you’ with the understanding that you know what is important.  SA is a process of 
monitoring the environment to gain comprehension from the information being 
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received, so that the current and future status of the environment can be understood.  SA 
is not something that can be given to someone, each person has their own perception of 
the environment and the information that they receive.  In a team it may be beneficial 
for each person to have a different SA, as each person will perform different tasks, and 
therefore need different information to perform that task, this is distributed SA (Stanton 
et al., 2005).  Some information needs to be shared amongst team members.  All team 
members should understand how the eleven pieces of information below should be 
used: 
• goal understanding,  
• understanding own and team members roles,  
• understanding tasks and schedule,  
• understanding relationship and dependencies,  
• understanding team members background and capabilities,  
• understanding business rules,  
• task knowledge,   
• activity awareness,  
• understanding of the external situation,  
• task assessment,  
• plan assessment,  
• understanding decisions drivers.  
 
SA can be built by observation, communication and the use of shared artefacts such as 
computers or a whiteboard (Artman & Garbis, 1988).   These should be designed into 
systems and the use of them should be taught to the team members so that they are 
taken full advantage off, without overloading anyone with information.  If this occurs 
then inappropriate information may become the focus and incorrect decisions could be 
made.   
 
2.4.6 Collaboration Maturity  
The length of time that a team has worked together as a team will affect how well the 
team works together. Below are three models of group development.: the linear model, 
the pendular model and the lifecycle model.   Each shows that a team improves with 
time (Figure 2.11), but not all in a continuous, progressive manner.   
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Figure 2.11: Models of Group Development  
(Huczynski & Buchanan, 1991)  
 
The ‘life-cycle’ model shows deterioration in the group after a period of time, whereas 
the pendular and linear models are ultimately progressive.  This is supported by the five 
stages of group development (Tuckman & Jensen, 1977, as cited in Huczynski & 
Buchanan, 1991).   
  
2.4.6.1 Group Development 
Table 2.3: Stages in Group Development (Tuckman & Jensen, 1977)  
Stage Interpersonal Characteristics Task Characteristics 
Forming Individuals become familiar with each 
other and bonds develop within the 
group 
Members determine what the 
group task is and what 
methods are suitable to carry it 
out 
Storming Tension develops and conflict occurs 
among group members and with the 
leader 
Resistance arises to group 
methods and the group task 
Norming Cohesiveness and group harmony 
develop and group roles are established 
Task cooperation among 
members is prevalent 
Performing  Relationships are stabilized The group’s orientation is on 
productivity and performance 
Adjourning Member contact decreases and 
emotional dependency  among 
individual members is reduced 
The task of the group is 
completed and the duties of 
members are finished.  
 
The stages are forming, storming, norming, performing and adjourning (Table 2.3). For 
a team to work effectively they must go through the first four stages.  The stages are for 
both the interpersonal characteristics of the team and the task characteristics, it takes a 
Time 
Group 
Unity 
Linear Model 
Pendular  Model 
Life-Cycle  
Model 
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varying amount of time to go through these stages.  However, the more time the team 
takes to work through these stages the better each stage is developed.  Therefore the 
longer a team has been together the more efficient they will be.  Also, if a team has 
developed the interpersonal characteristics to the ‘performing’ stage, they should be 
able to perform the task stages quickly for each new task, as some of the team tensions 
would not be present. These stages are appropriate for both co-located and distributed 
teams.   
 
2.4.6.2 Distributed Development 
Table 2.4: Development of Distributed Teams 
Team Description Indicators 
Unstructured • Some work forms are employed but inconsistently 
• A few collaboration tools are occasionally used, such as e-
mail, file sharing and Lotus Notes databases. 
• Face to face process disciplines are ongoing, but virtual 
processes are not common.  
Seeking 
collaboration 
• Some collaboration is being implemented; early forms of 
training, largely unstructured, are conducted to improve 
collaboration. 
• An array of collaboration tools is introduced. 
• Efforts to establish common processes and practices are 
underway 
Building 
collaboration 
• Collaboration is implemented significantly more effectively 
than in earlier phases; progress in personal competency 
working with collaboration tools and processes is 
appreciable. 
• More sophisticated collaboration tools are beginning to be 
used. 
• Some common processes are generally defined.  
Using 
collaboration 
• Collaboration culture of excellence is taking root. 
• All collaboration tools and supporting infrastructure 
essential to the team’s work are deployed and in use. 
• Common processes and practices are established and 
defined 
Sustaining and 
leveraging 
collaboration 
• Robust and disciplined team is working seamlessly and 
effectively at a distance in a common operative 
environment; it continuous improves and readily adapts to 
innovations in a workforce culture of excellence.   
• The right collaboration tools are used for the right task at 
the right time- without fail. 
• Common work processes 
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Carver (2005) has developed a more detailed model for distributed teams (Table 2.4).  
This is not a time-related model, but a team can develop through the stages with time.  
This model also suggests that, with training and experience, a team could come together 
for a short amount of time and work efficiently together, if a supportive organisational 
culture is present.  Also, if the right culture, training and tools are not available a 
distributed team will not be able to develop to its full potential.   
 
2.4.6.3 Trust 
Within a team there must also be a trust.  Trust is the ability to: 
• feel confident that other team members can and will perform that task 
effectively, efficiently and on time; 
• discuss apprehension to tasks,  
• admit to mistakes or inabilities to perform a task 
• discuss with other team members when they may make mistakes, or unable to 
perform a task 
• to have faith in the motives of other team members and that they will not betray 
you 
• have confidence that any benefits accruing will be shared equitably. 
 
 
Figure 2.12:  The Relationship of Trust, Time and Effectiveness. 
(Carver, 2005, after Muir, Barber, 1983 and Rempel et al, 1985) 
 
Trust, between suitable people, can develop with time (Figure 2.12).  The first level of 
trust is the ‘predictability of actions’.  This is when an individual will perform tasks 
when they say they will, although monitoring maybe required.  The second level is 
‘dependability of behaviour’.  This is when an individual is assured that other team 
Increased 
Effectiveness 
Building Trust 
Dependability 
of Behaviour 
Predictability 
of Actions 
Faith 
in Motives 
Time 
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members will perform tasks when they say they will, without interference.  The third 
level is ‘faith in motives’, collaborators have ethical behaviour when working in 
competing environments.  With an increase in trust there will be a decrease in the level 
of communication, giving more time to performing tasks rather than monitoring other 
team member’s behaviour.  
 
2.4.7 Culture  
Individual national organisations are different as the culture of the nation varies.  
Hofstede(1984)  has defined national culture on four dimensions: 
Power Distance: “degree of inequality among people” (P5) 
Uncertainty Avoidance: how structured situations are and how many rules. 
Individualism / Collectivism: “degree to which people in a country prefer to act as 
individuals rather than members of a group” (P6) 
Masculinity / Feminism: this is the degree to which people have either masculine or 
feminine qualities. Masculine qualities include assertiveness, performance, success, 
competition.  Feminine qualities include maintaining warm personal relationships, 
service and care for the weak.   
 
Hofstede focuses on the culture of a nation, but culture can be more localised to 
between companies in the same country, in fact it can relate to any group of people 
(Siemieniuch & Meese, 2006).  Power distance of an organisation is not dependent on 
the hierarchy of the organisation, but on the level of power leaders and subordinates 
have.  Siemieniuch describes power distance as “the degree of inequality in power 
between a  lower ranking individual (I) and a higher ranking Other (O) in which I and 
O belong to the same social system which is required to achieve a particular 
operational goal.” 
 
The responsibility of members in a team to make decisions and to be accountable for 
decision and for the decision to be followed by other team members varies between the 
members of the team.  But the level of responsibility is dependent on the power distance 
of the organisation / team in which the person is working.  This will be known as the 
decision making power distance.   
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Decision Making Power Distance (PD) differs from Hofstede’s or Siemieniuch’s 
definition as it focuses on the distance between two individuals only.   
 
2.4.8 Summary 
Teams are commonly used in civil and military environments. There must be at least 
two members in a team who interact with each other and perceive themselves as being 
part of a team.  Achieving the appropriate frequency, content, language and method of 
communication has a high effect on team reliability. Each team member must have 
suitable SA and an understanding of other team member requirements for them to have 
suitable SA.  Generally team work improves with time and for stability of team working 
to occur.   
 
The study of team work is not a precise area.  There are many variables that effect 
reliability of a team.  Throughout the MPhil this section will increase in size.  As the 
tool develops my knowledge of team reliability will increase, as this section is the 
justification for each statement in my tool. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
HRA have been developed so designers and users can understand how likely it is for a 
human to make an error when using a system, i.e. the reliability of the product (Kirwan, 
1994).  The current HRAs only consider one person using a system.  However, in many 
workplaces people work in teams, not as individuals (Fitzpatrick & Askin, 2005).  
Interactions between team members can increase reliabilities.  For example, in a cockpit 
the pilot may forget to set the flight level, the co-pilot may notice and inform the pilot, 
thus increasing the reliability of the pilot.  But interactions can also decrease 
reliabilities, e.g. as there is an increase in volume of communication occurring which 
creates added tasks and stress. To fill this gap a new generation of HRAs is being 
developed.  
 
After reviewing several methods HEART (Williams, 1986) is thought to be the best 
method to use as foundation for the new tool. It is a quantitative method that is easy to 
use and helps engineers to locate the areas of highest risk.  A second reason for its 
adoption is pragmatic; it is a widely-used and is familiar to the engineers.  This is 
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essential if the tool is to aid development throughout the design process rather than just 
provide overall probabilities.  HEART contains statements, which means qualitative 
justifications of error are plausible.  However adding more statements, to account for 
the team interactions, may encumber the list and reduce the usability of the tool.  
Another important aspect of HEART that needs to be contemplated is the probabilities 
used.  Currently these are not known to be accurate and have not been fully validated 
albeit the values are considered to be plausible.  It is undecided at this stage whether 
validation is required.  Employees at BAE Systems already use HEART and so using 
this method will reduce the amount of learning and integration time required to ensure 
correct use of the new tool. 
 
HEART is being expanded into a new tool that will quantitatively evaluate the 
reliability of a team using a system.  Aspects that can affect team function such as, trust, 
communication methods and cultural issues will be accounted for in the calculation.   
 
The tool will quantitatively predict reliability, highlight areas of high risk and educate 
designers on the importance of human factors to produce high usability and reliability 
products. 
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Chapter Three: Methods 
 
This chapter describes the methods used in this research.  Several techniques could be 
used to find out this information.  The three techniques considered are literature search 
(Section 3.1), observational methods (Section 3.2) and semi-structured interviews 
(Section 3.3).  After this initial assessment, the preferred method was semi-structured 
interviews, which was then chosen.  This method involves transcript coding (Section 
3.4) and matrices (Section 3.5).    
 
3.1 Literature Search 
A literature search is a valid method to finding most forms of information.  Some 
documents written by BAE Systems pertaining to lifecycle management and HRA 
methods (Ng, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, Wilkinson, 2000) have been read by the researcher. 
But, what is reported in these texts was in fact different from what was actually 
happening with the use of HRA methods within the individual business units.  For 
example Miguel & Wright (2002) is a document produced by BAE Systems, which 
describes the HRA method CHLOE (Miguel and Wright, 2003, Miguel et al., 2002), 
has been used to predict the outcome of two scenarios that could occur on a Nimrod.  
This would suggest that CHLOE is used within air systems, yet following discussions 
the researcher has had with people from Aerosystems, it appears that this paper was a 
one-off experiment and is not representative of the usual methods used.  This approach 
does not provide the correct information, so other methods were then investigated.  
 
3.2 Participant Observational Methods 
Each business unit (BU) works differently.  Time spent on projects in several BUs gives 
the researcher the opportunity to observe in detail the actions taken by the engineers and 
human factors experts.  The researcher becomes a ‘participant as observer’ (Robson, 
2002) where the fact that the researcher was observing the team would be known. The 
researcher takes part in as many activities as possible.  This enables the researcher to get 
a thorough understanding of the approach to human reliability within the BU and the 
advantages or disadvantages of methods used by the team.  An additional advantage is 
that the close working relationship could be a basis for future testing of the tool.   
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There are two big disadvantages to this technique: time and security clearance.  These 
are not related to the reliability or validity of the technique.  The first disadvantage 
relates to the availability and timing of the researcher’s own time.  The presence of the 
researcher working within a business unit during the development or modification of a 
product requires the allocation of long periods of time as well as precise planning of the 
timing of the researcher’s visit to coincide with the business unit activities.   
 
Six different placements would be required to attend at all areas of BAE Systems: 
Naval, Missiles, Submarine, Aircraft, Land based and Aerosystems.  It would be 
necessary to co-ordinate between the different BUs and the researcher to ensure that the 
researcher was present for the relevant stage in the development process when human 
reliability was being considered and yet visit all teams in the minimum of time.   
 
The second disadvantage was that the researcher needed access to the information on 
the products being developed. This requires security clearance from a high level.  This 
takes time, is costly to obtain and is not guaranteed.  This participant observation 
method was considered to be better suited, once the new HRA model had been 
produced.  
 
3.3 Semi-Structured Interview 
The definition of semi-structured interviews is: 
‘pre-determined questions, but the order can be modified based upon 
the interviewer’s perception of what seems most appropriate, question 
wording can be changed and explanations given; particular questions 
which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee can be omitted, or 
additional ones included’ (Robson, 2002, p270).   
 
There were potential disadvantages to interviews: the interviewees might recall 
information incorrectly and give opinions instead of facts (Sinclair, 2005).  However, in 
this investigation, opinions were a benefit.  The reliability of semi-structured interviews 
was low: each interview contained different questions and even different topics.  The 
flexible nature of the interview meant that relevant information was gleaned.  Becoming 
a proficient interviewer required practice and guidance from experts.  The interviews 
Chp 3: Methods 
48 
required preparation and following the interview, the transcripts needed coding.  These 
were time consuming, but less time consuming than an observation technique.  The 
semi-structured interview was chosen as the method to ascertain the information on 
HRA use and attitude.  They provided a means of finding out relevant information from 
the pertinent people.   
 
Table 3.1: Possible Research Methods 
Method Advantages Disadvantages Chosen 
Literature 
search 
None Produces irrelevant 
information 
No 
Observation Rich data gathered Time consuming No 
Interview Pertinent information retrieved 
quickly 
Lack of realism, 
interviewer bias 
Yes 
 
3.4 Transcript Coding 
There are two phases to the process of transcript coding.  The first phase is transcribing 
the interview (Section 3.4.1).  The second phase is coding the transcripts (Section 3.4.2) 
so that they can be analysed. 
 
3.4.1 Transcribing the Interview 
The researchers’ notes and the transcripts of the interview were written up for three 
reasons.  First, to have a soft record of the interview for future reference and to ensure 
the information was preserved.  Second, to check that the notes written by the 
interviewers matched the content of the interview.  The final reason was to resubmit the 
content of the interview back into the researchers mind.  This helped to reinforce what 
was said in the interview soon after it was performed, aiding memory of the interview.  
The information from the interview can be retrieved more readily during a discussion of 
the topic, where it may be relevant in future interviews. Notes taken by the researchers 
during the interviews were also added to the documents.   
 
Performing semi-structured interviews are only worthwhile if there is an efficient 
method of retrieving information from the interview that will help with the development 
of the tool that is to be created.  Here efficiency means a method that does not consume 
too much time to perform and also a method that provides data that can be analysed 
without ignoring portions of the conversations. 
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3.4.2 Transcript Coding 
Coding transcripts provides a framework for the data from which analyses of a 
conversation can be performed.  Some coding methods such as discourse analysis 
(Willig, 2003) or conversation analysis (Drew, 2003) study the intonations and phrasing 
of words.  However, understanding the content of the conversation was most important 
in this investigation.  Miles and Huberman (1984) suggest how to build a conceptual 
framework to organise the information.   
 
Data analysis: make a contact summary sheet list of what is needed quickly. A sheet of 
information from each interview should be made.  The information required includes: 
the BUs, HRAs used, future contacts, name, contact details.  This is to ‘serve as the 
basis for data analysis itself’ (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p51) and is attached to the 
analysis of interview. 
 
Codes and coding: ‘a code is an abbreviation or symbol applied to a segment of words 
in order to classify the words’ (Miles and Huberman, 1984, p54). Codes are categories.  
They usually derive from research questions, hypotheses, key concepts, or important 
themes.  They are retrieval and organising devices that allow the analyst to spot quickly, 
pull out, then cluster all the segments relating to the particular questions, hypothesis, 
concept or theme.  Clustering sets the stage for analysis.  The codes can be grouped so 
that similar topics can be together at different levels and are adaptable during the 
analysis process.  For example Figure 3.1 shows coding of literature with HRA, LCM 
and Products with a further level of coding for HRA methods, use and dislikes.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Example of Coding (Tree Codes)  
 
Literature
HRA
HRA 
method HRA Use
HRA 
dislikes
LCM Products
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3.5 Matrices  
A Requirements Matrix (Table 3.2) shows that each BU has different demands for HRA 
and explains why they want them, e.g. lack of people, no need for complicated tool, 
customer needs numbers.  The information from each interview was put into the matrix 
so that the different requirements can be compared. The contents from each interview 
was analysed and formatted into a requirements matrix.   
 
Table 3.2: Requirements Matrix 
Typical  
requirements 
Why these are needed 
Not enough people Customer wants it 
Simple technique yes Yes 
Quant technique no yes 
 
From this, a House of Quality (HoQ) (Table 3.3) could be produced.  This shows how 
the tool manages the requirements.  The requirements will help to create the model, 
which is a bottom up approach.  The Requirements Matrix and House of Quality are 
available for future referral and to ensure as many requirements as possible are featured 
in the tool. 
Table 3.3: House of Quality Matrix 
Typical 
requirements 
How this will be accounted for 
User interface Quantitative Computerised 
Simple technique    
Quant technique    
 
3.6 Summary of Methods 
The methods used to provide information for this research are outlined in Table 3.4.  
Background information was collated prior to the beginning of the research and a gap 
analysis was produced (Ng, 2003a).  This provided information for the original research 
into a THRA, Team HRA, CREAM-T (Smith, 2004).  This information was supported 
by a thorough literature search in the fields of importance for developing an HRA 
(Chapter 2).  
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Key for Table 3.4 
Personal Tool Development 
Tool Reviewed by SMEs 
Changes made to ROCCI 
No changes made to ROCCI 
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The next stage of the research was to gain insights from the stakeholders about the tool 
that was being developed.  This was in the form of semi-structured interviews.  These 
provided the opportunity for the Model of the Team to be developed and assessed and to 
increase the researcher’s knowledge on the issues that affect reliability and teams.  
 
Following the interviews, the “Model of a Team” (Figure 5.1) was defined and the 
initial team attributes and algorithms were assessed.  To test the sensitivity and logic of 
the algorithms a sensitivity analysis was performed.  This was the Monte Carlo method 
of testing the algorithms, i.e. as many formations of data were inputted in to the 
algorithms as possible to test their stability.   
 
Throughout the period of research the prototype, ROCCI, was presented to a wide range 
of audiences. The main areas were at Loughborough University; the Ergonomics 
Society (Smith et al., 2006, Smith et al., 2007a); Systems Engineering Conference 
(Smith et al., 2007b); and also at BAE Systems meetings (Appendix 2).  This provided 
the opportunity for ROCCI to be scrutinized by peers and experts and gave the 
researcher the opportunity to defend and develop the prototype.  
 
The final assessment method used was a Stakeholder Review of ROCCI where the tool 
was taken back to the original interviewees for them to assess the nearly finished 
prototype.  Semi-structured interviews and the Delphi method (Turoff and Linstone, 
1975) were used for this process.  The Delphi method is where an individual assesses a 
product privately and then a group come together to discuss the assessments.  This 
occurs repeatedly until all of the individuals agree on the outcome.  It was not possible 
to perform a complete Delphi assessment of ROCCI but an initial assessment was 
performed and this provided suggestions to be made to the tool in the future. 
 
The next chapter describes the process for the creation of the Requirements 
Specification. 
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Chapter Four: Requirements Specification 
 
This chapter describes the process of creating a requirements specification and the 
development of the THRA tool.  It begins with the aims of the stakeholder interviews 
(Section 4.1), followed by a description of the participants (Section 4.2) and the method 
of data collection (Section 4.3). It continues with transcribing the interviews (Section 
4.4) and the interview results (Section 4.5).  The chapter ends with a description of the 
requirements specification of the tool and the initial development of the tool (Section 
4.6). 
 
4.1 Stakeholder Interview Aims 
Stakeholder interviews were performed to gather information that would provide a 
thorough understanding of the current use of HRA in the different BUs at BAE 
Systems, specifically, and in the design process of the defence industry, more generally.  
Additionally the interviews gathered knowledge on what would be useful to Human 
Factors (HF) engineers in the design of a new HRA tool and the future HRA needs 
within each business unit.   
 
The aims of interviewing HF experts and HRA users are: 
• To determine which HRAs are currently being used 
• To determine how HRAs are used 
• To find where there is a gap in the HRA suite of techniques 
• To determine the requirements of a future HRA tool 
• To review the current model of team reliability. 
 
The information gleaned from these interviews was utilised in the requirements matrix.  
It provided the basis for some critical decisions that were made about the model.  For 
example, which BU and piece of equipment the model was designed for; whether a 
paper and pen tool or a computerised tool was more suitable; whether a qualitative or 
quantitative method or combination is more appropriate. 
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4.2 Participants 
The key stakeholders for this project are BAE Systems personnel: their engineers, 
designers, HRA experts, HF engineers.  Although non BAE Systems personnel, such as 
BAE’s customers, the MoD are also stakeholders, for reasons of Intellectual Property, 
only BAE Systems personnel where interviewed.  
 
Ten potential interviewees were contacted.  Nine actually participated at different times 
across six interview sessions.  The interviewees had experience in projects such as 
naval, missile, submarine, aircraft, land-based and Aero systems.  The interviewees did 
not receive any payment for taking part in the interviews.  
 
4.3 Data Collection 
4.3.1 Developing the Interview Schedule 
There was an evolving iterative design of the interview questions.  A lengthy list of 
interview questions was generated.  These were sorted into relevant groups, such as 
interviewee details, HRA use, lifecycle management.  Repeated questions were 
removed and some questions were rephrased to become more succinct.   
 
The interview questions were piloted with two experienced interviewers and amended 
to provide flexibility in questioning.  After each interview, further adaptations were 
made to the questions as required. This demonstrated the iterative nature of the 
“qualitative” approach. There were twenty-four open-ended questions divided between 
seven sections (Figure 4.1).  As this was a semi-structured interview some questions 
were omitted if they were irrelevant or if they had already been answered . 
 
4.3.2 Interview Structure 
The interview began with an introduction of the interviewers themselves and the 
purpose of the discussion, followed by warm-up questions relating to the interviewees 
job and experience with HRA.  The main bulk of the interview was divided into the 
following sections;  
• application of HRA techniques  
• selection criteria of HRA techniques 
• HRA requirements from either internal or external customers 
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The interview closed with a discussion about the future of HRA.  
 
4.3.3 Conducting the Interview 
There were two interviewers, myself, who was the primary researcher and my 
supervisor as the secondary researcher.  The secondary researcher provided some 
guidance during and after the interview.   
 
Before the interviews, the interviewer gave the interviewees information sheets 
(Appendix 2) informing them that the interviews were confidential and that they could 
withdraw at any time, following Loughborough University Ethics.  Consent forms 
(Appendix 2) were read and signed by the interviewees, thus ensuring that they 
understood their rights as participants.   
 
The interviews were recorded on a tape recorder and varied in length from 40 minutes 
to 90 minutes.  The use of tape recording improved the transcripts of the conversations 
but could lead to a reduction in note-taking during the interview.   
 
4.4 Transcribing the Interview 
4.4.1 Interview Notes 
The researchers handwritten notes from each interview were typed up into a word 
document.  All identifying information was removed to maintain confidentiality 
required for ethical reasons.  There is a separate document that contains the participant 
information.   
 
4.4.2 Interview Transcripts  
The data on the tapes were transcribed so that the information could be coded.  To ease 
understanding and coding each person presented was displayed in a different colour of 
text. 
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Questions for Interview 
Introduction: Previous work done by Loughborough with BAE Systems has 
revealed that there are a few holes in the HRA field.   It would be helpful to know 
some information about your experience with the HRA process.  The aim of the 
discussion is to get as much information and ideas as possible for a requirements 
specification for a new HRA tool.  The objective is to create a tool that will help 
and not disrupt current processes.  There would be advantages in talking to a few 
people that would actually be using the tool to get them on board and encourage 
others. 
 
Interviewees role 
1) Can you briefly describe what field of work you are in, what your department 
makes and how you are involved in that process? 
2) Within your field who are your main contacts for HRA.  (Names, positions, 
brief description of job. 
3) Can you give me an example of the HRA process? 
 
Current HRA process & requirements 
4) What is your current approach to HRAs? This is so that we can be know 
what to expect in the future, e.g. to understand how complex the tool needs 
to be. 
5) Which HRA techniques do you currently use. 
6) How do you decide which HRA techniques to use?  
7) Is there are list of techniques available to you, and you pick from the list? 
Does the customer have an input into the techniques use?  
8) Are there any techniques that are favoured, either by yourself or those within 
you department?  If so please can you explain why. 
9) Are there any techniques that are less frequently used or disliked and no 
longer used?  If so why? Can you suggest any ways to improve these 
techniques. 
10) At what stage in the design process are the assessments performed, who 
decided this and, why,?  Do you agree with this? 
11) Who performs the assessments? 
12) Who are your stakeholders? 
13) Do you have any HRA requirements, either internal or that are customer or 
government oriented.   
14) Can you foresee the introduction of any requirements in the future (five 
years)? Is there any ‘best practice’ in your field of work? 
15) Who assesses the techniques for validity, suitability and up-to date-ness? 
 
Info needed for HRAs 
16) What data do you have access to in order, to help you with using HRAs? 
17) Where do you get your HEP’s? 
18) Where do you get your PSF’S? 
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HRA Issues 
19) Do you have any worries about the HRA techniques used, or how they are 
used and documented with your dept.? 
20) Do you have any requirements that you would like from an HRA technique?  
Can you foresee any new requirements in the near future. 
 
Why use CHRA 
21) How would they define collaborative work for them, when do they think they 
would need a collaborative tool. 
22) What aspects are most relevant for analysis by a collaborative tool?   
23) Have you tried/used a CHRA previously, e.g. CHLOE, or have you tried to 
adapt a normal HRA to a CHRA. 
24) Do you feel that there is a gap in the HRA area? 
25) The main issues that the tool would be covering, so far, are communications, 
and knowledge sharing, inc. SA. Can you think of any other aspects that are 
important to be tested. 
 
Specific to my tool 
26) What would you like to get out of a new tool? 
27) What information can you foresee going into this tool and what information 
would you like to see coming out of it. 
28) When including a new tool into the design process, it would be predicted that 
this may come against some resistance.  How can the tool be designed to 
overcome this resistance. (This can also include what the tool must produce, 
i.e. its purpose) 
29) Is there a need for a predictive or diagnostic tool? 
30) Who would use the tool is it engineers or human factors experts?  What 
would their level of skill be and their domain of expertise?   
31) Would it be more useful to be a pen and paper tool, or a computer based tool.  
What would the reactions of the user be if it was the other? 
32) What would the effect of their work load mean, are they doing something 
similar already and so it would either replace it, or become part of it, or 
would it be something new altogether? 
33) Any their any other aspects of the BU that need to be observed? 
34) Would a new tool be maintained by the same person who maintains all the 
other tools, there may also be a database to add information too, so that 
improvements and knowledge can increase and not be lost, would this also 
be managed by the same person? 
 
Closing 
Thank you for your input.   
     Would it be possible to contact you again in the future for further questions?   
    YES / NO 
     If so what is the best way to contact you? 
Email, Telephone, Address 
 
Figure 4.1: Interview Schedule 
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4.5 Interview Results 
Below are summaries of the information and opinions that came from the interviews.  
 
4.5.1 BU 1: Naval 
This is a naval BU where it is rare to completely redesign a new platform.  New issues 
are identified when queries come from users of the platform, where they have had a 
problem, or when a new process is added to the platform.  These are normally 
addressed, under the control of the in-house team of HF experts, using subjective tools, 
such as workload analysis, DIF analysis, or HAZOP.   
 
Some  of the HRA is contracted out.  The contractors choose the method of assessment 
that they feel is appropriate.  There are usually four HF both in-house and contractors, 
who often work together as a team. Most of the reliability scores come from previous 
experience.  The important features of a HRA tool are: that it occurs early in the design 
process; it is usable by anyone; that it is concise, e.g., so it can be pinned to a notice 
board i.e. two sides of an A4 sheet (Figure 4.2).   
 
‘Early is the key thing.  One of the problems we have with the tools is 
that they are very often very sophisticated, put it this way academics love 
them.  By the time we have the data from the model, the results cannot affect 
the design.  If it can’t affect the design it is pointless doing it. So we need 
things that can run early.’ 
‘If we can’t get some human factors requirements into the ITT they 
are sending out, then the responses from suppliers will not have human 
factors implications in.’ 
‘Ideally it should be usable by anyone.’ 
‘A piece of paper that they can pin up on their notice board or have 
on their desk is more likely to be referred too than a software tool which 
they have to go somewhere else on the network to.’ 
‘Two sides of A4’ 
Figure 4.2: Quotation from Interview BU1 
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4.5.2 BU 2: Missiles 
This was a joint interview with BU 1, so some information may overlap. They have 
between seven and nine HF employees that are all internal. The main form of 
assessment is task analysis.  The HRA tool that they developed and used was  based on 
THEA (Wright et al., 1994), but they did not actually use the original version of THEA 
(Wright et al., 1994).  The interviewee from BU 2, who had experience of writing 
various types of tools to be used by HF and design engineers, gave the advice that the 
tool should be on two sides of A4.   This is so that it looks simple to use, can easily be 
referred to and can be laminated, which make it is less likely to be lost or destroyed.  
The HRA tool would be best if it can be used ‘cheap and early’ in the lifecycle process.  
The benefit is that changes can then be made at relatively lower cost.  HF is not a 
priority when it comes to the design process. It needs to be possible for the human 
factors integration (HFI) to be flexible and fit with the systems engineer’s process.  The 
implication is that anything that is simple and quick will be better than a more complex 
tool, delivered later in the process.  The time scales are short (Figure 4.3).  
 
‘That is the basis of all the work we do with HFI, the systems 
engineer, and you have got to fit it with.  They are going to go ahead 
whatever, you have to make sure that you have the right bits at the right 
time.’ 
Figure 4.3: Quotation from Interview BU2 
 
4.5.3 BU 3: Submarine 
Currently one HF engineer assesses the whole submarine, so high level tasks are the 
priority and lower level tasks are not addressed.  There is a hierarchical working 
structure on board the boat. There are eight or nine small teams within the big team, 
which consists of one hundred people.  The SA within the small teams is very good, but 
communication between the various small teams can take time, as there is a military 
hierarchical working structure, which explicitly forbids the horizontal communication 
between the smaller teams.  The submarine provides a restrained environment, so that 
personal characteristics are controlled to create a sound working environment.  The tool 
should be quantitative and qualitative and should include opinions from several SME 
and HF experts (Figure 4.4).  
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 ‘High level HRA at the moment as there are too many to do everyone.  
Use DIF and LARP [low as reasonably possible] to calculate risk.”  
‘We have requirements that include undertaking reliability analysis.’ 
‘[HRA] Actual numbers, human error probabilities and things like 
that.  I think there is going to be a demand for more, full stop.  Not just 
numbers but qualitative argument as well. And I get the impressions from 
our regulators like the NII [Nuclear Installations Inspectorate] they want 
an argument around [the numbers].’  
‘[ROCCI] needs to have independent peer reviews’ 
‘Communications systems are certainly very important’ 
Figure 4.4: Quotations from Interview BU3 
 
4.5.4 BU 4: Aircraft 
This is a single seater cockpit, so there were no teams within the plane and they 
personally did not perform HRA (Figure 4.5).  They did see the need for a larger use of 
HRA, but as the aircraft was coming to the end of its lifecycle, it was not a priority.  
 
‘So workload is a big issue, but pilots hate the term workload.  There 
is a very high workload in the aircraft.’ 
 [SA] ‘Some things are more important to some people, so they don’t 
necessarily want exactly the same.  But the common information has got to 
be [the same].’ [e.g. talking about the same target on a screen, as they look 
different on different screens] 
[talking about LCM] ‘They see a weapon they would quite like to use 
but they have no idea how they are going to use it.  We work out how they 
want to use it and how they want to integrate it with the rest of the avionics 
system.  We say ‘these are your requirements’, so they have a look and say 
‘yeah they seem good enough’. 
Figure 4.5: Quotations from Interview BU4 
 
4.5.5 BU 5: Land Based 
The interviewee has had experience in the design of parts for a variety of different 
platforms.  The customer gives BAe Systems a list of system requirements, ‘we want 
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the system to do this, and we want it to be this good.’ These are often about pieces of 
equipment that go into the system and the human being is not always considered.  The 
interviewee believed that the development process should consider the human as part of 
the system (Figure 4.6).  That is not yet the case, so the interviewee had  very little work 
experience with human reliability to date.  He suggested that the tool should consider 
changes to the physical conditions of the platform, when it is at different stages or levels 
of alert.  The tool should be simple and consist of only seven statements.  Types of land-
based teams on which the tool could be used are either, a team of three using a single 
piece of equipment, or a large team on the ground where the relationships may be 
disorganized. 
 
‘We are looking at making systems more useable’ 
‘When we talk about the human we start talking about decisions, 
cognitive loading and all of these sorts of things’ 
Figure 4.6: Quotations from Interview BU5 
 
4.5.6 BU 6: Aerosystems 
 
‘Current method that we use for human reliability assessment are part 
of the development process for that.’ 
‘we wanted to get human factors embedded into the design process, 
including HRA’ 
‘A quantitative method to try and put it into a wider systems 
engineering process, where there is a lot of human reliability processes and 
stand alone, are qualitative’ 
Figure 4.7: Quotations from Interview BU6 
 
An in-house HRA method is currently used for individuals.  It is important that it fits 
with the current design process (Figure 4.7).  The requirements that are worked to are 
DEF STANS (UK MoD defence standards) and US military standards.  Customer 2 (the 
user of the product) is a critical part of the design process, and as they are SMEs, they 
suggest improvements throughout the design process.  The cockpit only consists of one 
or two people, a very small team and the HF of the team is already well established. 
Chp 4: Requirements Specification 
62 
UAVs are seen as the future in Aerosystems and they could be a need for a new 
collaborative HRA.   
 
4.5.7 Summary of Interview Results  
The aims of interviewing HF experts and HRA users are: 
• To determine which HRAs are currently being used 
• To determine how HRAs are used 
• To find where there is a gap in the HRA market 
• To determine the requirements of a future HRA tool 
• To approve the current model of team reliability. 
 
The Table 4.1 shows the response from each BU about the main aims of the interview.  
All interviewees thought that the model of team reliability was a good basis for a team 
HRA and they were all interested in the developments of the tool.  It was expressed 
several times that the human as part of the systems should become more important and 
included as a consideration in the design process.   
 
Table 4.1 Interview Aims for Each BU 
 
HRAs in Use How is HRA Used Gap in HRA Market 
Requirements for 
Future HRA 
BU1 Contractors 
decide, DIF or 
HAZOP. 
Early in design, 
must be included in 
ITT. 
Yes there is one Usable by all,  
2 sides of A4. 
BU2 THEA, but not 
used. 
Flexible to 
designers timescale. 
n/a 2 sides A4,  
cheap and early. 
BU3 DIF LARP High level,  
Need justifications 
and reasons, not 
numbers. 
n/a Communication,  
quan. & qual. 
Incl. SME 
opinions. 
BU4 None Equipment 
reliability is known  
n/a n/a 
BU5 None n/a Development 
process part of 
human system 
Easy,7 questions. 
BU6 In –house  
HRA tool. 
Quantitative, 
included in design 
process, use 
DEFSTANS 
n/a Quantitative 
Supported by 
qualitative. 
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4.6 Development of Model 
4.6.1 Requirements Specification of Model 
The information from the interviews was processed to create the Requirements Matrix 
(Table 4.2) for the tool.  The Requirements Matrix is a list of requirements and the 
reasons that each needs to be addressed.  From this, a House of Quality (Table 4.3) is 
produced.  This checklist shows that the requirements will be accounted for in ROCCI. 
 
The Interviews, Requirements Matrix and House of Quality revealed that the tool 
should:  
• be usable at a variety of levels 
• quick and easy 
• up front with a qualitative yes/no answer 
• usable by a wide variety of people 
• progressing towards a more quantitative complex tool for the later stages of the 
development process 
• to be used by HF experts.   
This information provided a foundation for the development of the tool. Instead of 
creating a new HRA, an existing method should be expanded.  
 
The requirements showed that the original HRA must have the following qualities: 
• a quantitative method 
• a prospective method 
• simple for engineers to use 
• not time consuming 
• be able to fit into the engineers current method of working. 
 
4.6.2 Choosing an HRA 
After reviewing several methods, HEART (Williams, 1986) was selected as the best 
method to provide a foundation for the new tool. It is a quantitative method that is easy 
to use and it helps engineers to locate the areas of highest risk.  This is essential if the 
tool is to aid development throughout the design process, rather than just provide 
overall probabilities.   
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Table 4.2: Requirements Matrix for ROCCI 
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Table 4.3: House of Quality for ROCCI 
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HEART uses a standard set of statements.  The benefit is that the qualitative 
justifications for the probability of error are credible.  However, only one of these 
statements relates to crew collaboration.  Another benefit is that HEART is already used 
by some employees at BAE Systems.  This will reduce the amount of learning and 
integration time needed to start using the tool.   
 
One component of HEART, the probabilities, was not accurate and had not been fully 
validated (Dougherty, 1990, Kirwan, 1997a, 1997b).  They needed to be reassessed and 
revised.  However, given that within the HRA industry, many tools are not fully 
validated, HEART values are within the normal range of variation for the industry.  
This, therefore, is not a serious obstacle to its use. 
 
The researcher had an initial reaction to the fact that HEART only has one statement 
relating to crew collaboration.  This initial reaction was the idea of creating an 
additional list of statements about crew collaboration within HEART,  But, on 
reflection, it was realised that this would make HEART itself too cumbersome for 
general use.  The solution and way forward, chosen by the researcher, was to create an 
alternative method of assessing team attributes.  This was developed as the CTS Matrix 
(Section 5.3.3.3). 
 
Use of tool:  given that this is an industry where there are few brand new designs being 
made, as most are modifications, e.g. the next frigate, rather than  a brand new one.  So 
it is not expected that this tool will be used on designing new products or capabilities, 
but on developments or revisions.  This means that the tool will be used for 
comparisons between the old product and new products.  The tool can be used on old 
capabilities to show where there are problems and then on a variety of new designs in 
order to select the best design.   
 
The tool can be used in two ways.  The first way is early in the design process, to 
evaluate the benefits of various design options.  The second way is later in or at the end 
of the design process, for a product that has been developed or already exists, to make 
assessment of  a range of design solutions for a new version of the product or for a 
simple improvement in the product. 
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4.6.3 Future Developments to ROCCI 
Given the different fields within BAE Systems and the formation of the various teams, 
decisions will need to be made about where/when/how and by whom the tool is going to 
be used.   
 
Here is a list of questions that were raised through the interviews. 
• How big should the team be and does this matter?  
• How important is access to the teams using the product/system? And how easy 
is it to get this access? 
• How important is the structure of the team?  A team that has worked together for 
a long time will have fewer variables than a team that is comes together 
sporadically.  This may be important for the early development stages of the 
tool. 
• Can a non-human be part of a team?  Which leads onto how far should the 
equipment be taken into account. 
 
The above questions will be addressed in the following chapter, which takes the 
information from the Requirements Specification to produce the model of team 
reliability, team structures and algorithms for the ROCCI tool. 
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Chapter Five: Development of ROCCI 
 
This chapter describes the development of ROCCI.  It includes the tool vision (Section 
5.1), the model of team reliability (Section 5.2) the interaction factors (Section 5.3), 
communication and trust matrix (Section 5.4), interaction algorithm (Section 5.5), team 
algorithm (Section 5.6) and how to perform ROCCI (Section 5.7). 
 
Reliability of Collaborative Crew Interactions (ROCCI) assesses a group of individuals, 
who are interacting with the same system or piece of equipment and whose procedures 
are all critical in achieving the same overall goal.  A model of team reliability (Figure 
5.1) is used as a basis for the tool.  From this, the interaction factors and algorithms 
were developed.   
 
5.1 Tool Vision 
It was envisioned that the tool would:  
• quantitatively assess the reliability of a team.  
• qualitatively predict areas of high risk 
• be usable and accessible to those who are not experts in human factors 
• be able to fit into the engineers current method of working 
• not be time consuming 
• educate designers in the importance of the human factors to produce high 
usability and reliability.  
It is important that the tool is usable by those who are not experts in human factors.  
Therefore the tool should not contain human factors jargon or require an interpretation 
from an ergonomist.  The tool should be transparent, so that designers and engineers can 
understand how the tool calculates team reliability.  The calculations need to be 
straightforward to use and it will contain simple algorithms.  
 
To facilitate this simplicity some assumptions must be made:  
• the process can be defined  
• a team/individuals can be allocated to roles 
• the team has stability 
• equipment used has 100% reliability. 
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Stability of the team is necessary for a representative reliability value.  When a team is 
first brought together, there is a period of introduction to each other’s skills, abilities 
and personalities (Section 2.4.6; Littlepage et al., 1997).  During this period 
relationships and personality differences are frequently changing and so the reliability 
of the team may be inconsistent. The interaction attributes require team members to 
have relationships and personal perceptions of the other team members, which are stable 
and established (Figure 2.11; Huczynski & Buchanan, 1991). 
 
The ROCCI tool provides three sets of data to help assess the team: 
• Individual probability of error P(E) 
• Interactive probability of error P(I) 
• Team probability of error P(T). 
 
Potential users of the tool are anyone from the Engineering Life Cycle (ELC), from 
concept designer to engineer including: 
• An ergonomist that is trained in using the tool 
• The customer to reassure themselves that the product reaches standards 
• Maintenance personnel using the tool retrospectively. 
 
5.2 Model of Team Reliability 
The development of the model of team reliability (Figure 5.1) was part of a BSc project 
(Reid, 2005).  The model is based around a procedure. The procedure is made up of a 
number of tasks.  These task (1-6) are performed by people in a team (A, B, C).  A, B 
and C all have an individual probability of error (P(E)) for performing their given tasks.  
This is calculated by an HRA, e.g. HEART.  As A, B and C are in a team they interact 
with each other.  These interactions change the P(E) to become P(I).  The variable 
component being the interaction factors.  These P(I) then amalgamate to become P(T).  
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Figure 5.1: Model of Team Reliability 
 
5.3 Interaction Algorithm  
5.3.1 Introduction 
To develop this model into a tool the following factors needed to be decided: 
• Which interaction factors would be used e.g. communication (Section 5.3) 
• How the interaction factors would  be combined e.g. a mathematical equation 
(Section 5.3)  
• How the effect interaction factors would be found e.g. expanding an HRA 
(Chapter 7) 
• How the amount of interaction between team members would be presented e.g. 
lines of communication (Chapter 7) 
• How all team structures would be accounted for in the tool e.g. hierarchical 
structure (Chapter 7). 
The answers will be described in the following sections.   
 
5.3.2 Number of Attributes 
The model of team work is the basis of ROCCI.  It needs to include quantitative 
measures.  The use of algorithms is a method of getting from a qualitative model to a 
model that included a quantitative probability of error.  This is where the researcher had 
to confront the practical problem of including too many variables in the algorithms for 
the tool.  The next paragraph is a demonstration of the reasoning behind the decision to 
eliminate a model with too many variables. 
 
Interaction Factors 
People Interactive 
Probability 
Team 
Probability 
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Probability 
Tasks 
P(T) 
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The interaction attribute scores for the individuals in the team would be used as a 
weighting factor to the P(E).  This would be a multiplier: e.g. P(I) = P(E) x Interaction 
Attribute Score1 x Interaction Attribute Score2 x Interaction Attribute Scoren.  Having 
many attributes, each being a weighting factor, would reduce or increase P(E) 
indefinitely, and the P(I) would become meaningless (Figure 5.2).  This also implies 
that all the attributes effect P(E) separately, but it is likely that there is an interaction 
between them.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Example of the Effect of Multiple Attributes on P(I) 
 
The consequence of the impracticability of using this type of algorithm in the Model 
was that the researcher had to select a very small number of core attributes, which were 
central influencers or indicators of team reliability.   
 
5.3.3 Interaction factors 
Each person in a team brings different attributes that can influence how the other people 
operate.  It is these factors that make the effect of the whole team better or worse than 
the sum of its parts.   
 
A long list of factors that effect team work was created.  These included: organisational 
structure, training, team cohesion, location, task resources, MMI, environment, culture 
(Hofstede, 1984, 1994), trust (Bonini, 2005), communication, language, personalities.  
This is too many variables and would have made the tool too complex and prevented it 
from being transparent.  It was not known which of the factors would more significantly 
influence the quality of the team work.  There was the risk that the tool could become 
too impracticable to use, or develop in to  a “black box” solution, where the calculations 
were hidden within a computerised tool.  Of these permutations, neither would be 
Here is an example of Multiple Attributes.  If all five 
attributes decreased the P(E) by 0.1, with the initial P(E) = 
0.2, then the final P(I) is unrealistically low:  
 
P(I) = 0.0002 x 0.1 x 0.1 x 0.1 x 0.1 x 0.1 
P(I) = 2 x10-9 
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understood by designers or engineers.  For these reasons of clarity, only core attributes 
were considered for inclusion in the model.  The list of factors was reduced to two, after 
a review of the literature (Chapter 2) combined with the discussions with SME’s 
(Chapter 4).  
 
The two core factors that were initially considered to have the greatest effect on the 
reliability of a team were: communication and trust, as defined below. 
 
5.3.3.1 Communication  
The effectiveness and efficiency of the communication and passing of information 
between team members.  The method of communication or passing of information 
should be appropriate for the interaction.   
 
In some cases hand gestures that are taught is all that is needed to communicate, so for 
effective communication the team members must be able to see each other at all times, 
and be trained sufficiently in the meaning of the hand gestures.  Another case would be 
the use of radio communication.  Here are some issues that should be considered when 
deciding the method of communication is sufficient: are the environmental conditions at 
both ends of the radio quiet enough so that information is not misunderstood; is there a 
specific technical language in which the radio operators should speak, if so are they 
trained sufficiently; are there many users of the radio communication trying to speak at 
the same time resulting in disconnected communications and loss of information. 
 
5.3.3.2 Trust 
This is a measure of the level of trust that exists between the team members and their 
confidence that each will perform the actions required, successfully and on time.  It is 
also the trust between team members to check, give and receive advice or criticism 
about the tasks they are performing and their ability to act on this information (Bonini, 
2005). 
 
A person who is known not to be sufficiently skilled to contribute fully to the team goal, 
may be given tasks that are at a lower level of skill, in order to sustain a reliable level of 
trust for the completion of these tasks.  The rest of the team then have to adjust to 
compensate.  Without both aspects of this adaptation, a team member may be placed in 
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a situation where they are expected to perform a task in which they are not adequately 
skilled or trained.  The consequence could well be that they will fail or fall short and so 
lose the trust of the other team members.  If serious, the whole success of the team goal 
could fail or fall short.   
 
The ability to monitor or check each other’s work and provide feedback is very 
important to prevent such errors being made.  When team members are informed of the 
potential for risk or failure of their actual or intended actions, they can either correct 
them or justify how their actions or decisions will still achieve the success of the team 
goal. 
 
5.3.3.3 Development of CTS Matrix 
Communication and trust are factors that interact each other. If a leader does not trust 
the work of a subordinate, there will be an increase in communications to ensure work 
is being done correctly.  This increases the workload of the leader and therefore could 
increase the probability of error.  At the other end of the spectrum, if two team members 
completely trust each other’s work, there may be only a small amount of 
communication occurring, but this could also lead to errors occurring and so increasing 
P(I). The relationship of communication and trust are calculated in the CTS matrix. 
 
Communication and trust for ROCCI are measured on a Likert Scale of 1 to 4 to create 
a matrix.  The values in the CTS (Communication Trust Score) matrix (Figure 5.3) are 
the interaction multipliers.  When deciding upon the multiplication factors in the matrix, 
several options were considered: 
• should the lowest multiplication factor be 1 (teams can only worsen)  
• should the highest multiplication factor be 1 (teams can only improve)  
• what should the range of values be (how much can team work change 
probability of error)  
• should the values vary equally across the table (do trust or team skills effect the 
team equally). 
 
Through SME discussions and literature review, it was decided that team work can both 
improve and worsen, depending on individual reliability.  As the team are working 
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together, they are checking each other’s work and noticing mistakes that may have been 
made.  But sometimes errors may slip through that are not detected by other team 
members.  Clear lines of communication, which minimises the amount of ‘noise’, would 
increase the likelihood of mistakes being detected.  If an error is made by a person and 
it is detected and commented on by another team member, then it is expected that the 
person will react correctly to the team member’s information.  For this to occur there 
must be enough trust between the team members to know whether the comments are 
valid or not.  
 
 Trust 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n  1 2 3 4 
1 2 1.9 1.8 1.7 
2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.2 
3 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.7 
4 1.7 1.2 0.7 0.5 
Figure 5.3: CTS Matrix 
 
The final interaction factors are between 0.5 and 2, i.e. the reliability could be halved 
(0.5) or doubled (2).  At this stage, the prototype scores were divided equally in the 
matrix. 
   
5.3.4 Interaction Algorithm 
P(E) is multiplied by the CTS to produce P(I).  This is the interaction of each of the 
individuals in the team (Figure 5.4).   
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸) × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
Figure 5.4: Relationship Between P(E) and CTS 
 
However, a person will interact with more than one person.  This could be a very large 
number or theoretically, an unlimited number of people.  The average of all the 
interaction is P(I).  Compiling an algorithm for this could have some difficulties.  As 
explained earlier, having a multiple of P(E) x CTS has the same effect as having 
multiple attributes (Figure 5.2).  It would be a challenge to formulate an algorithm that 
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considers the sum total of just one person interacting with a very large number of 
people.   
 
The researcher had to find a method of resolving this problem.  A simplistic solution is 
to divide the sum of the individual influences by the total number of persons with whom 
that one individual interacted.  
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴) = (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) + (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶) + ⋯ (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑛𝑛  
Figure 5.5: Interaction Algorithm 
 
This algorithm can be used for any number of people that someone interacts with and 
any team structure.  It also ensures  that the tool can manage various team structures, 
decision systems, and any number of people executing actions.  
 
5.4 Team Algorithm 
The main issue for consideration was how best to combine the individual reliabilities to 
create a credible and realistic team reliability.  Different ways of combining the P(I) 
were considered.  For example: 
• should they be linked as a fault tree 
• should they be averaged out with equal weighting.  
 
Various hierarchy structures, decision systems and the number of people at the ‘sharp 
end’ (those executing the actions of the team) all affect how the team is influenced by 
the individuals.  A series of algorithms have been produced to ensure that the tool can 
manage various team structures, decision systems and a variable number of people 
executing the actions. 
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Figure 5.6: Venn Diagram Showing Probabilities of Team Error 
 
There are various options for compiling the algorithm used in calculating the team 
probability of error.  The method of calculating P(T) in CREAM-T is to use a fault tree 
diagram with the associated mathematics.  This method is only partially appropriate for 
ROCCI.  For the team success to take place, only one person needs to successfully 
detect or correct the mistakes of the other team members.  Failure of the team only 
occurs when every member of the team makes an error (Figure 5.6), which is unlikely.  
P(T) can be found using the algorithm: P(T) = 1-(1-P(IA))(1-P(IB))(1-P(IC)). 
 
However, if a team consists of many people the P(T) could potentially be low.  Some 
method of accounting for the number of people in the team was needed.  This was done 
by dividing the probability score by the number of people in the team.   
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) = 1 − �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)��1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)�… �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)�
𝑛𝑛
 
Figure 5.7: Algorithm for Team Reliability 
 
For the team to be successful in attaining the goal, everyone one in the team must be 
successful.  The P(I) scores are the probability that an error is made, which is 1- the 
Person A 
P(IA) 
Person B 
P(IB) 
Person C 
P(IC) 
P(IA) 
P(IC) 
P(IA) 
P(IB) 
P(IC) 
P(IA) 
P(IB) 
P(IB) 
P(IC) 
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probability of failure = 1-P(I).  As everyone one must be successful, the success scores 
are multiplied together and then divided by the number of people in the team (Figure 
5.7).  This algorithm is only performed once and must include all active members of the 
team.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has portrayed the evolution of the research through the phases of the tool 
vision, model of team reliability, team attributes and the creation of the interaction and 
team algorithms.  It has been explained that their application is through the seven steps 
of ROCCI.  The next stage addresses the need for any quantitative measure to be 
verified before it is accepted as a valid operational tool for use in simulated or real life 
scenarios.  This early version of ROCCI was now ready to be tested through a 
sensitivity analysis (Chapter Six).   
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Chapter Six: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Any quantitative measure needs to be verified through sensitivity analysis (Petzold et 
al., 2006), if it is to be accepted as a valid operational tool for use in simulated or real 
life scenarios.  This chapter addresses this necessary stage of improving the 
applicability of the Team HRA tool ROCCI.  In order to proceed in a logical manner 
through this stage, it is presented in two main sections: Interaction Structures (Section 
6.1) and Sensitivity Analysis (Section 6.2). 
 
The first main section (Section 6.1) addresses the difficult topic of selecting Interaction 
Structures from the variations that can exist.  This examination begins with a look at the 
core structures themselves (Section 6.1.1).  It then elaborates these structures with flows 
of interaction and power influences (Section 6.1.2).  Only then is it possible to 
formulate the application of Interaction Structures for ROCCI (Section 6.1.3). 
 
The second main section (Section 6.2) is the Sensitivity Analysis testing itself.  This is a 
complex test but a very important and central component of this research project.  It was 
precisely an absence of a quantitative tool for a Team HRA that had been identified as 
the gap in the Tools needed by BAE Systems (Ng, 2003a, 2003b).  The researcher 
formulated the various algorithms so that they are not only valid and verifiable but, 
most importantly, they can be used by designers and engineers who are not HF experts. 
 
6.1 Development of Interaction Structures 
This section on the development of team structures begins with an examination of the 
core structures themselves (Section 6.1.1).  It then builds on this by making explicit the 
interaction flows, as well as the varying power influences (Section 6.1.2).  These two 
subsections were developed by the researcher specifically to apply to ROCCI (Section 
6.1.3). 
 
6.1.1 Leavitt (1951) 
Two sets of team structures have been identified in the literature.  These show how 
information is shared between team members.  The first set consists of four team 
structures of five people, in various configurations, which are described below.   
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Figure 6.1: Interaction Structures (Leavitt, 1951) 
 
The Star or Wheel ( 
Figure 6.1a) shows a central person with whom the other four people will talk.  The 
central person receives all the knowledge from all of the four other people.  The other 
four people do not talk to each other.  They only know their own information and any 
information, which is passed to them through the central person.  The central person has 
the control over the information flow.   
 
The Line or Chain ( 
Figure 6.1b) is similar to a chain of command where information can go up and / or 
down the chain.  Like a conveyor line in manufacturing, each person talks to the persons 
either side of them.  This can be a controlled form of information transfer. 
 
The Circle ( 
Figure 6.1c) is similar to the line or chain, but there is no beginning or end to the 
information flow, or top and bottom to the hierarchy.  Information can flow back and 
forth, but each person will only talk to the two closest people.   
 
The Y ( 
Figure 6.1d) is mixture of the Star or Wheel and Line or Chain.  The central person talks 
to only three of the four people.  The fourth person receives information from only one 
source, increasing their degree of separation from the other team members. 
 
a) Star / Wheel 
d) Y 
b) Line / Chain 
c) Circle e) Total 
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The Total (Figure 6-1e) is a development of the circle.  Lines of communication link 
each member of the team to each other.  This means that there is complete information 
flow between the team with no formal structure.  
 
6.1.2 Eason (1995; Sinclair, 2003) 
Eason’s team structures (Sinclair, 2003, Personal Communication), are more than 
communication lines and information flow.  They also represent power structure.   
 
 
Figure 6.2: Eason's Team Definitions 
(Sinclair, 2003; based on Eason, 1995) 
 
The Hierarchy (Figure 6.2a) consists of a superior and several subordinates.  One 
person allocates and controls the work that is being performed.  The subordinates have 
little direct communication with each other.  This is strongly used in a military 
environment.   
 
The Partnership (Figure 6.2b) is where each person is responsible for their own work, 
and they are all equal.     
 
A Crew (Figure 6.2c) is where each person has a specific job to perform that requires 
specific skills.  The result is that the people are not interchangeable. There is a specific 
flow of information down the crew, but this is not due to a hierarchy of power.  This 
a) Hierarchy 
One person allocates 
& controls work 
b) Partnership 
Each person responsible 
for own work; all equal 
f) Hotel 
People come and 
go as necessary 
d) Team 
People can be 
interchanged 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e) Planets 
One person is the 
knowledge guru 
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would be like a conveyor belt manufacturing line, where there is no flow of information 
back up the crew line.  
 
The Team (Figure 6.2d) is not a hierarchical structure.  However, each person performs 
roles, but the people can be interchanged and information can flow easily both ways 
between the people.   
 
The Planets (Figure 6.2e) are representative of planets circling the sun.  The “sun” is a 
central person on the team that holds information from all other team members, who are 
the “planets”.  The sun is the knowledge guru.  The planets must approach the sun for 
information that is required, but they cannot contact the other planets.  This type of team 
is used in the manufacture of a product where parts are being outsourced to different 
companies and the main company is the central link between all the plants and contacts.   
 
The Hotel (Figure 6.2f) is a team where people can come and go as they are needed.  
There is not a strict structure, hierarchy or communication flow.  An example of this 
would be in Social Care.  Here a person requires different resources, such as a social 
worker, doctor, psychiatrist, lawyer, probation officer, to help them, but these will 
change for each individual’s situation.  
 
6.1.3 Interaction Structures for ROCCI 
For ROCCI the interaction and flow of information between the team members is the 
critical element for the team structure.  Leavitt’s set of team structures (Section 6.1.1) 
does not show lines of information flow. Eason (Section 6.1.2) placed hierarchical 
structure as the key focus of the team definition. The interaction links in ROCCI were to 
be represented by a new set of team structures, created by the researcher (Figure 6.3).   
 
A ROCCI team consisted of four, rather than five, people.  As all interaction 
combinations can be represented by a minimum of four people in a team.  If there are 
more than four people in the team a combination of team structures could be used, or 
individual people can be added to the team structures.  During the creation process of 
the Interaction Structures the researcher identified that there were no teams that could 
not be described by these structures.  
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When performing ROCCI the structure of a team does not need to fit into one of the 
twelve ROCCI Interaction Structures.  These interaction structures were created so that 
the algorithms could be tested in each possible interaction structure.  When performing 
ROCCI the number of interaction links between team members is fundamental to the 
calculations.   
 
 
Figure 6.3: ROCCI Interaction Structures 
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In Figure 6.3, a circle is a person and each line represents an interaction link, this could 
be written, verbal or a visual.  The arrowhead represents the direction of the flow of 
communication.   
 
6.1.3.1 Direction of Interaction 
In general, there is an interaction in both directions, hence an arrowhead at both ends of 
the interaction line.  Each person in Interaction Structures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 have 
bi-directional interaction.  
 
In some cases, for example on a conveyor belt, where there is no direct feedback of 
information, there is only a one-way flow. If a product is transferred from person A to 
person B, person B can affect person A’s work.  But person A cannot affect person B’s 
work. Persons A’s work is only dependent on person A.  This is an example of 
restricted communication, as there is no opportunity for feedback. Interaction Structures 
6, 10, 11 and 12 represent one-way interaction. 
 
6.1.3.2 Number of Interaction Links 
Within a team there may be some people that interact with more people than other 
members of the team do. Alternatively, the team may be such that all members can 
interact with each other.  The ROCCI interaction Structures represent the various 
combinations of number of interactions. 
 
Structures 3, 4 and 8 represent an equal number of interactions links between all 
members of the team.   
 
Structures 2, 6, 10 and 11 have one person in the team that has more interaction links 
than the other people do in the team.   
 
Structures 5 and 9 represent a linear interaction flow.  The two people in the middle of 
the interaction flow have an equal number of interaction links to each other, but a 
greater number of links that those at the end of the interaction flow.  
 
Structures 1, 7 and 12 each consist of a team of people that have a varied number of 
interaction links.  
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6.1.4 Summary of Interaction Structures 
The ROCCI Interaction Structures were designed to ensure that ROCCI could represent 
all possible formations of team interactions.  This has been done by producing twelve 
interaction structures, each have different number of interaction links with the structure, 
between the people in the team and containing a variety on one-way and bi-directional 
interaction.  These Interactions Structures will be used to test the algorithms used in 
ROCCI. The different structures will highlight the sensitivity of the algorithms and the 
effect that the different structures can have on team reliability.  
 
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The ROCCI algorithms for Interaction Probability of Error P(I) and Team Probability of  
Error P(T) (Figure 6.3). are a fundamental aspect of the ROCCI ‘proof of concept’.   
The ability for these algorithms to pick up on changes in individual reliability or team 
interaction will enable the designer / engineer to predict which combination of team 
members, interaction links or product to use.  To test the ability of ROCCI to handle 
different inputted data and to predict P(I) and P(T) a sensitivity analysis was performed.   
 
For the purposes of the sensitivity analysis: 
• P(E)  Probability of individual error 
• CTS Communication-Trust Score 
• P(I) Probability of interactive error between each role (e.g. between A and B) 
• P(In) Probability of interaction error for a role (e.g. between A and B & C) 
• P(T) Probability of team error. 
 
Each of the twelve interaction structures contains four positions 1, 2, 3 and 4. So in a 
team there are four people A, B, C and D.  For each structure, the algorithms were 
tested for each person in every position, e.g.  1-A, 2-B, 3-C, 4-D, and then 1-B, 2-C, 3-
D, 4-A.  There are twenty-four possible combinations of people and positions for every 
structure.  So for each structure the algorithms are tested twenty-four times.  
 
The data needed for the interaction algorithm is P(E) and CTS for each person in the 
interaction. The sensitivity analysis tested the algorithms with various values for 
individual P(E) and CTS.  
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There were six combinations of values that were used to test the algorithms.  The first 
three combinations were to test the basic logic of the algorithms. The first test had P(E) 
= 0 and CTS = 0 (Section 6.2.1)  The second test had P(E) = 1 and CTS = 1 (Section 
6.2.2).  The third test had P(E) = 0.1 and CTs = 0.5 (Section 6.2.3).   
 
The next three combinations changed either the P(E) or CTS.  The fourth test had a P(E) 
= 0.1 but a variable CTS, 0.5<CTS<1.2 (Section 6.2.4), this produced a consistent P(I) 
for each person e.g. P(IAB) = 0.05, P(IAC)=0.05.  The fifth test had a variable P(E), 
0.1<P(E)<0.6 and a constant CTS = 0.9 (Section 6.2.5).  The sixth test had a constant 
P(E)=0.1 and a variable CTS, 0.5<CTS<1.2 (Section 6.2.6), this varies from the fourth 
test as the P(I) for each person varied, e.g. P(IAB) = 0.07, P(IAC)=0.09. 
 
The algorithms that being tested are: 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴) = (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) + (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶) + ⋯ (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑛𝑛  
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) = 1 − �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)��1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)�… �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)�
𝑛𝑛
 
 
Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.7 are a sequence to demonstrate the variety of interaction and their 
impact on reliability. The results will show the effect that P(E), CTS and team structure 
have on the overall reliability of the team.  Therefore, the P(T)  results will be displayed 
graphically and will be discussed further in the test.  
 
6.2.1 Constant Individual P(E) = 0.0, Constant CTS = 0 
The first combination of values was a consistent P(E) and CTS across all people in the 
team, P(E)=0.00, CTS=0.  This results in P(I) for each interaction of 0 (Table 6.1).  For 
all twelve team structures there was a consistent result P(T)=0.00.  
 
Person     P(E) CTS    P(I) 
   A B C D  A B C D 
A 0.0 x   0 0 0  =  0 0 0 
B 0.0 x 0   0 0  = 0  0 0 
C 0.0 x 0 0   0  = 0 0  0 
D 0.0 x 0 0 0    = 0 0 0  
Table 6.1: Interactions for P(E) = 0, CTS = 0 
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The use of the value zero (0) for the baseline figure is also a basic test of the algorithms 
and the possible team structures and formations. There are no variables, as 0 x 0 = 0. 
The probability of an individual making an error was negligible (P(E) =0).  There was 
no effect of interaction, P(IR) = 0.  As such, the team could not decrease their 
probability of error, nor is there a mathematical opportunity for an increase in 
probability of error, results of P(T)= 0.00. This is again as would be predicted by the 
mathematics, showing that the algorithms, team structures and formations are logical or 
suitable.  
 
6.2.2 Constant Individual P(E) =1.0, Constant CTS = 1 
The second combination of values was a consistent P(E) and CTS across all people in 
the team, P(E)=1.00, CTS=1.  This results in P(I) for each interaction of 1 (Table 6.2).   
 
Person  P(E)  CTS     P(I) 
   A B C D  A B C D 
A 1.0 x  1 1 1 =  1 1 1 
B 1.0 x 1  1 1 = 1  1 1 
C 1.0 x 1 1  1 = 1 1  1 
D 1.0 x 1 1 1  = 1 1 1  
Table 6.2: Interactions for P(E) = 1.0, CTS = 1 
 
For all twelve team structures there was a consistent result P(T)=0.25.  Figure 6.4 
graphically demonstrates the P(T) produced for possible people and role combinations 
in each structure.  Where all people and role combinations produced the same P(T) only 
one mark is displayed for that structure.  It was shown that the people and role 
combinations created different values when the P(E) and CTS combinations become 
more varied, see later Sections.   
 
 
Figure 6.4: P(E) = 1, CTS = 1, P(I) = 1 
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The use of the value, one, 1, for the baseline figure is a basic test of the algorithms and 
the possible team structures and formations. As 1 X 1 = 1, and 1 / 1 = 1, 1 is a special 
number. There were no other variables in the data. 
 
The probability of an individual making an error was certain (P(E) = 1).  The 
interactions each person makes with other people does not affect their individual 
probability of error (P(I) = 1).  However, when they work together as a team, the 
sensitivity analysis presents a decrease in probability of error (P(T)= 0.25).  The 
algorithms work as predicted.  The overall team error is ¼ of each person P(E).  The 
analysis showed that the algorithms passed the test.   
 
6.2.3 Constant Individual P(E)=0.10, Constant CTS = 0.5 
The third combination of values was a consistent P(E) and CTS across all people in the 
team, P(E)=0.10, CTS=0.5.  This results in P(I) for each interaction of 0.05 (Table 6.3).   
 
Person P(E)  CTS     P(IR 
   A B C D  A B C D 
A 0.10 x   0.5 0.5 0.5  =   0.050 0.050 0.050 
B 0.10 x 0.5   0.5 0.5  = 0.050   0.050 0.050 
C 0.10 x 0.5 0.5   0.5  = 0.050 0.050   0.050 
D 0.10 x 0.5 0.5 0.5    = 0.050 0.050 0.050   
Table 6.3: Interactions for P(E) = 0.1, CTS = 0.5 
 
The results of P(T) for this combination is not consistent across all team structures 
(Figure 6.5).  When the interaction was bi-directional (Structures 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9), or 
all team members had equal influence on the team (Structure 4) there was a consistent 
result P(T) = 0.0464, which shows a marginal decrease in probability of error.  For 
structures that had one-way interaction the reliability of the team appeared to decrease, 
(Structures 7, 10, 11 and 12 P(T) = 0.57) and (Structure 6 P(T) = 0.67).   
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Figure 6.5: P(E) = 0.1, CTS = 0.5 
 
This shows that the algorithms are sensitive to the slight changes in the structures. The 
P(I) for those three people that have least interactive influence on the team had least 
influence on the P(T).  And as this circumstance P(I = 0.05) decreased the probability of 
error of the team,  there will be less of a decrease, and so P(T) will be higher.   The 
opposite would occur if there is a high CTS and therefore and increase in P(I).   
 
6.2.4 Constant Individual P(E) = 0.1, Variable CTS, Constant P(I) for Each 
Person  
The fourth combination of values was a consistent P(E)=0.1 for all members of the team 
and a varied CTS score, 0.5<CTS<1.2.  This resulted in a variation of interaction 
probabilities, 0.05<P(I)<0.12 (Table 6.4) across the people in the team, but constant for 
each person, e.g. P(IAB) = P(IAC) = 0.05. 
 
Person  P(E)  CTS     P(I) 
   A B C D  A B C D 
A 0.1 x   0.5 0.5 0.5  =   0.05 0.05 0.05 
B 0.1 x 0.7   0.7 0.7  = 0.07   0.07 0.07 
C 0.1 x 0.9 0.9   0.9  = 0.09 0.09   0.09 
d 0.1 x 1.2 1.2 1.2    = 0.12 0.12 0.12   
Table 6.4: Interaction for P(E) = 0.1,  Variable CTS, Constant P(I) 
 
Figure 6.6 shows that when all interactions were bi-directional P(T) = 0.0731 
(Structures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9).  This is because the interaction probabilities for each 
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person are constant e.g. a = 0.05, b = 0.07, so the team reliability scores are made from 
the same values.  However, when the interaction is one-way the location of the people 
in the team and the influence that they have on interactions will affect the P(T) even if 
the structure of the team does not change (Structures 6, 7, 10, 11 and 12).   
 
 
Figure 6.6: P(E) = 0.1, Variable CTS, Constant P(I) 
 
The structures where there are multiple P(T) were investigated to further understand 
affect the values have on the algorithms.  In Structure 6 (Figure 6.8), where two 
positions (2 and 4) have no effect on the other positions in the team.  When the most 
people with the lowest CTS are in these positions the P(T) will be higher as these 
people have no opportunity to increase the reliability of the team.  Figure 6.8 shows that 
when A (P(I)=0.5) and B (P(I)=0.7) are in positions 2 and 4 the P(T)=0.088.  However 
when C (P(I)=0.9) and D (P(I)=1.2) and in positions 2 and 4 P(T) = 0.071. 
  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Interaction Structure 6 with non-influencing positions highlighted 
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Figure 6.8: P(E) = 0.1, Variable CTS, Constant P(I), Structure 6 
  
This same effect is seen in Structures 7, 11 and 12. For these structures there are four 
alternative P(T) values (Figure 6.9).    For these structures there is only one influencing 
position.  For Structure 7 it is position 2, for Structure 1 it is position 4 and for Structure 
12 it is position 3.  When the person with the lowest CTS is in these positions the P(T) 
will be its highest as these people will have least influence on the working of the team.  
 
Figure 6.9: P(E) = 0.1, Variable CTS, Constant P(I), Structure 7, 11, 12 
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Figure 6.10: Structures 7, 11 and 12 non-influencing positions highlighted 
 
Having a constant P(E)=0.1 and a variable CTS shows that the location of the people 
within the team can have an affect on the overall reliability of the team. When an 
engineer / designer is using ROCCI it is important for them  to remember that if there is 
one person that is highly trusted and capable they cannot have a positive influence on 
the team if they cannot interact with the team.      
 
6.2.5 Variable P(E), Constant CTS = 0.9 
The fifth combination of values was a variable P(E), 0.1<P(E)<0.6 and a consistent 
CTS=0.9 for all members of the team.  This resulted in a variation of interaction 
probabilities, 0.09<P(I)<0.54 across the people in the team, but constant for each 
person, e.g. P(IAB) = P(IAC) = 0.54 (Table 6.5: Interactions for P(E) Variable, CTS = 
0.9).   
 
Person P(E) CTS    P(I) 
   A B C D  A B C D 
A 0.6 x   0.9 0.9 0.9  =  0.54 0.54 0.54 
B 0.5 x 0.9   0.9 0.9  = 0.45  0.45 0.45 
C 0.2 x 0.9 0.9   0.9  = 0.18 0.18  0.18 
D 0.1 x 0.9 0.9 0.9    = 0.09 0.09 0.09  
 
Table 6.5: Interactions for P(E) Variable, CTS = 0.9 
 
Figure 6.11: Various P(E) , CTS = 0.9Figure 6.11 shows that when all interactions were 
bi-directional P(T) = 0.0203 (Structures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9).  This is similar to the 
results of the Fourth Combination.      
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Figure 6.11: Various P(E) , CTS = 0.9 
 
When there was a single one-way interaction, that individual has least influence on the 
P(T). Figure 6.12 shows the effect of the outlying Individual on the overall P(T). 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Effective positions for structures 10, 11 & 12 
 
When two individuals have one-way interaction, e.g. Structure 6, then both people will 
effect P(T) ( Figure 6.13). 
0.202
0.204
0.206
0.208
0.210
0.212
0.214
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
P(
T)
ROCCI Interaction Structure
0.202
0.204
0.206
0.208
0.210
a b c d
Effective people in position: 
Structure 11 - position 4; Structure 10 & 12 - position 3
P(
T)
  Chp 6: Sensitivity Analysis 
93 
 
Figure 6.13: Effect of Two One-Way Interactions when  P(E) = Variable, CTS = 
0.9, Structure 6 
 
When only two-way interaction structures (Structures 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9), or all team 
members had equal influence on the team (Structures, 3, 4 and 8) there was a consistent 
result P(T) = 0.203.  In structure 6 (Figure 6.4) only 1 and 3 have an effect on another 
person, 2 and 4 do not affect another person.  The lower P(T) shown in the graph occur 
when the highest P(E) are in positions 1 and 3, as their P(I) is lower than their P(E), so 
their contribution to the P(T) is lower. In structure 10, person 3 has no interaction links.  
There is a positive relationship between the P(E) of person 3 and P(T).   This is because 
P(E) is used in the P(T) calculation for person 3, rather than P(I), and P(E) is higher 
than P(I).  If CTS was 1.2, then P(I) would be higher than P(E) and a negative 
relationship would be seen.  Structures 7, 11 and 12, supported this pattern. 
 
The algorithms mathematically show how teams can improve the reliability of an 
individual and that this affects the reliability of the team.   
 
6.2.6 Constant Individual P(E) = 0.1, Variable CTS Score, Variable P(IR) 
for each person 
The fifth combination of values was a consistent P(E) = 0.1, for all members of the team 
and a variable 0. 5<CTS<1.2.  This resulted in a variation of interaction probabilities, 
0.05<P(I)<0.12 across each person, e.g. P(IAB) = 0.07  P(IAC) = 0.09  (Table 6.6).   
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Person P(E) CTS    P(I) 
   A B C D  A B C D  
A 0.1 x   0.7 0.9 1.2  =   0.07 0.09 0.12  
B 0.1 x 0.5   0.9 1.2  = 0.05   0.09 0.12  
C 0.1 x 0.5 0.7   1.2  = 0.05 0.07   0.12  
D 0.1 x 0.5 0.7 0.9    = 0.05 0.07 0.09    
Table 6.6: Interactions for P(E) = 0.1, Variable CTS, Variable P(I) 
 
Due to the variability of P(I) the values for P(T) are more varied than the previous 
combinations.  Figure 6.14 shows that when there is an equal level of interaction 
between all team members the P(T) is constant (Structures 3, 4 and 8).  This knowledge 
can be applied, so that when a team has equal communication links with all the other 
members of the team, the P(T) will not change as each person is having an equal effect 
on the team.  
 
Structures 1, 2, 5 and 9 no longer have a single value for P(T).  Structures 10 and 11 
still have four values, this implies that there is one position in the team that has a greater 
or lesser effect on the P(T) than the other positions (as discussed in previous sections).  
For this combination Structure 2 has four values for P(T) (Figure 6.15).  The person in 
position 1 has the most effect on the team, when the person is A with whom other 
people have a low CTS then the overall P(T) is also low.   
 
 
Figure 6.14: P(E) = 0.1, CTS = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.2, P(I) varied across Person 
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Figure 6.15: P(E) = 0.1 CTS varied across people: Structure 2 
 
Structures 5 and 9 have a similar shape, they are a line of four people, where the end 
people cannot interact with each other.  The two people in the middle of the line have a 
greater impact of the P(T) than the two people at the end of the line.  When the lowest 
P(I) are in these positions the P(T) is lower,  e.g. when A and B are in these positions 
P(T) = 0.066 (Figure 6.16)   
  
Figure 6.16: P(E) = 0.1, Variable CTS and P(IR), Structure 9 
 
The sixth combination of P(E) and CTS values has shown that the algorithms are 
sensitive to the different structures that have been applied and to the data inputted into 
the calculations.  The structures that have bi-directional interaction produce a more 
consistent P(T) when the people rotate positions around the structure.  This suggests 
that bi-directional interaction is better for team work as it produces a more consistent 
team work.  
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6.3 Conclusions 
The algorithms for P(I) and P(T) were tested against four team members in twelve 
interaction structures.  When constant basic values (0, 1) were used the algorithms 
behaved in a predictable manner.  When variable P(E), CTS or P(I) were used the 
significance of the team structures and outlying team members became apparent.  This 
theoretically showed that team structure affected the reliability of the team.   
 
If an unreliable or non-team player were a central person in the teams configuration the 
reliability of the whole team would be more negatively affected than if this person was 
an outlier to the team, or if the central person was reliable and had good team skills.  
 
The Sensitivity analysis produced the results that the algorithms can show the 
importance of individual members of the team, whether that is based on their placement 
in the team or their ability to perform a task.  This sensitivity analysis showed that the 
algorithms, structures and formation can cope with the variety of input and is sensitive 
to the data.  
 
6.3.1 Use in Safety Cases 
It has been shown that, in theory, the ROCCI algorithms can account for variations in 
team structure, P(E) and CTS.  Engineers and designers who will use ROCCI 
throughout the design process of a piece of equipment or capability can use this 
information.  This can be done in a number of ways.  
 
Changing the number of interaction links in the team 
If the team is dispersed the method and bandwidth of communication available may 
affect the number of interaction links possible.  Inputting different team configurations 
into ROCCI can investigate how communication and structure affects the 
communication scores.  
Changing the person in each position 
When deciding which member of the team should perform which function the level of 
experience can be used to inform the structure.  The algorithms will assist in 
determining the effect of P(E), how well the person will perform the task, and team 
structure on the overall reliability of the team.  The engineer/designer may advise to 
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ensure that an experienced member of the team is responsible for performing a complex 
task, whilst an inexperienced member should perform fewer and more simple tasks, as 
each team member will be less likely to perform an error in the suggested role. 
Comparing Different Products 
The Engineer/Designer may have the opportunity to compare several possible products 
to purchase.  These are likely to have different configurations of team members, 
methods of communications and skills required to perform a task.  Using the ROCCI 
algorithms will help the engineer to decide which product will enable the team to 
perform most reliably.   
 
6.3.2 Modification to ROCCI  
6.3.2.1 Inclusion of Decision Making Power Distance (PD) 
After performing the sensitivity analysis the level of responsibility within the team and 
the influence one person may have over the other became important.  The solution that 
the researcher identified and applied was the use of PD (decision making Power 
Distance).  Hofstede’s (1984) definition of high power distance is a dependence of 
subordinates on superiors with little inclination to question decisions (a dictatorship).  
Low power distance is preference for consultation.   
 
In ROCCI decision making power distance (PD) is a weighting factor from (low) 1 to 5 
(high).  The higher the PD score, the more that team member will influence the person.  
This is important as information and instructions received from a person that is more 
senior are more likely to be followed than information and instructions received from a 
person, who is more junior.  Thus, the senior team member’s interaction will have more 
of an effect on the individual than that of the junior team member’s.   
 
In any team, there is a decision hierarchy and ultimately somebody will take 
responsibility for the decision made. This person is at the top of the hierarchy.  Those 
that do not have this responsibility are lower in the hierarchy.  The difference in PD 
level is the primary interest.  
 
6.3.2.2 Measuring PD 
To calculate decision hierarchy, the sum PD score for each pair of team members that 
interact will equal 6.  If they are at an equal level in the hierarchy, each PD score will be 
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3.  A large PD will exist if there is little or no discussion of instructions and decisions, 
the PD scores will be 1 and 5.  A small PD exists if decisions and instructions are made, 
but the other team member can discuss these, the PD scores will be 2 and 4.   
 
If people have equal power over decisions in the group, then they are level on the 
hierarchy.  If there are two people that take responsibility for all decisions and the 
success of the team, then these two people are at an equal level.   
 
PD is not the number of levels between one person in a team and another. 
 
6.3.3 Summary 
Chapter Six has examined in depth the sensitivity analysis of team reliability in a range 
of team structures.  Chapter Seven will be a full review of the contribution, the potential 
for development and current limitations of ROCCI. 
 
  Chp 7: Discussion 
99 
Chapter Seven: Discussion 
 
Chapter Six on Sensitivity Analysis has fully explained the way ROCCI has been 
applied to test the team reliability of the alternative team structures.  The graphs 
associated with the test of each structure have been explained and presented in a way 
that permits easy comparison between structures.   
 
This Chapter Seven, Discussion, is a fuller review of ROCCI.  This review provides the 
detail of the different contributions that ROCCI might make, including its use in 
relation to Safety Cases.  It provides a critical review of ROCCI that describes its 
potential and also discusses its present limitations. 
 
The Chapter uses a worked example to illustrate the Seven Step Process of ROCCI, and 
the contribution that ROCCI might make.  The example is that of a sailing crew in 
action consisting of the captain, a deckhand and a helmsman.  Whenever the worked 
example is used it is placed within a green box (Figure 7.1). 
 
 
Figure 7.1: A Worked Example of a Sailing Crew  
 
7.1 Performing ROCCI 
7.1.1 Introduction 
The effect of the interaction factors are found by applying ROCCI to the individuals.   
The interaction multiplier, CTS, is applied to each individual’s probability of error P(E), 
producing P(I).  These are combined to provide the team error probability P(T). 
 
Using Kirwan’s (1994) ‘10 HRA Stages’ (Figure 7.2), the shaded areas represent which 
parts of the HRA process are covered by ROCCI.  
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Figure 7.2:The 10 HRA Stages (Kirwan, 1994) 
 
The first steps in ROCCI are to define the process and allocate roles to team members.  
These are necessary for the individual HRA as well as ROCCI.  ROCCI consists of 
seven steps, the first three are needed for the individual HRA.  Steps five and six are 
used to calculate the interactive probability of error.  Steps six and seven assess the 
overall team reliability.   
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This provides three sets of data to help assess the team: 
1. Individual probability of error: P(E) (Steps 1-3) 
2. Interactive probability of error: P(I) (Steps 4-6) 
3. Team probability of error: P(T) (Steps 6-7). 
 
Definitions of annotation for ROCCI are provided: 
P(EA)  Probability of individual error for A 
P(IA)  Probability of interactive error for A 
PDAB  Decision making Power Distance between A and B 
ΣPDA  Total number of PD for A 
CTSAB  Communication Trust Score between A and B 
P(T)  Probability of team error 
Σt  Number of people in the team 
 
7.1.2 Overview of ROCCI Process 
ROCCI is a seven step process, as can be seen in Figure 7.3.  If there is already a HRA 
process in place, then ROCCI can be used as an ‘add – on’ to that current work, as 
many of the steps will already be covered in the existing HRA process.  
 
Step 1: Define the team and task (Section 7.2.1) 
Determine the boundaries of the task and the team that is being assessed. Identify the 
equipment that is used for communication and sharing information. 
Step 2: Produce task analysis for each role (Section 7.2.2) 
Define the tasks that each person performs.  This will help confirm the identity of the 
equipment that the team members use to communicate and with whom they are 
interacting. 
Step 3: Perform HRA for each role (Section 7.2.3) 
The task analysis can be used to perform the HRA for each person.  Any method that 
provides a quantitative probability of error can be used.  The individual HRA assesses 
many of the attributes that affect the reliability of each person.  This means that only a 
few additional attributes are needed to assess the reliability of the team. 
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Figure 7.3: Advised Methods to be Used During the Seven Step Process of ROCCI 
 
Step 4: Determine the interaction links (Section 7.2.4) 
Clarify who interacts with whom in the team.  This step is the key to ROCCI.  It is these 
lines of interactions that the CTS and PD scores evaluate. This step produces a 
diagrammatic representation of the interactions. 
Step 5: Determine the CTS and PD (Section 7.2.5) 
Communication, Trust and Decision Making Power Distance are the three attributes that 
are used to assess the reliability of the team. Communication and trust combine to 
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produce the CTS. CTS and PD scores for each interaction are used in the equations for 
interaction and team reliabilities. 
Step 6: Calculate the interaction and team reliabilities (Section 7.2.6) 
Use the CTS and PD scores for each interaction to calculate how a person interacting 
with their team mates affects their probability of error P(I). The P(I) scores are then 
used to calculate the overall team probability of error P(T). 
Step 7: Evaluate the need to modify task/team (Section 7.2.7) 
The suitability of P(T) can be assessed, on whether it is suitably low, or how it 
compares to other structures of the team.  Modifications to the team structure and 
interactions can be made to improve P(T) if required.  
 
7.2  Seven Steps to ROCCI 
These seven steps will now be described in detail with worked examples (Sections 7.2.1 
to 7.2.8). 
 
7.2.1 Step 1: Define the Task and Team 
The aim of the first step is to define the task that is to be studied and so focus the 
designer / engineer on the goal of the team and who is in the team.   
 
A definition of a team is  
‘two or more individuals who must perform distinct, complementary 
or independent tasks in pursuit of a common, specified goal.  Teams must 
communicate as well as share information and resources in order to meet 
their goal(s). (P.794, Salas et al., 2005) 
 
This definition is used to help define the boundaries around the task and team.   
‘two or more individuals’ – there must be at least two individuals in the team. How 
many people are there in the team? 
‘perform distinct, complementary or independent tasks’ – the tasks are those that each 
team member performs.  These can be different from the other team members or the 
same.  The location of the team does not matter.  They can either be together or 
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separated by space and time.   The tasks that each person performs must be capable of 
being defined with clarity. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Defining Task and Team Form. With Example Answers Shown. 
 
‘in pursuit of a common specified goal’ – this is what makes the team a team, all team 
members must have a common goal. Once this has been determined the task and team 
may become more clear. 
‘teams must communicate as well as share information and resources’ – 
communication and sharing of information is critical to deciding who is in the team.  It 
is these links that creates the team structure.  A person who does not communicate or 
share information with another person in the team is not part of that team.  Therefore 
they should not be included in the analysis.  It may be found that some people in the 
The Goal: 
 
To perform a gybe to change tack whilst sailing in waters where there may be 
submerged reefs.  This is performed during the day, but the weather conditions are 
wet, making verbal communication at a distance difficult.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tasks performed by each team member to complete the goal:  
 
The Captain will decide when to perform the gybe, considering the sea conditions, 
submerged reefs and weather conditions. He will also instruct the deckhand and 
helmsman on the functions they must perform.  
 
The helmsman will steer the boat into the wind at the correct time.  
 
The Deckhand will furl and unfurl the jib, and main sail.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of people in the team:  
 
There are three members in the team.  Captain, Deckhand and helmsman, whom all 
interact with each other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The methods used for communication/sharing information or resources:   
Main form of communication is hand signals, which have been taught.  Along with 
talking/shouting to each other along the deck of the boat or face-to-face 
communication in the cockpit area. Communication is sometimes passed down a line 
of team members along the length of the boat when visibility and audibility is 
difficult/low.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Define Task and Team Form 
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team may only communicate with one other team member, whereas other team 
members will interact with a majority of the team.  An unevenness in interaction does 
not matter.  It is the interaction links that are studied, not the team as a whole, and so 
this will be accounted for later on in the tool.  
 
In a military setting there is a very hierarchical working structure.  The team could 
include many levels of the hierarchy, but that may have very little impact on the 
reliability of the team. It must be decided at this point, who should be included in the 
team.  This should become more obvious when the goal that the team must reach is 
decided and defined.   
 
A tool to aid the designer in defining the information about the team, the Task and 
Team Form (Figure 7.4), was produced. 
 
7.2.2 Step 2: Produce a Task Analysis for Each Role 
This further defines the tasks and team that is being assessed.  Any method of task 
analysis can be used (e.g. HTA).  The next step is to provide a link analysis of the 
interactions of the team members (e.g. TTA). 
 
7.2.3 Step 3: Perform HRA on Each Role 
When the task analysis has been created, it is possible to perform HRA on each team 
member to calculate the P(E) for each person.  Any quantitative HRA method can be 
used (e.g. HEART (Williams, 1986), CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998)). If a person performs 
many actions in the defined task  a fault tree should be created.    
 
7.2.4 Step 4: Determine the Interaction Links 
The tasks that each team member performs (Steps 2 & 3) show that team members 
interact with each other.  Step 4 represents the interaction links in a diagram to aid 
visualisation of the team, and show factors that would not normally be seen, e.g. one 
person interacts with many people, yet has very poor lines of communication.  Each 
team structure is drawn individually; implying that any team structure can be 
represented using the same method and algorithms (Figure 7.5). 
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Figure 7.5: Interaction Diagram of Three Crew Members from Case Study 2  
 
7.2.5 Step 5: Determine CTS and PD 
The three main factors that can affect the reliability of a team are communication, trust 
and decision making power distance (PD).  These are defined below: 
Communication: the efficiency and effectiveness of the communication. 
Trust: the amount of trust there is between team members to perform the work to their 
best ability; and the trust that is there for team members to check each other’s work and 
receive criticism on their work. 
Decision Making Power Distance (PD): PD is a weighting factor, the higher the PD 
score the more the person will be influenced by that team member.  This is important as 
information and instructions received from a more senior person are more likely to be 
followed than information and instruction received from a person that is more junior, 
thus the senior team member’s interaction will have more effect on individuals. 
 
Communication and Trust are interdependent factors and so their scores combine to 
produce the Communication Trust Score (CTS). 
 
7.2.5.1 ROCCI Assessment Form  
For each interaction link, the scores for CTS and PD need to be identified.  The ‘ROCCI 
Assessment Form’ (Figure 7.6) is completed for each person by selecting the correct 
score for each interaction link.   
 
Question A relates to the PD (scored 1-5); Question B relates to the amount of trust 
score for the work to be performed (scored 1-4); Question C relates to the trust in the 
value of the interaction (scored 1-4). Questions B and C represent the two aspects of 
trust; a simple matrix is used to combine these scores to provide a single score for trust 
C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C – Captain 
D – Deckhand 
H – Helmsman  
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(Table 7.1). Question D relates to the quality and efficiency of the communication 
(scored 1-4). 
 
 ROCCI Assessment Form 
A Assess the difference in hierarchical decision making between each team 
member.  
1 Inferior, instructions will be given and will rarely be questioned or overridden. 
2 Inferior, advice/instructions will be given, these and decisions will be discussed. 
3 Equal, advice/instructions are given between team members, and they do not have to be 
followed. 
4 Superior, advice/instructions will be received,  these and decisions will be discussed 
5 Superior, instructions will be received and will be rarely questioned or over-ridden. 
         
B Assess each team member on how much they should be trusted to complete the 
work that was set for them to do. 
1 The work will probably not be done 
2 The work will be of low quality or incomplete or late 
3 The work will be done on time, but would not be of good quality 
4 The work will be done on time, and would be of good quality 
         
C Assess each team member on the value of their views on aspects relating to the 
task. 
1 Their views could be inappropriate and irrelevant 
2 They will not have many views on the task 
3 Their views will be a mixture of inappropriate and valuable  
4 Their views will usually be well justified and were valuable 
         
D Assess how the efficiency and effectiveness of communication and transferring 
information between team members. 
1 The communication will be insufficient, it will be hard to pass documents and facts or 
have discussions between each other.  
2 The communication was insufficient, either documents and facts could be sent OR 
discussions were sufficiently supported, but not both. 
3 The communication was sufficient, documents and facts could be sent, and discussions, 
but some problems occurred. 
4 The communication was sufficient; if information was needed at any point it was easily 
shared, and discussed, with very few problems. 
         
Interaction Link  Quest. A Quest. B Quest. C Quest. D 
          
          
          
          
 
Figure 7.6: One Page ROCCI Assessment 
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Table 7.1: Trust Matrix 
 Question B 
Q
ue
st
io
n 
C
  1 2 3 4 
1 1 1 2 3 
2 1 2 3 3 
3 2 3 3 4 
4 3 3 4 4 
 
Communication-Trust Score (CTS) 
Communication and trust are attributes that are interdependent.  For example if there is 
good trust between the team members, the effect of communication may be less 
important.  Equally, if there is bad trust between the team members, there may be a 
greater need for good communication and if it is not provided there may be severe 
consequences on the team success.  For this reason, communication and trust are 
combined to give the CTS.  CTS is a multiplying factor to the individual probability of 
error P(E).  Figure 7.7 shows the CTS for each interaction (Communication - Trust).  
These scores are then used in the CTS matrix (Table 7.2) to provide the final CTS in the 
CTS and PD scores table (Table 7.3). 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Interaction Diagram Showing Communication Score and Trust Score 
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(Communication Score: Trust Score)  
C – Captain 
D – Deckhand 
H – Helmsman  
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Table 7.2: CTS Matrix 
 Communication 
Tr
us
t 
 1 2 3 4 
1 2 1.9 1.8 1.7 
2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.2 
3 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.7 
4 1.7 1.2 0.7 0.5 
 
Table 7.3:  CTS and PD for Each Interaction 
 Comms Trust CTS PD 
CD 4 2 1.2 1 
CH 3 2 1.7 2 
DC 2 3 1.7 5 
DH 4 4 0.5 3 
HC 2 4 1.2 4 
HD 3 3 1.2 3 
 
The final CTS and PD should now be placed on the interaction diagram (CTS:PD) 
(Figure 7.8). 
 
 
Figure 7.8: CTS and PD Score on Interaction Diagram 
 
7.2.6 Step 6: Calculate Interaction and Team Probabilities  
To perform the interaction calculations the information needed is: 
1. P(E) for each person 
2. CTS for each interaction 
3. PD for each interaction. 
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(CTS: PD)  
C – Captain 
D – Deckhand 
H – Helmsman  
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7.2.6.1 Interaction Algorithm 
The individual probability of error (P(E)) found from the HRA (Step 3) remains the 
basis for the interaction reliability for each person.  The CTS is a multiplying factor to 
the P(E) as it is believed that these are the main attributes of team work that strongly 
effect reliability. Probability of Interactive error (P(I)) is calculated using the Algorithm 
for interactive Reliability (Figure 7.9). 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴) = (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) + (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶) + ⋯ (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)ΣPDA  
Figure 7.9: Algorithm for Interactive Reliability for Each Person 
 
The worked example of the sailing crew (Figure 7.10) demonstrates the Algorithm 
for interaction. The probability of error for each team member is shown in .  The 
interaction Algorithm will be used to calculate P(I) for the Captain, Deckhand and 
Helmsman, presented in  
Table 7.5.  
 
Table 7.4: Table of Probabilities of Error for Each Sailing Crew 
Team Members Probabilities of Error 
C Captain P(EC) 0.5 
D Deckhand P(ED) 0.3 
H Helmsman P(EH) 0.2 
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Figure 7.10: Calculation in Interaction Algorithms 
 
Table 7.5: Table of Probabilities of Interaction for Each Sailing Crew 
Team Member Probabilities of Interaction 
C Captain P(IC) = 0.76 
D Deckhand P(DD) = 0.38 
H Helmsman P(HH) = 0.24 
 
7.2.6.2 Team Algorithm 
For the team to be successful in attaining the goal, everyone in the team must be 
successful.  The P(I) scores are probability that an error is made – the probability of 
failure.  The probability of success = 1-probability of failure,   = 1-P(I).  As everyone 
must be successful the success scores are multiplied together, and then divided by the 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) = (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃) + (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)ΣPDC  
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) = (0.5 × 1.2 × 1) + (0.5 × 1.7 × 2)3  
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) = 0.76 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃) = (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶) + (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶)ΣPDD   
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃) = (0.× 1.7 × 5) + (0.3 × 0.5 × 3)8  
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃) = 0.38 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) = (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) + (𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶)𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)ΣPDH  
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) = (0.52 × 1.2 × 3) + (0.2 × 1.2 × 4)7  
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) = 0.24 
Calculation of P(I)  for Captain, Deckhand and Helmsman using 
the  Interaction Algorithm 
 
P(I) for Captain 
P(I) for Deckhand 
P(I) for Helmsman 
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number of people in the team (Figure 7.11).  This is only performed once, and must 
include all active members of the team.  
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) = 1 − �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶)��1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃)��1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶)�
Σt  
Figure 7.11: Algorithm for Team Reliability 
 
Demonstration to calculate Team Algorithm.  The P(I) for each member of the team are 
shown in Table 7.5.  Figure 7.12is a demonstration of the team algorithm . 
 
 
Figure 7.12: Calculation of Team Reliability 
 
By comparing these values to the P(I) values for each person, it can be seen that 
working in a team has reduced the probability of error for most of the members of the 
team.  An overall probability of error for the team is 0.30, this is less than the reliability 
of the captain or the deckhand, therefore, in this case, working as a team is beneficial.  
 
7.2.7 Step 7: Assessment of the Reliability Score 
There are several ways in which to use the score for the reliability of the team 
It can be used to see if the team is suitably reliable for the safety case 
• If this is a redevelopment of a product that is already available and in use, then 
the new product or system can be compared against the original to ensure that 
the team does not decrease its reliability.   
 
• Modifying the number of people in the team, the methods of interaction, the 
hierarchy level and the training of the team may affect the reliability of the 
product or system and so some experimentation of different inputs can be used 
to work out the most suitable set up of the team.  
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) = 1 − �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶)��1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃)��1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶)�
Σt  
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) = 1 − (1 − 0.76)(1 − 0.38)(1 − 0.24)3  
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) = 0.30 
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• The product or system can be compared against other similar products that are 
already available, but made by competitors, to show buyers which is the better 
product. 
• It can also be used to see how a team’s reliability will be affected if a team 
member leaves unexpectedly, e.g. if they are injured.  This is particularly useful 
in a military environment and also in the non-military, where a key decision 
maker or executor of tasks is unavailable.  
 
The engineer or designer can use ROCCI as they see fit.  Changing the CTS and PD 
scores will not take much resource and so experimentation is feasible. 
 
7.2.8 Summary 
This section describes the final prototype of ROCCI.  It uses all the previous 
information.  ROCCI is a seven step process, with the ability to produce a quantitative 
value for P(E), P(I), P(T).  Qualitatively the tool can focus designers and engineers on 
possible areas of improvements that would benefit team reliability.  
 
7.3 Stakeholder Review of ROCCI 
This chapter describes the final prototype of ROCCI.  It uses all the previous 
information.   
7.3.1 Aims 
The stakeholder review aimed to: 
1. Get SMEs to use and assess ROCCI 
2. Gain opinions on the interaction factors trust, communication, PD 
3. Gain opinions on the interaction multipliers matrix 
4. Gain opinions on interaction algorithms used in ROCCI. 
 
7.3.2 Participants 
Six human factors experts were interviewed in three separate interviews; interview one 
was with ID1, interview two was with ID2, ID3, ID4, interview three was with ID5, ID6 
(Table 7.6).  The aim of the interviews was to explore different opinions on the matrix 
values.  Having a single group meeting could have resulted in a common agreement in 
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the matrix values, but individual thoughts and conclusions would have been missed.  
The purpose at this stage was to collect as many opinions as possible.  Table 7.6 shows 
each participants experience with HRA and roles as human factors experts.  
 
Table 7.6: Participant Information Showing HRA Experience 
Int. ID Job Title Job Description HRA Experience 
1 ID1 Technologist advisor of HFI 
Direct and carry out 
research on current and 
future projects 
Developed method of 
HRA use on nimrod and 
typhoon 
2 ID2 
Graduate 
systems 
engineer 
Graduate training scheme Knowledge but no experience 
2 ID3 
TNA and 
manning 
manager 
Defines manning solutions 
and training requirements 
Knowledge and some 
experience 
2 ID4 HFI coordinator Responsible for HFI on submarine 
Used HEART, have used 
HRA and developed a 
process. 
3 ID5 Senior Principal Scientist 
HF research and 
consultancy Little experience,  
3 ID6 Senior principal scientist 
Design and analyse data, 
HF design, team 
assessment 
Worked with Williams 
and HEART and other 
methods.  
 
7.3.3 Methodology 
The interview consisted of five sections:   
1. An introduction and description of the ROCCI tool and its parts (Section 0) 
2. Exercise 1: Determining basic values in the CTS matrix (Section 7.3.3.2) 
3. Exercise 2: Scenario examples (Section 7.3.3.3) 
4. Exercise 3: Group discussion (Section 7.3.3.4) 
5. Confidence and feedback forms (Section 7.3.3.5). 
 
Table 7.7: Example of Matrices presented in Exercise One 
Please fill in THIS matrix 
 
 Communication 1 2 3 4 
Tr
us
t 1 2   1.7 2     
3     
4 1.7   0.5 
 
 Communication 1 2 3 4 
Tr
us
t 1     2     
3     
4     
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Throughout the interview the researcher was available to answer any questions relating 
to the use or wording of ROCCI.  Discussion during the exercises was discouraged, 
however notation on the sheets was encouraged, and there would be an opportunity for 
discussion after each exercise. 
 
7.3.3.1 Introduction and Description of ROCCI 
The interviewees were given information sheets about the data collection and consent 
forms (Appendix 3).   
 
The interview began with a PowerPoint© presentation of the ROCCI tool, including 
who would use it, the stage in the design process it would be used, and how it was 
performed with a worked example of ROCCI.  Handouts were given to each 
interviewee with definitions of Trust, Communication and Power Distance, as referred 
to in ROCCI (Appendix 4).  It was important to ensure that the workings of ROCCI and 
all its parts were fully understood.  
 
7.3.3.2 Exercise One: Determining Basic Values in the CTS Matrix 
The aim of Exercise One was to insert multiplication factors into each box of the CTS 
matrix.  This began with a clarification of the terminology of Trust and Communication 
in the ROCCI tool.  The sheet provided consisted of two matrices (Table 7.7), the first 
with the four corner values of the matrix filled in.  This was designed to give a starting 
point of the interviews.  
 
“Based on your experience, please assess the appropriateness of the 
extreme corner multiplication factors, whilst considering the definitions of 
communication and trust, and the statements that are used to assign the 1-4 
scores.   
Based on your experience and judgement, please write the values you 
would use for the extreme corner multiplication factors in the matrix on the 
right.   
Please write an explanation for your values, e.g. are there any 
examples that you are basing the values on.” 
Figure 7.13: Exercise One Instructions 
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The exercise was divided into three parts.   
1. Part A to fill in the corner values,  
2. Part B to fill in the edge values,  
3. Part C to fill in the central values.   
The directions for each part is based on the information given below (Figure 7.13).   
 
Once all parts had been completed everyone in the interview discussed the suggested 
values.   
 
7.3.3.3 Exercise Two: Scenario Examples 
The aim of Exercise Two was to get the experts to use ROCCI, to test its usability and 
the credibility of the process and also to see the range of values assigned to each 
scenario.  
 
Scenario 1 – Sailing Crew 
 
Figure 7.14: Example of Interaction Diagram Case Study Two 
 
The three scenarios were a sailing crew, air traffic control / pilot team and London 
Underground station team.  The interaction diagrams (Figure 7.14) for each team were 
provided. Each scenario was described on an A4 sheet of paper (Appendix 4).  This 
provided a description of the piece of equipment or system with which the team were 
interacting; the role of the three or four members in each team; the team attributes; the 
communication method and its suitability; the trust between each team member; the 
experience of each team member; and the power distance of the team.  This was 
followed by the specific scenario to be assessed.   
 
Comments: Captain 
Engineer First Mate 
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Each interviewee then completed the interaction diagram, giving the communication, 
trust and power distance scores for each team member.   
 
7.3.3.4 Exercise Three: Group Discussion 
When everyone had finished the three scenarios, the experts discussed the values for 
communication, trust and PD and the justifications for these choices.  Also comments 
on problems with the use of ROCCI, were noted by the researcher.  
 
7.3.3.5 Confidence and Feedback Form 
The interviews were concluded with each person filling in a feedback form (Appendix 
4). This requested information on each person’s experience with HRA and human 
factors.  To guide the researcher, each person assessed their confidence that they had in 
the CTS values they provided.  There are also areas provided to write comments on the 
matrix, multiplication factors, and general ROCCI tool. 
 
7.3.4 Results 
7.3.4.1 Exercise One 
 
ID1 
Table 7.8: ID1 CTS Matrix Values 
 Communication 
1 2 3 4 
Tr
us
t 1 
5.0 4.0 2.5 2.0 
2 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.75 
3 3.5 2.5 1.75 1.25 
4 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 
 
Table 7.8 shows ID1 values for the CTS matrix.  ID1 suggested that the best team is 
base line, i.e. (4,4) – 1.0.  There should be a bigger distance between (4,4) and (1,1).  
The middle numbers were chosen by looking vertically and horizontally at the matrix, 
then by skewing the numbers slightly.  So lowest multiplication factor is 1.  Bad team 
work will affect reliability strongly so the high multiplication factor is large at 5. 
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ID2 
Table 7.9 shows ID2 suggested matrix values.  ID2 believes that there is no need for the 
separate values in each box as they don’t add much.  Bad communication would have 
more impact on reliability than trust.  
 
Table 7.9: ID2 CTS Matrix Values 
 Communication 
1 2 3 4 
Tr
us
t 1 1.75 1.4 2 
3 
1.75 0.5 
4 
 
ID4 
Table 7.10:  ID4 CTS Matrix Values 
 Communication 
1 2 3 4 
Tr
us
t 1 
1.7 1.6 1.4 1.2 
2 1.8 1.6 1.2 0.8 
3 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.5 
4 2.0 1.5 0.8 0.3 
 
Table 7.10 shows ID4 CTS matrix values.  ID4 believes that the best situation is good 
trust and good communication.  If there is insufficient communication then the level of 
trust is unimportant, but lack of trust can be counteracted by good communication.  If 
there is bad communication ((1,1)(1,2)(1,3)(1,4)) then trust will increase in 
multiplication factor.  If communication is difficult there are assumptions on what other 
people in the team will be doing.  If there is low trust in the other person, there will be 
an increase in checking and mitigation factors.  If there is high trust it will be assumed 
that the other team members are performing their tasks correctly so there may be little 
attempt at checking and mitigation, this could mean that errors are missed.  ID4 
believed that (4,4) is too low in the original matrix, and so increased the value to 0.3.  
 
ID5 
Table 7.11 shows ID5 CTS matrix values.  ID 5 believes that there should be a normal 
distribution curve of how CTS affects reliability.  With the diagonal 
((1,1)(2,2)(3,3)(4,4)) values of 1.0 being the most common. The most reliable team 
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would have high trust and high communication.  A team with perfect communication 
will “trap” errors.  ID5 was not sure how trust mitigates errors but low trust could 
increase errors.  High trust and low communication could lead to an unreliable team, 
hence the high multiplication factor.  
 
Table 7.11: ID5 CTS Matrix Values 
 
Communicatio
n 
1 2 3 4 
Tr
us
t 1 
1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 
2 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.6 
3 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.8 
4 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.0 
 
ID6 
Table 7.12 shows ID6 CTS matrix values. ID 6 believes that the values in the original 
matrix were not extreme enough.  The type of team will vary depending on the task, e.g. 
operating theatre or airline cockpit, and maybe different matrices are required for 
different scenarios.  ID6 correctly assumed that the tasks are performed generally in 
parallel, as there would be a different method of calculating reliability for serial tasks.   
 
Table 7.12: ID6 CTS Matrix Values 
  Communication 
1 2 3 4 
Tr
us
t 1 
3.0 2.75 2.25 2.0 
2 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.3 
3 2.0 1.8 1.2 1.0 
4 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.2 
 
7.3.4.2 Exercise Two 
All interviewees reported that they did not have any problems when using ROCCI to 
apply the communication, trust and the power distance scores. There was some 
confusion about the direction of the interaction, but this was understood after a re-
explanation by the researcher. The diagrams produced were very similar, showing that 
ROCCI is repeatable.  
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ID1:  Scenario two, air crew – there may be prejudices, due to a conflict of nationality 
between the pilot crew and ATC crew.  This may result in a communication and/or trust 
issue.   
 
When comparing PD and trust. Sometimes the person with higher power distance may 
not be the most experienced.  In the RAF / Navy, there may be members of the Royal 
Family in the flight crew with less experience, but their decisions may not be questioned 
by other flight crew.  There is implicit trust from PNF to EC.   
 
7.3.4.3 Discussion Exercise 
Two interviewees provided specific feedback to ROCCI. 
ID1: 
• Trust is related to autonomy, there will be less trust if there is less autonomy.   
• From his experience when looking at a team, if both people are reliable to 10x-3 
then the most reliable would be a P(E) 10x-5, but if both people have the same 
environment and training then P(E) 10x-4.   
• It may be better to have several equations that will suit different situations.   
• There should be a greater difference between the best and worst multiplication 
factors.  
• Communication is more important than trust.  
• When using a HRA reliabilities are normally discussed between a couple of 
people.  This would produce more reliable figures. 
• Use ROCCI on a series of snap shots throughout the task, rather than looking at 
the task as a whole.   
• Trust could change frequently.  
• Statements – B3 – variable quality, not good quality, B1 – work not done or not 
done as I would. C1/2 other way around. D1 – incorrect as well as insufficient.  
 
ID4: 
• If operator doesn’t trust supervision and there is bad communication what is the 
result? 
• DIF analysis would be useful for communication, difficulty , importance, 
frequency.  
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7.3.4.4 Feedback Exercise 
The results from the confidence forms are displayed in Table 7.13, showing a large 
range in confidence of the matrix values. 
 
Table 7.13: Stakeholder Review Interviewees Feedback and Answer Confidence 
ID Confidence Value 
Values of Aspects 
Particularly confident in 
Suggestions for the Matrix, 
Statements, or ROCCI 
ID1 70% Least confident in Rail 
scenario 
Easier to use with 2 than 1.  
ID2 70% None No suggestions 
ID3 65% None Steering board to provide advice 
and guidance on matrix values 
approx to team scenario 
ID4 60% Not sure about the 4,4 value 
whether it should be higher 
or lower.  
Generally more confident in 
relationship of values than 
absolute score 
Nothing extra 
ID5 40% Communication key factor, 
breaks into passive v’s active 
comms.  
Trust needs more thought 
A “graphics equalizer” like GUI for 
sensitivity / trade off analysis. 
Probably need to rethink the 2 
factors in the matrix.  
ID6 30% None Definitions of trust and comms 
need to be clear, and note what they 
exclude.  Real data from a small 
tasks could be useful. 
 
7.3.5 Conclusions 
ROCCI is a seven step process, with the ability to produce a quantitative value for P(E), 
P(I), P(T).  Qualitatively the tool can focus designers and engineers on possible areas of 
improvements that would benefit team reliability.  
 
The aims of the stakeholder review were: 
1. Get SMEs to use and assess ROCCI 
2. Gain opinions on the interaction factors trust, communication, PD 
3. Gain opinions on the interaction multipliers matrix 
4. Gain opinions on interaction algorithms used in ROCCI. 
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Each of these aims were met in the exercises.  The main outcome from the interviews 
was to get opinions from the stakeholders on ROCCI.  From the interviews the 
following key points were made 
• Communication is very important, and in some instance it is more important 
than trust  
• There was little agreement on the values for the matrix  
• The statements used need better wording to be more easily understood 
• ROCCI was a valuable tool. 
 
No further adaptations were made to ROCCI at this stage.  This research has showed 
that a proof of concept THRA tool would be beneficial to the design process.  
Advantages and limitations of ROCCI that were discussed in the Stakeholder Review 
should be taken forward in any further development of a THRA too.  These future 
modifications and validation methods are described in Section 7.5.1.  
 
7.4 Discussion 
The previous six chapters have provided the reader with a complete account of the 
elements of the research.  They have shown how the background from which BAE 
Systems commissioned this research led them to identify a gap in the suite of HRA tools 
for a quantitative technique for teams.  The existence of such a gap was confirmed by 
the literature review (Chapter Two).  The subsequent stages of the research confirmed 
that the stakeholders could articulate their requirements sufficiently clearly (Chapter 
Four) for the researcher to develop the model, matrix and algorithms of the requested 
quantitative tool, now known as ROCCI (Chapter Five).   
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Figure 7.15: Model of Research Stages: Development and Testing 
 
Section 7.4 reflects on the integrity and value of this research project as a whole.  The 
first task is to appraise the methodology of the research structure (Section 7.4.1), in its 
development and the testing stages.  The next section highlights the benefits of ROCCI 
(Section 7.4.2) both as a tool and in its applications.  This clarifies how the tool 
provides a solution that fills the gap about team assessments that had been identified 
earlier as missing from the range of HRA tools (Section 7.4.3).  The researcher then 
explores some of the limitations of ROCCI and suggests how these might be addressed 
(Section 7.4.4)  The thesis concludes with a general summary of the research project 
(Section 7.5), which brings the chapter to a close with ideas about the potential for 
future research and development of ROCCI. 
 
7.4.1 The Research Structure 
The research has two stages.  The development stage leads to the formulation of the 
HRA Tool ROCCI.  The testing stage validates its benefits in applications (Figure 7.15). 
 
7.4.1.1 Methodology of the Development Stage  
This section reviews the strengths of the research methodology applied to the 
development stage.  The development stage prepared the groundwork for the 
formulation of the HRA tool ROCCI.  In general, there was confirmation that it is 
normal to use HRA in the design process.  There was also agreement that including a 
team HRA would be a benefit, since it would address the team issues, which are not 
Requirements Specification 
(Chapter 4) 
Create Model of Team 
(Chapter 5.2) 
Sensitivity Analysis 
(Chapter 6) 
Future Developments 
(Chapter 7.4) 
Stakeholder Review 
(Chapter 7.3) 
Development Testing 
Literature Review 
(Chapter 2) 
ROCCI 
(Chapter 5) 
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currently included in the normal HRA assessment.  The development stage process went 
on to identify that the different business units would require different outcomes from a 
team HRA tool.  For example: the aeronautical business unit required not only a 
quantitative technique but also a qualitative technique that would be straightforward to 
use by those that are not experts in HF.  Another example: naval BU suggested that the 
best size for this tool would be one or two sides of A4 that could be laminated.  This is 
supported by Kariuki and Löwe’s (2007) procedure to identify the benefit of human 
factors in process hazard analysis.  Their HF assessment was a simple one side of paper 
document with simple tick boxes.  
 
In summary, the development stage produced the requirements specifications which 
shaped the Tool Vision (Smith et al., 2006, Smith et al., 2007) and provided the 
framework from which to formulate the team HRA tool ROCCI.   
 
Literature Review 
The literature review (Chapter Two) successfully showed that there were HRA’s 
available, but highlighted that there was no method for assessing team reliability.  The 
literature review also highlighted areas of team working that should be considered.  
However there was not a large amount of literature on this topic, so other methods of 
developing information for ROCCI was required. 
 
Requirements Specification 
The development of the Requirements Specification (Chapter Four) through stakeholder 
semi-structured interviews revealed that the gap found in the literature for a team HRA 
was also felt by SME’s.  The interviewees drew the researcher’s attention to team 
attributes and issues with HRA that had not previously been known. 
 
The Requirements Specification and House of Quality were useful tools in the 
development of ROCCI as they guided how the tool should be used and how it should 
be presented.  The Requirements Specification was referred to frequently throughout the 
design process.  The model of team reliability, matrix and algorithms came as a result of 
the researcher’s work with the interviewees. 
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7.4.1.2 Methodology of the Testing Stage 
This section evaluates the strengths of the methodology of the final stage of the research 
process, the testing stage.  Just prior to the testing stage, the researcher had incorporated 
the specification requirements into the HRA tool, ROCCI.  The formulation of these 
specification requirements was the final step in the development stage.  The testing 
stage assessed how practical it was to include all the requirements in arriving at a Proof 
of the Concept for the tool.  The validation process scrutinises the specific aspects of the 
tool that need to be used in an operational application and so test the logic for their 
inclusion.  The testing stage included sensitivity analysis, two case studies and the 
stakeholder reviews. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
This process assessed the sensitivity of the algorithms (Chapter Six) used in ROCCI.  It 
demonstrated that they were suitable to be developed and used further.  It enabled the 
researcher to identify the different types of team structures that exist in theory and 
practice.  The process provided a mechanism to measure the impact that these team 
structures had on the overall reliability of the team.  It established that different team 
structures create different results, even when the input data was identical.  
 
Stakeholder Reviews 
These reviews with the stakeholders took place as the ROCCI prototype was nearing 
completion.  It was at that almost final stage when there is a benefit in exposing it to 
expert users.  The objective was to get their opinions on the matrix values and the 
application of the ROCCI tool.  The technique applied was based on the spiral 
development method.  The individuals assessed the tool independently and then came 
together as a group to share their assessments.  Changes were then made in the light of 
the feedback. This method was very useful.  It provided different perspectives and 
opinions on the matrix values.  An excellent benefit was that the interview process 
included time for discussion with the researcher, who was then able provide further 
explanation of ROCCI.  It also gave the experts the chance to provide constructive 
criticism of the technique.  One of the limitations was the lack of availability of the 
interviewees for a second round of reviews. Ideally, there would have been a benefit in 
visiting all the interviewees with an adapted version of the matrix and ROCCI that had 
emerged from the first round of interviews. 
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7.4.1.3 Summary 
During the testing stage of ROCCI a variety of methods were used.  Each exercise 
assessed different aspects of ROCCI: the sensitivity analysis tested the logic of the 
algorithms and structures; case study one tested the evaluated the usefulness of the tool; 
case study two assessed the repeatability and sensitivity required of the inputted data, 
and use of statements; the stakeholder reviews appraised the use of ROCCI by expert 
users, suggesting intra-analyst reliability.  
 
Throughout the time of research ROCCI was presented to stakeholders and experts in 
the form of presentation at conferences or internal meetings.  This presented the 
opportunity for the researcher to defend ROCCI whilst the experts critically assessed 
and questioned it.  Generally ROCCI was well received, with no major concerns.  This 
provided a greater strength in the knowledge of the need and validity of a THRA tool.  
 
7.4.2 Potential of Team HRA Tool ROCCI  
As stated earlier, the methodology of the development stage of the research process 
(Section 7.4.1) included a round of interviews with the potential stakeholders of 
ROCCI.  The outcome of the development stage was the formulation of the 
requirements specification for the team HRA tool ROCCI. The previous section 
examined the final stage of the research process, the methodology of the testing stage. 
 
The development and the testing stages lead up to and away from the prototype of the 
core product THRA tool ROCCI.  The benefits of this THRA tool can now be reviewed 
further.  The review begins (Section7.4.2), with a summary of the requirements, which 
the researcher incorporated into the HRA tool ROCCI (Figure 7.16).  This is at the 
central point of the research program.  There then follows an assessment of the benefits 
for the practical application of ROCCI in a variety of operational scenarios (7.5.1). 
 
7.4.2.1 Proof of Concept: ROCCI 
The proof of concept tool, ROCCI, is the outcome of the development stage of the 
research process.  It incorporates the requirements, which were identified by the 
potential stakeholders (Chapter Four), who would be using the application in real life 
operations.  Of the requirements listed in the Requirements Matrix (Figure 4.2) 24 of 
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the 30 requirements were met.  One of the requirements that is not met is the production 
of a computerise HRA tool.  A programming expert could transform ROCCI as it 
currently stands relatively easily into a computerised tool.  
 
The full description is provided in Section 7.1, which includes the steps needed to 
complete the ROCCI process (Figure 7.3).  This process was published by the author in 
an earlier paper and is reproduced here (Figure 7.16). 
 
 
Figure 7.16: Process for Evaluating Team Reliability (Smith et al 2007) 
 
A general benefit of the Team HRA tool ROCCI is that it is designed to fit into existing 
design processes.  Any quantitative HRA and any task analysis can be used with 
ROCCI, without being time consuming.  The next section provides some examples of 
applications of ROCCI. 
 
7.4.2.2 ROCCI Team Attributes 
This section looks at recent research that has been produced on the attributes of ROCCI.  
There are many aspects to communication interaction (Cushings, 1994, Gibson et al., 
2006, Rognin and Blanquart, 2001).  This includes the language used, content of the 
communication and the background level of noise.  Svensson and Andersson (2006) 
found that the warnings inside a cockpit can interfere with general communication 
within a cockpit.   
Define task and team  
to be assessed 
Produce task analysis  
for each role inc. 
decision hierarchy &  
interaction links 
Perform HEART  
on each role 
Calculate interaction 
and team reliabilities 
 
Assess need to modify 
task/team 
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A recent review of the literature on the team attributes show that a high level of trust is 
not always best (Burt et al., 2009).  If there is a lower amount of trust, there will be 
more monitoring, leading to more errors being detected.  However there is not an 
inverse relationship between trust and reliability.  Trust between team members is 
needed for the team to function sufficiently and safely.  From this research and the 
findings from the stakeholder review (Chapter 7.2) the relationship between trust and 
reliability should be further investigated.  
 
7.4.2.3 Contributions of ROCCI to Safety Cases 
The Sensitivity Analysis illustrated that ROCCI algorithms could determine between 
the different aspects of a team, such as number of interaction links, different levels of 
trust and communication skills.  This knowledge can influence a decision on the 
potential reliability and safety of the system designed and can be used in Safety Case 
arguments.  There THRA tool can be applied with to a variety of situations where 
reliability and safety will change:  the development of a new product; comparing 
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) products on the market; refitting systems; reducing 
manning of a system and man-down situations.  A review of these applications follows. 
 
Developing a new product 
ROCCI can be applied to test how reliable a new product will be when used by a team.  
Areas of bad communication, interaction links, trust and PD would be highlighted by 
ROCCI and so indicate if adaptations to these are required.  This would result in 
changes to: the extent of the training; number of people in the team; configuration of the 
team; altering the tasks the team performs; variations in the communication methods 
used.   
 
Comparing COTS products 
This comparison can take place prior to the time of purchase, to identify the degree of 
team reliability of the different products.  ROCCI will reveal the different manning 
levels, the number of tasks required, the communication methods used and evaluate 
whether more equipment or extra training is needed for each product, so informed 
decisions can be made about their selection.  
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Refitting Systems 
When a product is being developed further, there is a benefit in testing the new version 
of the product against the previous version of the product.  The ROCCI results from the 
previous version will show areas that could be improved when designing the new 
version.  Mock models can then be compared at an early stage in the design process, 
when the cost of change is lower than the cost of change later in the design LCM.  
 
Reducing manning in a system 
There may be circumstances that make it necessary to reduce the number of people on a 
team. An example was the number of men on a submarine.  ROCCI could evaluate the 
impact of reducing the number of people in the team.  Along with workload 
information, it was possible to assess how roles could be combined without reducing the 
reliability of the team, whilst taking into account the interaction links, the 
communication methods and trust.  
 
Man-down situations 
Equipment is designed for operation by a certain number of people. Occasionally 
someone in that team may become incapacitated.  This reduces the number of active 
people in the team and may change the PD.  When there are products where this is a 
high possibility, it would be useful to run ROCCI in a ‘man-down’ scenario. This 
examines the effect on the team reliability.  It can aid in the formulation of standard 
operating procedures for these circumstances. 
 
7.4.3 ROCCI and Individual HRAs 
The researcher reviewed the current list of HRA methods available (Section 2.2.2 and 
Section 2.2.3).  Some were new to the researcher, as described below.  
 
7.4.3.1 General List 
 An overview of HRA methods reviewed qualitative and quantitative methods.  These 
were: the qualitative methods CRS, MDTA, and CESA (Reer, (2008a, 2008b)); and 
quantitative methods; MERMOS (Reer, 2008b); a generic Human Error template (HET; 
Marshall et al, as cited in Stanton et al (2009)); and application for a power plant 
environment DEPEND-HRA (Cepin, 2008); and an Analytic Hierarchy Process – 
Success Likelihood Index Method (AHP–SLIM ((Park and Lee, 2008)).  These methods 
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have general applicability, but they are not sufficiently specific to be a foundation of 
ROCCI. 
 
7.4.3.2 HRA relevant to ROCCI  
The most relevant HRAs to the development and support of the ROCCI tool were the 
HEPI and HEAR methods. These methods and their relevance to ROCCI are explained 
below. 
 
HEPI (Khan et al, 2006)   
Human error probability index (HEPI) (Khan et al., 2006) is a new quantitative tool for 
calculating error probability for offshore operations and has been designed during the 
period of this research.  HEPI is based on SLIM.  HEPI provides recommendations for 
training, procedures, management systems and equipment.  An individual can perform 
many of the steps of HEPI.   But HEPI must be assessed by an experienced team for the 
final three steps. If ROCCI is to be developed for us in many industrial sectors, an 
experienced team can produce the matrix values, so that any single person can use 
ROCCI in the design process.  
 
HEAR (Kim eta l, 2010) 
Human Error Analyses and Reduction (HEAR) (Kim et al., 2010) is a model of accident 
causation.  It defines that an unsafe situation is caused by human failure, technical 
failure or an external intrusion.  The unsafe situation can be intervened by human 
responses to mitigate the effects.  ROCCI’s team interactions would partially be 
involved in this intervention,.  Since team members ‘catching’ another person errors 
would reduce the probability of human error. 
 
7.4.3.3 ROCCI and HRA Summary 
The literature review confirmed that HRAs continue to need to be refined (e.g. HEPI 
was based on SLIM) and developed (e.g. HEAR) as gaps in their application tools are 
identified. The main focus of HRAs was on quantitative assessments of the individual.  
This demonstrated that there was still a gap for quantitative assessment of groups of 
individuals or teams.  This gap is precisely where the work of ROCCI, as a quantitative 
tool for teams, fitted into the HRA market.  
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7.4.4 Limitations of ROCCI Assumptions 
To set the boundaries for ROCCI assumptions were made: the team must be stable; the 
equipment has 100% reliability; communication is not solely through a computer.  The 
limitations of these boundaries are described below (Section 7.4.4.1 – 7.4.4.3).  Also 
described are other fields of interest that are related to, but not covered by ROCCI 
including: situational awareness (7.4.4.4) and fuzzy theory (7.4.4.5).   
 
7.4.4.1 Stability 
One of the assumptions of ROCCI is that the team must be stable: by either working as 
that team for a long period of time, or at least working with the same people, or with the 
same roles for a period of time (Littlepage et al., 2007).  This is because there is an 
increase in probability of incidents occurring when there is a high employee turnover 
(Burt et al., 2009).   
 
7.4.4.2 Equipment Reliability 
It is assumed that the equipment used is 100% reliable.  ROCCI has not been tested with 
varying reliability of equipment.  Equipment is often used to support human actions and 
to increase safety of systems (Hoc & Carlier, 2002; Hollnagel & Bye, 2000).  So the 
equipment could be thought of as another team member (Kim, 2001).  Each piece of 
equipment can have varying probability of error, communication ability and perceived 
trust levels (Bonini & Kirwan, 2003).  
 
7.4.4.3 Virtual teams 
One area where there has been a large amount of research is in exploring the potential 
for much wider scope of interaction and trust for virtual teams (Introna, 2001, Jarvenpaa 
and Lediner, 1999, Kanawattanachai and Yoo, 2002, Wilson et al., 2006).  This is where 
the members of the teams are distributed and interact through computer links 
 
However, this would have required the researcher to become involved in BUs which 
had, or were exploring the possibilities of, virtual teams.  However they were not 
available for access by the researcher.  This not being possible, this topic could not be 
included within the focus of ROCCI.  From a technical perspective, the team HRA tool  
ROCCI could be adapted easily and used to assess the trust, communication and PD 
within virtual teams.  This would be and exciting project to test and explore further.  
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7.4.4.4 Situation Awareness 
ROCCI has not considered specifically the aspect of situation awareness (Endsley, 
2000, Riley et al., 2006) or distributed situation awareness (Stanton et al., 2005).  
Although good situation awareness within a team is a key part to working as a team 
(Artman, 2000, Patrick et al., 2006).  ROCCI uses the attributes of good communication 
and good trust to ensure that the best sharing of information for good situation 
awareness is possible (Stanton and Baber, 2006, Stanton et al., 2005).   
 
7.4.4.5 Fuzzy theory 
ROCCI  is designed to be a transparent tool, which uses three selected core team 
attributes, with two clear algorithms of interaction.  Fuzzy Theory would enable the tool 
to be developed for more complex team interactions.  Another strength of using fuzzy 
theory is that it is capable of including many more attributes about the team.   
 
The final prototype team HRA tool ROCCI is intended to be straightforward, 
transparent and easy to use, by those who were not experts in HF.  The researcher had 
initially examined the feasibility of applying Fuzzy Theory in the research.  However, it 
became apparent from the stakeholder interviews, that they had an immediate need for a 
‘simple’ practical tool to provide a solution for a gap that had been identified as part of 
the original research specifications from BAE Systems.  
 
7.4.5 Present Limitations of ROCCI 
ROCCI developed as a prototype shows that there is potential for future development 
into a real tool.  SMEs have shown interest in the use of the tool (Section 7.2) and that 
the tool is usable and potentially helpful for designers, engineers and ergonomists.  
However as ROCCI is a prototype there are areas of the tool that are not fully 
developed.  These include: 
• The development of the values that are in the matrix. The interaction 
multipliers need developing, e.g. what is the dependency of trust and 
communication, how much does the does trust effect individual reliability. 
• Rigorous testing and validation of the algorithms and ROCCI tool.  HRAs 
generally have little validation, and as such, are not fully accepted by all 
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ergonomists.  Validation of the tool will indicate the usefulness and impact of 
Safety Cases that HRAs can have.  
• Development of ROCCI into a computerised tool.  Computerisation was 
indicated as a requirement early in the research.  It would be useful in cases 
where there are a large number of team members and the interactions are 
complex, or where many combinations of the interaction are to be tested. 
• Further research into the attributes that effect team reliability.  ROCCI has 
focused on 3 aspects of team reliability.  There has been little research that 
proves that these 3 aspects are those that most effect team reliability.  Further 
research into this development would be advisable and potentially fruitful. 
 
7.4.6 Summary of Limitations for ROCCI 
ROCCI is a good tool and it is well developed.  Most of the seven steps of ROCCI are 
performed during LCM, e.g. the TA and HRA.  The assessment of the team interactions 
can be fitted onto a single piece of paper that can be stuck onto a display board.  
Stakeholders agree that the use of communication, trust and PD are key attributes to 
teams.  This is a innovative tool. There are no other tools available that address THRA 
quantitatively.  It is possible to vary the values in the matrix to adapt ROCCI for 
different industrial sectors.  The limitations of ROCCI are that the statements have not 
been fully elaborated and matrix values have not been fully tested and validated. This 
needs to be performed before the tool can be used commercially (Table 7.14).  
 
Table 7.14: Strengths and Limitations of ROCCI 
Strengths Limitations 
Steps performed already in LCM Matrix values need validation 
Change matrix values to suit 
different industrial sectors 
Statements need validation 
Innovative  
Stakeholder agreement that trust, 
communication and PD are important 
 
Short and simple to use  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this research had two components.  The first and primary component was to 
develop a proof of concept prototype of a quantitative team HRA (THRA) tool.  This 
  Chp 7: Discussion 
134 
THRA tool was called ROCCI (Reliability of Collaborative Crew Interaction). The 
second component was to evaluate whether the process could be implemented further.   
 
To achieve these aim the work consisted of a number of objectives: 
1. To explore, using interviews with stakeholders, requirements based on current 
experience and future expectations 
2. To develop a model for team reliability using information from Objective One 
and produce team structures and algorithms for use in sensitivity analysis 
3. To carry out  sensitivity analysis on ROCCI algorithms 
4. To further develop and validate ROCCI through stakeholder reviews. 
 
The first objective was progressed through semi-structured interviews with nine 
stakeholders at BAE Systems.  These produced a detailed Requirements Specification 
for the tool, which in turn developed the House of Quality and Tool Vision on which the 
Proof of Concept was based.   
 
The key requirements were:  
1. two sides of A4 with seven questions 
2. qualitative and quantitative 
3. fits in with current LCM 
4. usable by all. 
 
The second objective delivered a model of team reliability (Figure 5.1) based on the 
team structures of Leavitt and Eason.  Twelve team interaction structures were 
developed.  These structures meant that all team structures could be accounted for in a 
sensitivity analysis.  Two algorithms were produced, one to encompass P(E), CTS and 
PD to create P(I) and one to evaluate P(T) overall). 
 
The third objective involved a sensitivity analysis on the two algorithms using the 
twelve structures of a team of four people.  The sensitivity analysis showed that the 
algorithms were logical and suitable to be used further. 
 
The fourth objective, was to develop ROCCI to a further level and present this Final 
Prototype of a THRA to stakeholders.  They had the opportunity to assess the Matrix 
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Values, Questionnaire Statements and general ROCCI tool, by using the Delphi Method 
and Case Study examples.  This was another test of repeatability of ROCCI and the 
interviewees all produced similar CTS and PD scores for the case study examples.  
Adaptations suggested by the reviews were noted and are a good basis for future 
research. 
 
7.5.1 Future Research  
Salas et al (2008) performed a review of current work in the field of teams, teamwork 
and team performance.  Salas et al (2008) stressed the importance of the field keeping 
pace with the changing demands in the workplace.  In particular, one of the areas to 
focus on is the need for better measurement of team work.  They also identified the 
importance of communication structure on team performance.  A fully developed and 
validated ROCCI would produce a robust tool that fulfils these requirements.   
 
7.5.1.1 Future Validations of ROCCI 
One method for validating ROCCI would be to test it against other similar methods to 
see if similar results are produced (Stanton et al., 2009).  Another method for validating 
ROCCI would be to get several analysts to use ROCCI on the same situation to test the 
inter-analyst reliability (Stanton et al., 2009).   
 
Validation of AHP – SLIM is by comparing the results of two groups of expert 
assessors when they use AHP – SLIM to  assess ten driving errors (Park and Lee, 2008).  
This is quite a simple method of validation, and is a possible method for ROCCI.  
 
7.5.1.2 Laboratory Based Experiments 
Laboratory experiments assessing the definition of trust; the important factors for 
communication and team work; and the relationship between trust and communication 
can be used to validate ROCCI. 
 
7.5.1.3 Computerisation of ROCCI 
A recent development of HRA is a probabilistic cognitive simulator (PROCOS) that 
provides simulation of human error (Trucco and Leva, 2007).  A computerised tool that 
can vary the values of P(E), CTS, and PD automatically, would be a version of ROCCI 
that could assess a large variety of situations relatively quickly.  
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Human error databases such as CORE-DATA (Gibson and Kirwan, 2004,  Kirwan et 
al., n.d.) and OPERA (Park and Jung, 2007) are useful to accurately predict human 
error.  Linking ROCCI to one of these could increase the reliability of the P(E) values in 
ROCCI, and therefore the P(T) values would also be more accurate.   
 
CAS-HEAR (Kim et al., 2010) is a computer-aided tool.  More HRAs are becoming 
computer aided.  A more complex version of ROCCI could be produced as a computer 
program. This could increase the possible number of team attributes accounted for in 
ROCCI, and very large teams, such as combined military forces, could be assessed.  
 
Kirwan et al (2008)is producing a method for collecting human error data in ATM real 
time simulations.  This is a method of collecting data errors with a high validity to 
realistic situations.  Mentioned in the paper was the need to allow and account for 
recovery after an error has occurred, this is is also mentioned in CAS-HEAR (Kim et 
al., 2010).  Safety cases for European ATM required quantified risk and safety 
assessments (Kirwan et al., 2008).  ROCCI could be used for this and it shows that 
quantification is still required by governing authorities.   
 
7.5.1.4 Extending the Scope of Application for ROCCI 
There is an opportunity to provide a more developed version of ROCCI, which can be 
used in the tool kits of all ergonomists as a core element in the design process, even if 
this requires it to become compulsory   
 
Create different ROCCI matrices for different sectors, e.g. nuclear, military, civilian 
academics the scope of ROCCI and its internal reliability of its matrices and 
probabilities.  This would be done by adjusting the statements of trust (Bonini & 
Kirwan, 2003) communication and PD to be task specific.  The matrix values could also 
be adjusted as the relationship between trust and communication varies between 
different industrial sectors.  
 
7.5.2 Summary 
This draws the thesis to a close.  The final chapter has summarised the aims and the 
objectives of the thesis.  A proof of concept for a team HRA tool, ROCCI, has been put 
forth for further development. 
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Human reliability assessment techniques (HRAs) have been in existence since the 
1960’s.  Following Dougherty’s (1990) comments, a second generation of more 
complex HRAs were created, all measuring the reliability of individuals.  However, 
often a team of people interact with a system, not an individual.  This can increase 
or decrease the individual’s reliability.  A new generation of HRAs is needed to 
assess the effects of teamwork on reliability.  During the development of a new 
tool, the model of team reliability needs to be validated.  This is to be partially 
accomplish at a workshop at the Annual Conference of the Ergonomics Society, 
where HRA experts and other interested parties can critique the model.  These 
opinions will then be utilised to enhance the model.    
 
Introduction 
A human interacting with a system can be analysed to determine the errors that could occur, 
what factors could help mitigate these errors, and the probability of these errors occurring.  This 
is done by using human reliability assessments (HRA).  HRAs are qualitative and quantitative 
measurements of the risks and errors that can occur in a system because of human actions, not 
by a fault of the system.  HRA have been developed for designers and users to understand the 
technical difficulties of using a product or system.  As, no matter how good the product is, it is 
impossible to make the product error proof: humans are inevitably fallible.   
As a field of research HRA has been around since 1960s.  Predicting the probability of error 
can be a controversial topic because probabilities are based on random behaviour and humans 
are not random; some factors that can affect them that are consistent (Redmill, 2002).   HRA 
techniques have accounted for factors that influence the error probability in the form of 
"performance shaping factors” (PSFs).  The task, the individual and the environment define the 
performance shaping factors.  There are three main approaches to HRA (Kirwan, 2002): 
1. Human error identification – what can go wrong? 
2. Human error quantification – how often will a human error occur? 
3. Human error reduction – how can human error be prevented from occurring or 
its impact on the system reduced? 
The first generation of HRA techniques began in the 1970s, e.g. THERP (Swain & 
Guttmann, 1980) and HEART (Williams, 1986). Criticism by Dougherty (1990) triggered a new 
generation of techniques that included the most recent knowledge of error and human behaviour 
(Redmill, 2002).  Second-generation techniques such as, CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) have 
improved the reliability of the HRA for individuals.   
However, often a team of people interacts with a system, not just an individual.  There is 
now a call for a new generation of HRA techniques to account for team interaction with a 
product or system.  The interactions between the team members can increase and decrease the 
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reliability of each individual and hence the overall reliability of the team.  Some of the PSFs of 
team reliability are communication, trust and resource management (Sasou & Reason, 1999).   
CHLOE (Miguel, Wright, & Harrison, 2002) has been developed to take into account the 
effect of teams on reliability.  Miguel et al (2002), wrote ‘collaborative errors may be caused by 
factors such as a lack of [situational awareness (SA)], misunderstandings between participants, 
conflicts and failures of co-ordination’ (p. 4).  CHLOE is a qualitative method, and in a time 
when corporate manslaughter is becoming more prominent and system reliability is measured in 
probabilities, human reliability also needs to be quantitative. 
 
Aim 
Therefore the aim of the workshop is to validate, using expert judgements, a model of team 
reliability and tool that will quantitatively  measure team reliability.  
 
Definition of a team 
The tool being validated will be looking at a team of people that are either interacting with 
the same system or piece of equipment, and whose procedures are all critical in achieving the 
same overall goal.  The tool does not look into how an organisation works, and so it will not go 
into details of the command structure.  However, the communication structure, and decision 
structure are important to team reliability.  Several group topologies that should be considered 
are shown in Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1. Group Topologies need to switch planets and teams 
 
Error classifications 
Before team reliability can be measured, how and why humans perform errors must be 
understood.  There are three main aspects that can cause error; the task, the environment and the 
individual.  There are several types of errors that humans can perform, such as execution errors, 
or errors of cognition.  There are also, many causes of error, e.g. bad design, or cognitive 
overload.  Below are some of the main classification of errors.  
Kletz (1999) presented four classifications of errors. 
1. Mistakes are errors that are made because the correct procedure is not known 
and the intention of the action is wrong.   
Hierarchy 
One person allocates 
& controls work 
Partnership 
Each person responsible 
for own work; all equal 
Hotel 
People come and go 
as necessary 
Team 
People can be 
interchanged 
Planets 
One person is the 
knowledge guru 
Crew 
Each person has specific 
job and skills 
© Ken Eason 
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2. Violations are actions that are known to be wrong but are thought of as being the 
most suitable action at the time given the information known; again the correct 
procedure is not followed.   
3. A mismatch is where the task and the cognition of the operator are not 
compatible, for example the operator could be overloaded or may have 
established a habit and cannot change their viewpoint when new information is 
offered.   
4. A slip is where the intention is correct but that action is wrong, for example, 
pressing the wrong knob on a control panel.  A lapse is where an action is 
missed.  
Rasmussen (1982) presented error classifications based on the cognitive functions,  
1. Skill based errors are errors related to variability of force, space or time. 
2. Rule based errors are errors that are related to cognitive mechanisms, such as 
classification, recognition or recall. 
3. Knowledge based errors are errors in planning, prediction and evaluation.   
These definitions of errors are for individuals, not teams.  Errors of execution, such as slips, 
or skill based errors, are affected less by team reliability.  Cognitive errors are affected by team 
reliability, as cognitive overload, can be augmented by the presence of other team members.  
Taxonomies of team error should also be used, such as Sasou & Reason’s (1999) individual and 
shared errors. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Model of Team Reliability 
 
Model of team reliability 
Before the tool can be developed a model of how the individuals in a team interact should 
be produced.  One viewpoint of team reliability is represented in Figure 2. A procedure is 
performed by a team of people.  Each person has an individual reliability score (Rn), as 
measured using a 1st or 2nd generation HRA technique.   The interactions between team 
members, such as communication and trust create the PSFs for the team.  But as each 
individual, their task and their environment is unique, effects of the interaction should be 
calculated separately, creating new ‘interaction reliability’ scores Rni.  These are then combined 
together to produce the overall team reliability score, RE.  
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Tool vision 
Following interviews with potential users of the tool (HRA and design experts in a defence 
systems integration company) a list of tool requirements was formed.  These illustrated that it 
was necessary to develop a tool that can: 
• quantitatively assess the reliability of a team.  
• qualitatively predict areas of high risk 
• be usable and accessible to non-human factors experts 
• educate designers in the importance of the human factors to produce high 
usability and reliability.  
 
Structure of the workshop 
The workshop will consist of a brief introduction into the reasoning for collaborative HRA.  
The model that is used to represent team interactions will be described and explained. There 
will then be a discussion on some of the issues that may effect interactions within teams, and 
what errors may be produced from these interactions.   
 
Subsequent work 
Following the workshop the opinions expressed will be considered and further adaptations 
to the model and tool will be made.  
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Human reliability assessments (HRA) have been developed so designers and users 
can understand how likely it is for a human to make an error when using a system, 
i.e. the reliability of the product.  There are many tools that test reliability, but they 
only consider one person using a system.  As human factors experts and engineers 
are getting more used to the role of individual human reliability in design and 
development, teams are becoming more prominent as an antecedent to errors and 
disasters.  HEART (Williams, 1986), an individual HRA, is being expanded into 
one of the first tools that will quantitatively predict the reliability of a team. This 
paper is a continuation from a workshop presented at last year’s Ergonomics 
Society Conference (Smith, Siemieniuch and Sinclair, 2006), where the tool was 
introduced.   
 
Introduction 
Human reliability assessments (HRA) have been developed so designers and users can 
understand how likely it is for a human to make an error when using a system, i.e. the reliability 
of the product.  There are many tools that test reliability, but they only consider one person 
using a system.  As human factors experts and engineers are getting more used to the role of 
individual human reliability in design and development, teams are becoming more prominent as 
an antecedent to errors and disasters, as interactions between team members can increase or 
decrease reliabilities.   
A model of team reliability has been created.  The main issue for consideration was how to 
best combine individual reliabilities to create a credible and realistic team reliability.  Different 
hierarchy structures, decision systems, and the number of people at the ‘sharp end’ (those 
executing the actions of the team) all affect how the team is influenced by the individuals.   A 
series of algorithms have been produced to ensure that the tool can manage various team 
structures, decision systems, and any number of people executing actions. The tool has been 
used by an external and independent source to determine the reliability of a helicopter crew that 
is potentially under missile attack,  and on non-military operational crews.   The function of the 
tool shall be described below. 
 
HRA Background 
As a field of research HRA has been around since 1960s.  HRAs can be qualitative and/or 
quantitative measurements of the risks and errors that can occur in a system because of human 
actions, not by a fault of the system.  A human interacting with a system can be analysed to 
determine the errors that could occur, what factors could help mitigate these errors, and the 
probability of these errors occurring. Predicting the probability of human error can be a 
controversial topic because probabilities are based on random behaviour and humans are not 
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random; some factors that can affect them that are consistent (Redmill, 2002).   There are three 
main approaches to HRA (Kirwan, 2002): 
1. Human error identification – what can go wrong? 
2. Human error quantification – how often will a human error occur? 
3. Human error reduction – how can human error be prevented from occurring or its 
impact on the system reduced? 
HRA have been developed for designers and users to understand the technical difficulties of 
using a product or system.  As, no matter how good the product is, it is impossible to make the 
product error proof: humans are inevitably fallible.   
The first generation of HRA techniques began in the 1970s, e.g. THERP (Swain & 
Guttmann, 1980) and HEART (Williams, 1986). Criticism by Dougherty (1990)  triggered a 
new generation of techniques that included the most recent knowledge of error and human 
behaviour (Redmill, 2002).  Second-generation techniques such as, CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) 
have improved the reliability of the HRA for individuals.   
As human factors experts and engineers are getting more used to the role of individual 
human reliability in design and development, teams are becoming more prominent as an 
antecedent to errors and disasters.  There is now a call for a new generation of HRA techniques 
to account for team interaction with a product or system.  The interactions between the team 
members can increase and decrease the reliability of each individual and hence the overall 
reliability of the team.  There is a gap in the market for a new quantitative tool that combines 
the reliability of the people in a team and produce a realistic reliability of the whole team.   
 
Tool Vision 
The tool that is being developed assesses a group of individuals that are either interacting 
with the same system or piece of equipment, and whose procedures are all critical in achieving 
the same overall goal.  It then uses their individual reliabilities, as found using an individual 
HRA, such as HEART; and the affect of performance shaping factors (PSFs) to produce an 
overall team reliability.  It is envisioned that the tool will:  
• quantitatively assess the reliability of a team.  
• qualitatively predict areas of high risk 
• be usable and accessible to non-human factors experts 
• educate designers in the importance of the human factors to produce high 
usability and reliability.  
It is important that the tool is usable by non-human factors experts.  Therefore the tool 
should not contain human factors jargon, or require a interpretation from an ergonomist.  The 
tool should be transparent so that designers and engineers can understand how the tool 
calculates team reliability.  The calculations will be kept straightforward to use, and it will 
contain simple algorithms. To facilitate this simplicity some assumptions must be made.  
• the process can be defined,  
• a team/individuals can be allocated to roles 
• the team has stability. 
The process is to be defined by a form of task analysis (TA) which describes the tasks that 
need to be performed, the order in which they are to be performed, and the relative importance 
that the order has on the overall task.  The team must be defined, and that tasks that are to be 
performed should be allocated to particular team members.  This is necessary for the individual 
HRA to be performed. The PSFs require team members to have established relationships and 
personal perceptions of the other team members. Stability of the team is necessary for a 
representative reliability value, when a team is first brought together there is a period of 
introduction to each others skills, abilities and personalities.  During this period relationships 
and personality differences are frequently changing, and so the reliability of the team may be 
inconsistent.  
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Tool Mechanics 
Process Definition 
 
Figure 1. The process for evaluating team reliability 
 
The process  of using the tool is designed to have minimum increase in workload on the 
user of the tool, where an individual HRA is already performed (see Figure1).  The initial step 
of the process is to define the task and team that are to be evaluated.  The task can be defined by 
any form of TA, and the team can be defined using the role matrix technique (Callan, 
Siemieniuch and Sinclair, 2006).  Alongside the TA interaction links between the team 
members must be illustrated, as it is these links where the calculations will be made.  In 
addition, at this second stage, the decision hierarchy (power distance) within the team must be 
defined.  Power distance is a PSF for this tool as it is a strong influencing factor on what actions 
are performed and when.   It is presumed that the designer/engineer will have previously 
produced a TA and allocated roles for design purposes, and for completion of the HRA. 
Therefore little extra work has been created.   
The third stage is to perform an individual HRA on each of the tasks.  When a member of 
the team performs more than one task, then their reliabilities are to be averaged.  Any HRA 
technique can be used, but it must be a quantitative technique, and during the design of the tool, 
HEART (Williams, 1986) has been consistently employed.   
The fourth stage is to calculate the interaction reliabilities and the overall team reliability, 
this is a series of algorithms and tables and will be discussed in more detail below.  
Once the overall team reliability has been found, the assessor uses this figure to determine 
whether this is an acceptable level of reliability, if it is then they can proceed through the design 
life cycle, and if appropriate the reliability score can be used in further validation assessments of 
the tool.  If the reliability score is below acceptable levels, then the designer/engineer can 
reassess the tasks, system and team to evaluate how to adapt the either of these more effectively.  
 
Interaction Algorithms 
There are two algorithms used in the tool, the algorithm for interactive reliability (Figure 2) 
and the algorithm to calculate team reliability (Figure 3). These algorithms are representative of 
all teams, but in particular the team in Figure 4.   The PSFs that are used in the tool are Team 
skills, how well people can give and receive instruction/criticism; trust, who well team members 
Define task and team  
to be assessed 
Produce task analysis for 
each role inc. decision 
hierarchy &  interaction 
links 
Perform HEART  
on each role 
Calculate interaction 
and team reliabilities 
Assess need to modify 
task/team 
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trust each other; and power distance (PD) a scale of 1-5 with 3 being no PD, and the extreme 
values being high PD.  The first two are described as the Skills-Trust Score (STS), which is a 
multiplier to the P(e) on a scale of 0.5 (good STS score) – 2 (bad STS Score). The first 
algorithm should be performed for each team member.  Then the algorithm for team reliability 
can be performed and this will provide the overall reliability for the team.  
 
 
P(e) = Individual probability of error 
P(i)= Individual interactive 
probability of error 
P(T) = Team probability of error 
STS = Skills-trust score 
PD = Power distance multiplier 
   P(ia) = (P(ea) x STSab x PDab) + (P(ea) x STSac x PDac) 
                                                 PDab+PDac 
Figure 2. Algorithm for interactive reliability and abbreviations 
 
    P(T) = P(ia) + P(ib) + P(ic) 
                           N 
Figure 3. Algorithm for team reliability 
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction links between three team members 
 
Validation methods 
To date there have been several validations of the model and the tool at different stages of 
its development.  There has been an independent evaluation of the tool when it was used by an 
external source to test the survivability of a helicopter sortie.  The tool was used to assess two 
teams, one in the helicopter making the sortie, and the other a missile launching team on the 
ground, potentially attacking the helicopter.  The team reliability was part of the over reliability 
and survivability score of the helicopter and its crew.  The tool fitted well into the larger 
assessment that was being performed, and it was perceived that the methods of the tool were 
reasonable and easy to use.  
More recently the model of team reliability, and the tool have been validated during an non-
military operational exercise, onboard a sailing yacht.  The crew were assessed on the PSFs and 
their overall team ability. This successfully confirmed the suitability of the tool and model for 
assessing team reliability.   
 
Conclusions 
Following the discovery of the gap in the market for a quantitative team reliability 
assessment this tool has developed significantly.  The vision to keep the tool simple has been 
maintained and only a few PSF and algorithms are used. It should be understood that this tool is 
not complete, and final validations and assessments have not yet been performed.  Validation of 
A 
B C 
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the tool hitherto has been positive, and has provided constructive development areas for the  
tool, which will be investigated presently. 
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In a CASE studentship supported by BAe systems, a prototype has been 
developed to enable a designer to quantify and answer to the question, “If I allocate 
this team to execute that task in System X, how likely is it that they will succeed?”  
This technique should be useful to engineers in the earlier stages of the design 
process for a given capability; if successful, the prototype will be extended to 
operations; e.g. “can I reduce the manning for this task?” 
There are 26 different techniques for assessing the reliability of individual 
humans in a process, and none for assessing team reliability; hence the CASE 
studentship.  The prototype assumes that a process can be defined, in the form of a 
flow diagram, and that roles can be allocated to execute it.   Then, using one of the 
26 techniques (currently HEART), individual reliabilities  are calculated.  These 
are then modulated by considering team interactive effects; comprising  at the 
present time Trust, Communication, and Power distance, to create ‘interactive 
reliability’  for each individual in the team.  Then these reliabilities are combined, 
according to the team architecture for the process, to arrive at an overall team 
reliability.  Mathematically, this amounts to an algorithm 2 lines long.   
The paper will outline the technique, show its application to several scenarios 
(a helicopter mission; crewing a sailing yacht; managing a railway station), and 
will outline its interface to designers. 
 
HRA Background 
A human performing a task has a goal to perform, when this task involves interacting with a 
system, both the system, and the human can make errors. The number of errors made (the 
reciprocal of this being the reliability) of a system can be quite predictable, but the reliability of 
the human element of the task can vary.  Human reliability assessments (HRA) are qualitative and 
quantitative analysis methods for measuring errors that can occur because of human actions, rather 
than by a system fault.  These errors can be analysed in terms of; the causal factors, how to 
mitigate the errors, and the probability of these errors occurring (Kirwan 2002).  Since the 
development of HRAs designers and users of a system can understand the human difficulties of 
using a product, and that human errors are always possible to occur, as, even for the most safe 
system, it is impossible to make it completely human error proof. 
Technique for human error rate prediction (THERP; Swain & Guttmann, 1980) and Human 
error assessment and reduction technique (HEART; Williams, 1986) were amongst the first 
generation of HRA techniques which were developed between 1970’s and 1990’s.  However, 
these were criticised by Dougherty (1990) triggering a second generation of techniques that 
included more recent knowledge of human error and behaviour (Redmill, 2002).  Cognitive 
Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM; Hollnagel, 1998) and other second generation 
techniques have increased the reliability and relevance of HRA for individuals.   
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Individual human reliability assessments are gradually becoming embedded into some design 
processes, and improvements in designs have been made and accepted.  However teams are 
frequently used to operate a system and individual HRAs cannot account for how individuals 
affect each others ability.  Consequently, there is now a call for a third generation of HRA 
techniques to account for team interaction.  Some of the factors that can affect team reliability are 
communication, trust and resource management  .  Currently, there are no quantitative third 
generation techniques that combines the reliability of the people in a team to produce a realistic 
overall team reliability.   
 
Tool Development 
Tool Vision 
A tool is being developed at Loughborough University that will predict the reliability of a 
team of people working together towards a given goal.  It will take individual reliabilities and then 
combine to create an overall team reliability.  During conception of the tool clear ideas of the 
general approach and vision of the tool were defined. It is envisioned that the tool will:  
• quantitatively assess the reliability of a team  
• qualitatively predict areas of high risk 
• be usable and accessible to non-human factors experts 
• educate designers in the importance of the human factors to produce high 
usability and reliability.  
Nonhuman-factors-experts should be able to use the tool effortlessly and competently, without 
the aid of an ergonomist.  Therefore, no human factors terminology will be used in the tool, and 
the algorithms used within the tool should be transparent. To facilitate this simplicity some 
assumptions must be made. The process must be definable, this can be done using a task analysis 
(TA), which illustrates the tasks that need to be performed, by whom, and in which order.  The 
team must be definable, including the interaction structures, and the decision hierarchy. The team 
must be stable (i.e. exist for a period without a change in structure).  At establishment of a team 
there is a period of ascertaining other team members abilities and personalities, during this period 
relationships can change, consequently, the reliability of the team may be inconsistent.  This factor 
is not accounted for in this tool.   If all assumptions are adhered to this tool should be 
representative of all teams.  
 
Process Definition  
As the tool is to be useable by a large range of people, the process only contains 5 steps 
(Figure 1) and two algorithms.  The first and second steps of the process are to define the task, 
using any form of TA; and the team, using the role matrix technique (Callan, Siemieniuch and 
Sinclair, 2006),  that are to be evaluated.  Interaction links between the team members should be 
illustrated on the TA, as it is these links that will be evaluated by the tool. The decision hierarchy 
(power distance) of the team should also be identified at this stage. Power distance (PD) can be a 
strong influencing factor on which actions are performed.  
The third stage is to calculate the individual HRA for each team member (P(e)).  Any 
quantitative HRA technique can be used, during the development of this tool, HEART (Williams, 
1986) has been predominantly employed.   
The fourth  stage is to use the P(e) and interaction factors to calculate the interactive 
reliabilities and subsequently the overall team reliability, this is a series of algorithms which are 
described below.    
Finally, overall team reliabilities can be used in two ways.  Firstly, to determine if the 
reliability is of an acceptable level, if the probability of error is too high, then the design changes 
can be made.  Secondly, different scenarios can be compared, for example, varying the team 
hierarchical structures, or the methods of communication that are used.   
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Figure 1. The process for evaluating team reliability 
(Smith, Sinclair, Siemieniuch , 2006) 
 
 
Interaction Algorithms 
Once the TA has been performed, a HRA can be executed for each task and individual, giving 
the individual reliability P(e).  These reliabilities are then adjusted using the three interactive 
factors: communication, how efficiently and effectively information is passed between team 
members; trust, the amount of trust between team members; and power distance (PD), the decision 
and responsibility hierarchy between team members, a scale of 1-5 is used,  with 3 being no PD, 
and the extreme values being high PD.  The first two factors are described as the Communication-
Trust Score (CTS), on a scale of 0.5 (good CTS score) to 2 (bad CTS Score) (Smith et al, 2006).   
The P(e), CTS and PD values are amalgamated for each individual using the interactive reliability 
algorithm (Figure 2). The team reliability algorithm (Figure 3) is then used to calculate the overall 
team reliability.  These algorithms are suitable to represent all teams, but the team in Figure 4 can 
be used as an example of a simple team. 
 
P(e) = Individual probability of error 
P(i)= Individual interactive probability of error 
P(T) = Team probability of error 
CTS = Communication-trust score 
PD = Power distance multiplier 
Define task and team  
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hierarchy &  interaction 
links 
Perform HEART  
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P(ia) = (P(ea) x CTSab x PDab) + (P(ea) x CTSac x PDac) 
PDab+PDac 
Figure 2. Algorithm for interactive reliability and abbreviations 
 
 
P(T) = P(ia) + P(ib) + P(ic) 
n 
Figure 3. Algorithm for team reliability 
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction links between three team members 
 
 
Scenario Application 
 
Helicopter Sortie 
During the tool’s development, it has been used on several scenarios.  An external source 
performed an independent evaluation of the tool using it to predict the best sortie route for a 
helicopter whilst it was potentially under attack from a ground missile launching team. The tool 
was used to assess the two teams, one, the helicopter crew making the sortie; and the second the 
ground missile launching team, potentially attacking the helicopter.  The aim of the exercise was 
to create an overall reliability score for the equipment and the humans in the team when the 
helicopter took different sortie routes, and the missile launching team had varying aiming success.  
This tool was used in conjunction with other system reliability methods, and provided the human 
reliability of both teams.  It was perceived that the methods involved in the tool, i.e. TA, HRA, did 
not result in a large increase in workload, or complexity.  Furthermore, the tool fitted well into the 
larger exercise that was being performed. This tool could potentially be used to determine best 
plans for action in a military environment, depending on how well a team works together.  
 
Sailing Yacht 
During a journey of 3,000 nautical miles, a 3 person crew of a sailing yacht were assessed on 
their communication methods, trust levels, and the influence of power distance.   Throughout the 
journey the crew performed a number of tasks repeatedly, for example, raising the mainsail, or 
performing a gybe.  After each exercise was performed, the crew were asked to fill in a brief 
questionnaire on the thoughts of how the other crew members performed, and the success of the 
task.  The crew members often changed their roles for each iteration of the task, therefore, the 
reliabilities of the team could be found whilst assessing the effect of individual HRA scores, 
communication abilities, trust and power distance.  It was found that the team was a consistently 
reliable team, and the main factor that produced error was a malfunction in communication.  The 
results supported the model of team reliability that is used, and demonstrated that the tool is 
suitable for assessing how the team factors could effect reliability of a future system.  
 
Student Design Team 
Presently, the tool will be used to assess a group of students that are designing a system.  The 
students will be divided into design groups, the overall reliability will be the end of year 
assessment of how well their system performs. This experiment will further validate the team 
factors of communication, and trust (all students are equal so there is no PD).  The students will 
self-assess their communication and trust levels with the other students in their groups.  It is 
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predicted that with an increase in effective communication there will be an decrease in the number 
of errors made by the team.  
 
Railway Station Manning 
Small suburban railway stations are being studied to see how different hierarchy and 
interaction structures effect the performance reliability of the station.  The station crew, around 3-
6 people, are distributed and function independently, but share information and a similar goal of 
ensuring the stations operates effectively.   Communication methods, trust and power distance will 
be assessed, and the effect these have on reliability will be examined.  This provides another 
application of the tool of distributed teams.  Potentially, these stations will be compared to larger, 
busier train stations, with a crew of over 6 people, consequently the influence of team sizes can be 
investigated. 
Each of these scenarios provide validation for the tool, and the model of team reliability that it 
is founded on.  After each scenario testing the tool is adapted to account for the increase in 
knowledge of team interactions. Preceding validation of the tool has been positive, and has 
provided constructive development areas for the  tool. 
 
Conclusions 
This BAE-Systems funded research is a result of a discovery of a gap in the market for a 
quantitative team reliability assessment tool.  The tool is designed to be used by non-human 
factors experts, and to be transparent to the user.  This is accomplish  by founding the tool on other 
techniques that are already used by developers of systems.  There are a limited number of 
interaction factors and algorithms employed. The tool is in the process of being validated for 
several scenario uses whilst current validations have proved positive and  provided constructive 
areas of development , it should be understood that this tool has not completed its validation 
process. 
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7.6 Appendix 2A: Requirement Interview Information Sheet 
Information Sheet 
 
Isabel Smith, BSc, MSc 
Designing a Human Reliability Assessment for Groups 
 in the Military Domain 
 
Researcher 
My name is Isabel Smith.  I am a PhD student at Loughborough University, with 
sponsorship from BAE Systems.  My thesis is to design a tool that tests the reliability of 
group work in the military.   
 
Background of the thesis 
Previous work by Loughborough University investigated which Human Reliability 
Assessment (HRA) methods the different business units of BAE Systems used.  A range 
of current techniques are in use: 
• Human error assessment and reduction technique (HEART) 
• Systematic human error reduction and prediction approach (SHEPRA) 
• Hazard and operability study (HAZOPS) 
• Technique for human error assessment (THEA) 
• CHLOE 
These techniques measure the reliability of individuals.  It was discovered that there is a 
need to have an HRA tool to study the reliability of a team.  CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) 
was developed to test the reliability of a team, prototype called CREAM-T.  This was 
tested for sufficiency at Eurocontrol over the summer, 2004.  The test showed that there 
is plenty of scope for further development of a technique designed especially for teams.   
 
Purpose of the interview 
The aim of the current investigation is to increase the understanding of the current use 
of HRA in the different business units and future needs of HRA within the business 
unit.  To obtain this information an investigator will interview you or your thoughts.  
The interview should last about an hour.  The interview will be recorded.  The tapes and 
any comments made during or in relation to the interview will be confidential.   
 
The details of the investigation have been approved by the Loughborough University 
Ethical Advisory committee.  You have the right to withdraw from the interview at any 
time without giving any reason.   
 
If you have any questions pleas feel free to ask.  You can contact me by:  
Emailing: I.H.Smith2@lboro.ac.uk 
Phoning: 01509 223942 
Writing to: Department of Human Sciences, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, 
LE11 3TU. 
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Appendix 2B: Requirement Interview Consent Form 
Consent Form 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand 
that this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures 
have been approved by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory 
Committee. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for 
any reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for 
withdrawing. 
 
I understand that the information that I give will be treated as confidential. I 
understand that the information will be used in a way that will not allow me to be 
identified individually. I am aware that the data will be collected and stored in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and will be disposed of in a 
secure manner. The data may be used for this and/or other studies and may be 
used in interim reports and/or the thesis. 
 
I have read and understood this consent form. 
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
 
              Your signature 
 
 
 
Signature of investigator 
 
 
 
                               Date 
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7.7 Appendix 3A: Stakeholder Review Information Sheet 
Information Sheet 
 
Isabel Smith, BSc, MSc 
Designing a Human Reliability Assessment for Groups 
 in the Military Domain 
 
Researcher 
My name is Isabel Smith.  I am a PhD student at Loughborough University, with 
sponsorship from BAE Systems.  My thesis is to design a tool that tests the 
reliability of group work in the military.   
 
The aim of the current investigation is to review the matrix and statements that 
are used in the tool ROCCI. This will be done by a series of exercises and 
discussion.  Your experience and opinion is very important to this investigation, 
and there are not right or wrong answers.  The interview will be recorded, to 
ensure that the interviewer has a record of the interviews.   
 
The details of the investigation have been approved by the Loughborough 
University Ethical Advisory committee.  You have the right to withdraw from the 
interview at any time without giving any reason.   
 
If you have any questions pleas feel free to ask.  You can contact me by:  
Emailing: I.H.Smith2@lboro.ac.uk   
Phoning: 01509 223942 
Writing to: Department of Human Sciences, Loughborough University, 
Leicestershire, LE11 3TU. 
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7.8 Appendix 3B: Stakeholder Review Consent Form  
CONSENT FORM 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand 
that this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures 
have been approved by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory 
Committee. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for 
any reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for 
withdrawing. 
 
I understand that the information that I give will be treated as confidential. I 
understand that the information will be used in a way that will not allow me to be 
identified individually. I am aware that the data will be collected and stored in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and will be disposed of in a 
secure manner. The data may be used for this and/or other studies and may be 
used in interim reports and/or the thesis. 
 
I have read and understood this consent form. 
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
 
              Your signature 
 
 
 
Signature of investigator 
 
 
 
                               Date 
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Appendix 4A: Team Attributes of ROCCI 
TEAM ATTRIBUTES OF ROCCI 
 
The three main factors that can effect the reliability of a team are trust, communication 
and decision making power distance (PD).  These are defined below: 
 
Trust:  there are several aspects of trust: 
• Trust that team members perform actions as expected, successfully and on time. 
• Trust that team members check, give and received advice/criticism on tasks they 
are performing and their ability to act on this information. 
A person that is not skilled will either be given tasks that are easy, and so the 
level of trust that they will complete the task will be high; or they will be expected to 
perform a task that they are not sufficiently trained in, and so they will not be trusted to 
complete the task to the highest standard.   
The ability to check each others work, and provide feedback on this is important, 
in the case that errors are made team members can be informed of their mistakes and 
correct them, or justify the work that they have done.   
 
Communication:  the effectiveness and efficiency of the communication and passing of 
information between team members.  The method of communication or passing of 
information should be appropriate for the interaction.   
In some cases hand gestures that are taught is all that is needed to communicate, 
so for effective communication the team members must be able to see each other at all 
times, and be trained sufficiently in the meaning of the hand gestures.   
Another case would be the use of radio communication.  If the radio is used to 
portray detailed information, vocabulary, environmental conditions at both ends of the 
radio need to be considered so that information is understood.  Is there a specific 
technical language in which the radio operators should speak, if so are they trained 
sufficiently.  Are there many users of the radio communication trying to speak at the 
same time resulting in disconnected communications and loss of information?   
 
 
 
Appendix 4A 
A25 
 
Decision making power distance (PD): a weighting factor of the importance of the 
team members actions and decisions on other team members.   
In any team there is a decision hierarchy and ultimately somebody will take 
responsibility for the decision made. This person is at the top of the hierarchy.  Those 
that do not have this responsibility are lower in the hierarchy.  The difference in PD 
level is the key interest.  
To calculate decision hierarchy the sum PD score for each pair of team members 
that interact will equal 6.  If they are at an equal level in the hierarchy, each PD score 
will be 3.  A large PD will exist if there is little or no discussion of instructions and 
decisions, the PD scores will be 1 and 5.  A small PD exists if decisions and instructions 
are made, but these can be discussed by the other team member, the PD scores will be 2 
and 4.  If people have equal power over decisions in the group, then they are level on 
the hierarchy.  If there are two people they take responsibility for all decisions and the 
success of the team, they these two people are at an equal level.   
PD is not the number of levels between one person in a team and another.   
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Appendix 4B: Exercise One 
EXERCISE 1 - INSERT VALUES INTO MATRIX ON OWN 
EXPERIENCE 
 
The purpose of this exercise is for you to assess the current multiplication factors in the 
matrix, and to assign the factors that you feel are appropriate. There are no right or 
wrong answers. 
 
The matrix on the left is the Communication – Trust matrix that is currently being used. 
 
Please fill in THIS matrix 
 
 Communication 1 2 3 4 
Tr
us
t 
1 2   1.7 
2     
3     
4 1.7   0.5 
 
 
 Communication 1 2 3 4 
Tr
us
t 
1     
2     
3     
4     
Exercise 1 – Part A 
 
Based on your experience, please assess the appropriateness of the extreme corner 
multiplication factors, whilst considering the definitions of communication and trust, 
and the statements that are used to assign the 1-4 scores. 
Based on you experience and judgement, please write the values you would use for the 
extreme corner multiplication factors in the matrix on the right.  
Please write an explanation for your values, e.g. are there any examples that you are 
basing the values on. 
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Exercise 1 – Part B 
 
Now you have set the extreme corner values, based on your experience and judgement, 
please fill in the values you would use for the edge multiplication factors in the matrix 
on the right.  
Please write an explanation for these values, e.g. are there any examples that you are 
basing the values on. 
 
 
 
Exercise 1 – Part C 
 
Now you have set all the outside values, based on you experience and judgement, please 
fill in the values you would use for the central multiplication factors in the matrix on the 
right.  
Please write an explanation for these values, e.g. are there any examples that you are 
basing the values on. 
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Appendix 4C: Exercise Two 
EXERCISE 2 – SCENARIO EXAMPLES 
 
Please read each of the following scenarios through.  There are 3 or 4 members in each 
team, (diagrams of the interaction are shown below).  The scenarios should provide 
enough information for you to assign Trust (1-4); Communication (1-4) and PD (1-5) 
score for each interaction.   
 
The Trust and Communication scores can then be used to find the multiplication factor 
to the probability of error from the matrix created by you.  Please use the scenarios to 
ascertain whether the Communication and Trust scores correspond to the matrix values.  
 
Scenario 1 – Sailing Crew 
 
 
Scenario 2 – Air Traffic Control 
 
 
Scenario 3 – London Underground Station 
 
Comments: 
SA2 
SA1 
SAMF 
SS 
Comments: PC EC 
PF PNF 
Comments: Captain 
Engineer First Mate 
Appendix 4D 
A29 
Appendix 4D: Exercise Two, Scenario One 
SCENARIO 1- SAILING CREW 
The Boat:  A large, 90ft, ocean going sailing yacht.  The sails are too large to be moved 
manually so hydraulics aide the crew when they are furling or unfurling the sails.  The 
sails are very large, and so they can have a lot of power, if a manoeuvre is performed 
incorrectly the rigging could fall down, causing upwards of £1million worth of damage, 
and also possible capsizing the boat, creating danger to the lives of those on board.  
 
The three crew members: 
Captain – is ultimately in charge of the survivability of the yacht.  He decides the route 
of the boat, which sails are used and how much of the sail is unfurled.  The captain 
gives instructions to the other members of the team, in order to maintain a smooth 
sailing trip.  
First mate:  assists the captain in ensuring the sails are in the correct position, and 
unfurled the correct amount.  The first mate also contributes when deciding the route 
that the boat takes. 
Engineer / crew:  assists the captain and first mate in ensuring the sails are in the 
correct position, and unfurled the correct amount.  The first mate also provides 
information to the captain on the state of the engineering, and all moving parts onboard 
the boat.   
 
Team Attributes: 
Communication: when performing a manoeuvre team members are located on different 
parts of the deck and it is often too noisy to use verbal communication, hand gestures 
are used instead, these are learnt through experience.   
If a manoeuvre is not being performed communication is face – to face, with the use of 
charts / sailing rigging for reference.  
Trust:  the captain of the yacht is new; he is experienced at sailing many types of yacht 
in many environments and sea conditions, but has only been on this yacht a short 
period.  The first mate and engineer have been on the boat for a year, under another 
captain.  They are very capable at performing all tasks and manoeuvres under the old 
captain, and can predict each other’s actions, so they can help each other quickly.  They 
sometimes feel that the new captain will not always suggest the most effective solution 
to problems.  
Power Distance:  The captain informs the first mate and engineer what tasks they 
should perform on a manoeuvre.  Before a manoeuvre is performed, the captain will 
ensure that team members know which tasks they are to perform.   
When a manoeuvre is not being performed the captain will discuss specific aspects of 
the boat openly with the appropriate crew member.  
 
Scenario 
The crew are performing a Jibe, which requires all the members of the team to perform 
actions at the same time.  It is raining, and with a strong wind, so team members cannot 
hear each other easily, but it is during the day time so hand signals can be used.  To 
perform the manoeuvre the boat must change direction; the captain is at the helm, at the 
centre of the boat.  The engineer and first mate are moving the main sail/boom, from 
one side of the boat to the other.  They must work together to ensure the boom does not 
move abruptly or early, causing damage to the boat.  
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Appendix 4E: Exercise Two, Scenario Two 
SCENARIO 2- AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
The environment:  A commercial aircraft on a long distance flight, with English 
speaking PF and PNF.  Flying at high altitude through a sector, not preparing to land.  
The ATCs have control of a large very busy sector. If two aircraft become too close 
together they could collide meaning massive loss of life – a disaster.  
 
The four crew members: 
Pilot Flying (PF):  flies the plan, receiving instruction from the PNF.  The PF listens to 
all PNF communications with the EC, checking that all information is understood and 
inputted into the onboard computer correctly.  
Pilot Non-Flying (PNF):  receives communication and instruction from the EC on the 
correct heading and flight level of the aircraft.  Inputs this information into the onboard 
computer.  The PNF also passes on this information to the PF.  The PNF performs other 
tasks in the cockpit not directly related to the heading and flight level of the aircraft.  
Executive Air Traffic Controller (EC):  watches aeroplane traffic on a screen in, 
reads information on the flight level, speed and destination of the aircrafts and 
determines the best route that each aircraft should take through the sector.  The EC 
informs the PNF of each aircraft which heading and flight level they should be 
travelling. EC also gets information about future aircraft to enter the sector from the PC 
Planning Air traffic Controller (PC):  looks at the future aircraft that are entering the 
sector and foresees any problems that may occur.  The PC then informs the EC of any 
situations that may arise.  The PC will also listen to all the EC communications 
checking that they are all correct and understood.  
 
Team Attributes: 
Communication: the official language of ATC is English, with very precise language 
and terminology used.  The communication is through a one-way radio that all crew on 
that frequency can hear, but only one person can use at a time.  Very occasionally words 
can be misheard.  Both the pilots and the ATC are trained in the correct terminology to 
use. 
The communications within the cockpit is private, and face – to – face. 
Trust:  The ATC have worked together on the same sector for a long period of time, so 
they know the aircraft and the routes they will take well, and they also know how each 
other works.  The PF has had many years experience, the PNF is recently trained.  
Power Distance:  The PF must follow the instructions of the EC, there is very rarely 
discussion of instructions but the PNF may ask the EC for a shorter route or higher 
flight level to decrease flying time and fuel consumption.  The PNF provides 
information to the PF, but the PF has final say over decisions in the cockpit, it is 
encouraged that the PNF should question any decision or action that they seem is 
unsuitable.  
 
Scenario 
The PF has requested a change in heading from the planned route to reduce time and 
fuel consumption.  The EC is aware that the airspace is very busy but gives permission 
for change in heading.  However, another aircraft has changed flight level unexpectedly, 
and potentially a collision between the two aircraft could occur.  The EC informs the PF 
to return to original heading, resulting in an increase in flight time. 
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Appendix 4F: Exercise Two, Scenario Three 
SCENARIO 3 – LONDON UNDERGROUND 
The environment:  A central London Underground station, which consists of a ticket 
office, ticket hall, and platforms, each contains a team of people working together.  
Staff can move between teams depending upon where there are needed at the time.  This 
is a busy central London location, where peak flow times are 7.30am – 9.00am and 
4.30pm – 6.30pm. 
 
The four platform team members:  
Station Supervisor (SS): oversees the day-to-day accountability of the staff 
performance and events on the station, station safety and security inspections, 
deployment of staff and administration of takings, resources, records and the 
management of line and network wider information. 
 
Station Assistant Multi-Functional (SAMF): duties include the selling of tickets, 
servicing the Passenger Operated Machines, account for all revenue taken and under 
degraded station operations the SAMF may also carry out gate line and platform duties 
as required. 
 
Station Assistant 1 (SA1): perform gate line and platform duties, passing information 
to and taking reports from passengers, they communicate with the SS in order to 
reconfigure the station in the event of a station incident, or service is restricted. 
 
Station Assistant 2 (SA2): Same as SA1. 
 
Team Attributes: 
Communication: the are many methods of communication that are used including 
radios, watching CCTV, fact – to face and transferring information to handheld personal 
computers (PDAs).  There is no official technical language that is used, or taught.   
 
Trust:  The two SAs have differing approaches to controlling the passengers and train 
on the platform, and often come into conflict.  The SAMF and SS understand this 
conflicting relationship, and knows each SAs strengths and weaknesses, although they 
do find the relationship frustrating and work is often compromised. 
 
Power Distance:  The SS has responsibility for all decisions that are made, and all other 
members of staff must follow the SS’s instructions.  The SAMF’s and SAs’s work 
separately in the station, and have equal power is decisions and actions that are made.  
 
Scenario 
It is rush hour, and all the staff are busy.  An elderly lady has fallen from a train to the 
platform, causing the train to remain in the station, and causing confusion to the 
passengers on the platform.  The SAMF is required to aid the SA1 and SA2 on the 
platform.  First aid needs to be administered to the lady, and when possible she needs to 
be moved away from the door to the train.  The passengers and other train stations need 
to be informed of the delay and the consequences of this delay on train times.  
Organisation of the different roles will be performed by the SS. 
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Appendix 4G: Feedback Form 
FEEDBACK FORM 
Name: _______________________________________________________________ 
Job title: _____________________________________________________________ 
Brief description of job: ________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Experience with human reliability assessments: ____________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Throughout this session you have been asked to suggest values in a Communication – 
Trust Score matrix. Generally, what is your confidence in the values that you have 
provided. 
 
0%      10%      20%     30%     40%     50%      60%      70%     80%     90%     100% 
 
Are there any values, or aspects of the matrix that you a particularly confident in, e.g. 
from occupational experience.  Please state which values, and why. 
 
Do you have any other suggestions for the matrix, statements or the ROCCI tool. 
 
 
 
 
 
